

A
SUMMARY
OF
NATURAL RELIGION.

Containing a PROOF of the
Being and Attributes of GOD:

And a particular Deduction of the
LAWS of NATURE:
WITH AN
ENQUIRY
INTO THE
Ground of their Obligation:

In which the
Relations of Things are distinctly considered,
both as an *Objective Rule* to the *Divine*
Mind, and as the *Foundation of Morality*.

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M DCC XXXVI.

TO
THE
HONORABLE
MEMBERS OF THE
HOUSE OF COMMONS

IN PARLIAMENT ASSEMBLED
THE
MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS
DO HEREBY RESOLVE



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THE
PREFACE.

THE Subject of the following Papers, as it is confessedly of the greatest importance to Mankind, so it has often exercis'd the Pens of Persons of the first Distinction in the world of Letters, both in our own Country and abroad. Pufendorf, Thomafius, Buddeus, Wilkins, Wollaston, &c. are well known amongst the Learned; and since them a very ingenious *Writer (whom the Reader

* Mr. Law, Fellow of Christs College in Cambridge, in his Notes on an English Version of Archbishop King's Treatise *De Origine Mali*.

The P R E F A C E.

will find I have been much indebted to in the course of these Papers) has thrown a great deal of Light on several very important and nice Points which fall within the compass of our Enquiry: It were to be wish'd that He had given us a set Treatise on the Subject, rather than interspersed his Notions here and there occasionally, or thrown them into a Corner where scarce any body will think of looking for them. Had he done so, my Labours might well have been spared, as the World would have been furnish'd with a much better Treatise on the Subject before us, than I can pretend to give them. But, as he has not obliged the Publick so far, I have here ventur'd abroad the Product of a few leisure Hours in a Country-Retirement, at a distance from Books, and the Conversation of Men of Learning. I pretend not to excell or equal those great Names I mention'd above; but, as their Writings are principally or solely in the Hands of the Learned, I hope this short Treatise will not be without its Use, at least to Persons of lower Capacities and Acquirements. I write not to the Learned, from whom I am glad to learn: but I have a regard to the Improvement and Benefit of those of lower Rank; whom I have often found at a loss even as to the first Principles of Religion and Morality. For the Service of these I have drawn out the principal Lines of Duty, and shewn how they are to be deduced from the most easy and obvious Principles, such as must be
clear

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clear and evident to every one, who has but Knowledge enough to be a Moral Agent. I begin with a Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God, a due Apprehension of which is the only just Foundation upon which a System of Morality can be built: For he that cometh to God must believe that He Is, and that He is a Rewarder of all them that diligently seek Him. The independent Scheme of Morality, which resolves all Law and Obligation into certain abstract Relations of things antecedent to, and independent of, a Supreme Law-giver, is too refin'd for my Taste, as I am one of those dull Mortals who can have no Idea of a Law without a Law-giver, who can see no Obligation where there is no Sanction, and who can think of no other Sanction than what is founded in the Sensible Nature of Man, the Desire of Happiness, and Aversion to Misery. The Intellectual Cords of Virtue, which have lately been spun out of some Mens Brains, are much too fine to lay any hold of my slow Apprehension, when Rewards and Punishments are out of the Question: And therefore I have been content to go on in the old-fashion'd way of deducing Moral Obligation from the final Cause of Human Actions, from the Summum Bonum so much talk'd of by the Antients, which can be no other than Private Personal Happiness, chiefly that which is expected in another Life. And in like manner, with regard to the Being and Attributes of
God,

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God, I am content with the Old Method of proceeding a posteriori, or from Effect to Cause, as I find I can lay no other hold of those famous Mediums (Space and Absolute Necessity) which have been invented of late to build up a Demonstration a priori, than merely as Entia Rationis, or abstract Ideas, without any objective Reality. And therefore, if the Reader expects to be entertain'd with such curious Speculations, I shall be so fair as to desire him to stop here, and save himself the trouble of looking farther.



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A SUM-



SUMMARY
OF
NATURAL RELIGION.

SECT. I.
Of a DEITY.

PROP. I. **T**HERE is some Cause
distinct from, and superior
to, the Material World.
We find a System of Be-
ings now existing; which
must either have produced itself; or, 2dly, arose
from Nothing; or, 3dly, was Eternal; or, lastly,
depended upon some other Being for Existence.

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1. Supposing it to have produced itself, it must have acted before it Was, and consequently have been both Cause and Effect; i. e. Have, and Not have been at the same time.

2. If it arose from Nothing, Something would have been effected by Nothing, or there would have been an Effect without a Cause.

3. It cannot have been *ab eterno*; for neither the Manner in which it exists, nor the Matter out of which it was fram'd, have been so: The former is contrary to Fact; every Part in this System being not only Liable to, but actually Undergoing numberless Changes in its Size, Form, and Motion, by the Impulse of the other Parts: And that the Matter, out of which it was fitted up, could not have been eternal, appears thus;

(1.) There is no Matter however existing, but what may be conceiv'd Not to be; and consequently the Idea of Matter includes only a possibility of Existing; and consequently could not always have actual Existence; the Question then is, Whence had it Existence? Not from itself, on account of the above-mention'd Absurdity. Besides, if Matter be Self-existent, its Existence is Necessary, and so no longer barely possible; the necessary Existence of any Being destroying all Ideas of the possibility of its Non-existence. It must therefore owe its Existence to some other Being.

(2.) If Matter has been from Eternity, it must exist without Cause, and consequently Existence must belong to its Nature, and it cannot be indifferent to such a Being to exist, or not exist; and, if so, it must be independent on any Thing, Being, or Principle, both for its Existence, and the Manner of it: Since whatever exists, exists in some manner; Existence taken separately from
any

any particular Mode, being a mere Fiction of the Mind. But if Matter were absolutely independent for the manner of its Existence, that manner would be incapable of being affected by any thing else, which contradicts Experience.

Since therefore the present System could neither produce itself, nor arise from nothing; nor has existed from Eternity; it follows that its Existence is owing to some other Being.

COROL. 1. The first Cause having no prior Cause (otherwise it could not be the first) and it being impossible for what once was Not, to Begin to be of itself, it follows, that the First Cause is Eternal.

COROL. 2. As this Being depends upon no other either for Existence, or the Manner of it, He must be Absolutely Independent.

COROL. 3. And if he be absolutely independent on any other thing, both for Existence and the Manner of it, he is Absolutely Independent on any other for such Powers, and Qualities, as are necessarily connected with that Existence and its Mode.

PROP. II. *The First Cause cannot cease To be, or He is Everlasting.* Nothing can either cease to exist, or exist in a different manner from what it now does, without undergoing a Change. Every Change is an Effect, and as such requires a Cause. But, as this Being exists without Cause, he cannot possibly have any Cause of Change, and therefore must be the Same he is to all Eternity.

Nor, Secondly, can such a Being destroy himself. For, whatever Power he may be possessed

ed of, he cannot have such an one over himself; because that would be a Power to effect that there be no such Power; i. e. the Power must continue, whilst the Subject is suppos'd to be taken away, and the Power itself destroy'd.

If then a Being, who exists without Cause, is incapable of having any Alterations made in the manner of his Existence, the Consequence is, that, as it was impossible for him ever to begin to be, so for the same Reason it will be impossible for him Ever to cease.

PROP. III. *The First Cause is Intelligent.* The Beauty, Order, and Consistency of the Parts of this System, proclaim a supreme Mind, and governing Intelligence: The Tendency of the several parts of Nature to one End; the uniform Method by which the several ranks of Beings attract, repel, act, propagate their Species, &c. and the situation of the several Bodies in the Universe agreeably to their several Natures, plainly evince that there is a Supreme Intellect, who thus rang'd, modell'd, and presides over the Whole.

Secondly, Intelligence is a Perfection, and to be found in this System: Consequently the Author of it is Intelligent; otherwise the Effect would have a Perfection which the Cause wants, i. e. there would be an Effect without a Cause.

PROP. IV. *The First Cause is possess'd of active Power.* Since Nothing cannot effect Any thing, whatever is effected, is effected by a certain degree of Power; which degree of Power must for the same Reason be adequate to the Effect. And consequently the Power of the Creator must at least be adequate to the Works of his Creation.

PROP. V. *The First Cause is Free.* Independency, added to Active Power, includes a perfect Freedom of Will and Liberty of Action; for what is independent can have no Restraint laid upon it by any thing *ab extra*, and what can have no Restraint laid upon it, must determine and act freely.

Nor can such a Being have any internal necessitating Cause to Action; for if he acts not by Choice, but Necessity, all his Effects and Communications must be Necessary; and if necessary, then whatever is or has been, could not possibly but have been; and whatever is not, nor has been, could possibly have been brought into Existence; nor could the mode of Existence of any thing be different from what it is. But this, we see, is not the Case of Things around us. They seem to be indifferent as to Being or Not-being, or to any Particular manner of Being. They can, without any contradiction to our Ideas, be suppos'd not to exist, or to exist in a different manner from what they do at present; which could not be, were they the Necessary Effects of a Necessary Cause.

They, who from a Survey of the Divine Attributes conclude for the Eternity of the World, by bringing the Deity under a sort of Necessity or Obligation to create, argue thus; *If the Goodness of God, say they, was the Cause of the Production of the World, since he was always good, the Effects and Communications of his Goodness must have been ab æterno, i. e. Creation is eternal.*

It might suffice to answer, that Goodness, denoting a voluntary communication of Happiness, is a Moral Power, or Quality; and seeing moral Qualities, tho' they may solicit, cannot oblige (I

mean in a Physical Sense) the Being to whom they belong, it follows, that notwithstanding God's Goodness he is perfectly Free whether he will create any thing at all, or in This manner rather than That. But if this Answer should seem unsatisfactory, please to take the following one.

Every Effect has a Beginning, for the same Reason that it requires a Cause ; for what is without a Beginning, never was not ; and what never was not, never needed or could admit of any Cause. Consequently, it being of the Nature of an Effect to have a Beginning, Creation, as being such, must have one, and therefore cannot be eternal. Hence, as Creation cannot be *ab eterno*, it must be equally indifferent in whatever Period of Time the World was created, since Time however amplify'd can bear no proportion to Eternity. Whence the Unreasonableness of asking, Why was not the World created sooner ? For, supposing it created Millions of Ages sooner, the same Question with equal propriety might still be ask'd : And that which will hold equally against all time, cannot be of force against any one.

We may also from hence furnish ourselves with an Answer to another sort of Querists, who demand, If God existed from Eternity, could he not have created from Eternity ? Otherwise would he not have been an impotent Being a whole Eternity ?

Ans. Seeing every Action or Effect requires a Cause, and therefore has a Beginning, and consequently cannot be eternal, it follows, that God's not being able to create from Eternity arises not from any defect of Power in him, but from the Incapacity, or Absolute Impossibility of the thing itself ; the very nature of an Effect not allowing it to be eternal. Besides, to suppose a Cause not prior

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prior both in order of Time and Conception to its Effect, is to suppose that To be, which is Not, and that Not to be, which Is, *i. e.* the Cause to be Necessary while there is nothing to be Caused, and the Effect to want a Cause, when it is already supposed to be.

I know that it is urged by some, that as Light existed the same moment with the Sun, where is the impossibility of an Effect being coeval with its Cause? *Ans.* Light is no more the Effect of the Sun, or produced by it, than Extension and Solidity are the Effects of Matter: Each are contained in the Idea and Definition of its proper Subject, and are rather Properties and Affections of Substances, than any Effects of them; Light being equally essential to the Sun as a lucid Body, as Solidity and Extension are to Matter, consider'd as consisting of solid and extended Parts.

PROP. VI. *The First Cause is Immutable.* All Changes are made in Time; therefore have a Beginning; and therefore are owing to some prior Causes: But, as this Being is eternal, Nothing can be prior to his Existence, nor any Cause of it, seeing he exists without Cause. Consequently he can have no Cause of Change, and consequently both his Nature and Attributes are unchangeable.

PROP. VII. *This Being must exist in the highest degree of Perfection.* To suppose him confined to a degree lower than he is capable of, is to suppose Limits without a Limiter, *i. e.* an Effect without a Cause: To suppose him not capable of the highest degree, is to suppose that We can conceive a Perfection greater than the Highest of all Beings is really possess'd of, *i. e.* that the Stream can rise

above the Fountain-Head, or the Effect rise in Intellect above its Cause.

COROL. Hence the Powers, Qualities and Attributes of the First Cause absolutely exclude all manner of Limitation both from Within and Without; and consequently are as absolutely positive and independent as his Existence; and consequently all the divine Attributes, as belonging to such a Subject, are in him *infinito modo*.

PROP. VIII. *This Being is Omniscient, or intimately acquainted with the Natures and Powers of those Beings, which derive their Existence from him.* Seeing the Natures and Powers of every Order of Beings, and the Relations arising from and subsisting betwixt them, flow from the Manner of their Existence; and seeing that Manner depends on the Will of the First Cause, therefore on his Will also depend these Natures, Powers, and Relations; and, if so, he must be conscious of them, and throughly acquainted with them.

When an Artist has contrived a Piece of Mechanism, and adjusted the Weights in due Proportion to the Strength and Structure of the Wheels, he knows the Justness of such a Machine, and consequently is qualify'd to calculate the Ends that will be attain'd by it, and the Uses it will serve; how much more must the great Framer of universal Nature, who brought every Creature into Being, and gave it suitable Powers, and a convenient Situation in the World, know what will be the result of such Powers in such a Situation? As much as Infinite surpasses Finite.

PROP. IX. *The First Cause is Omnipresent; or he has so perfect a Knowledge of, and Power over every*

every thing in Nature, as to be able at all times to direct and govern the manner of its Existence. This Proposition follows from the last, and Corollary the first : For, as he is Omniscient, he has a perfect Knowledge of, and, as he is Omnipotent, he has an Absolute Power over, every thing that exists ; consequently he is so present with every thing that exists, as to be able to superintend and govern it by such Rules and Laws as he has establish'd in the Creation, which is all the Presentiality that we are concern'd, or perhaps able, to prove.

PROP. X. *This Being is Infinitely Happy.* Various Degrees of Happiness we find communicated to various Orders of Beings : Consequently Happiness is in this System ; and, if so, the Cause of it must be happy ; otherwise Happiness must have arose from Unhappiness, *i. e.* be communicated by a Being void of Happiness itself ; *i. e.* there would be an Effect without, or contrary to, its Cause. And, if the Cause be happy, it appears by Proposition VII. and Corollary 1. that he must be perfectly so ; because Happiness is a Perfection, and all Perfections as in him are in him *infinito modo*, or he exists in the highest degree of Perfection.

These seem to be all the natural Attributes of our Deity ; however all such as are discoverable by us, in the Use of our present Set of natural Powers. And previously to all Attempts to deduce his Moral ones, it will be to the purpose to enquire into the Ground and Reasons of Creation, and of the several Divine Acts consequent thereupon : because the Exercise of his Natural Attributes in pursuance of this End will be found to constitute his Moral ones.

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But, before we enter upon this, it falls properly within the compass of our Design to examine the Opinions of some late Writers upon this Head ; and to see what it is which determines the Deity to Action in general, or to Action in this or that particular manner ; whether it be the Relations, Proportions, &c. of things, as such ; or whether the Principle of Determination arises merely from his own Will. And this shall be the Business of the second Section.

SECT. II.

Concerning the Grand Principle of Action in the Deity.

GREAT Differences have arose betwixt those who have handled this Subject ; but the Generality assign the Relations of things as the Cause which Absolutely, and of Itself determines the Deity to act ; and affirm that they are both an objective Rule, and a Law to him ; or, as they phrase it, bind the Almighty himself. I think it may be of great Service in the determination of this Point, to premise the Three following Positions, which carry their own Evidence along with them.

1. A Being, perfectly happy, can neither be made more nor less so by any thing without ; and consequently cannot be determin'd to create, with a view that such Creation can affect his Happiness : And therefore it cannot be better for such a Being, with respect to himself, to act rather than not ; or,

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vice versa ; and, if he should ever create any thing at all, his Creatures would have no room to suspect that he would either make For or Against their Happiness, on account of his own.

2. Wisdom in any Being denotes its pursuing the Best End by the Best Means ; and consequently has always some Relation to Means or End. Goodness implies a Design of communicating Happiness to others.

3. Actions, with regard to us and other sensible rational Beings, obtain the Epithets of Good or Evil, Fit or Unfit, as the Agent design'd to procure us Pleasure, or bring upon us Pain : Consequently these Actions, which neither were intended to introduce Pleasure nor Pain into the Creation, are of an indifferent Nature ; and the Agent, whose they are, is to us the same as no Agent at all.

This being premis'd, let us come to the Point : And we shall see, that unless we previously suppose the independent Being mention'd above really to be kind, and of a benign Disposition, *i. e.* to take Pleasure in doing Good ; all the Reasons, Relations, &c. of things, so much talk'd of, cannot move him one jot, or draw him in the least to act either in conformity or non-conformity with them ; or to produce Happiness and Perfection, rather than Misery and Imperfection. Perfect Knowledge can indeed shew the way by which any degree of Happiness may be communicated, and Perfect Power can bring about any assignable End, *i. e.* whatever Perfect Knowledge can discover ; but yet something further is wanting, in order to *dispose* him to it. For a Being out of the reach of
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any thing, and such a one as *Epicurus* feign'd God to be, absolutely unconcern'd in the Happiness and Misery of others, *i. e.* devoid of all kind and malicious Affections, can never, in such a state of perfect Indifferency, be under the least Influence, or, as far as we can see, have any Motive to pursue the one or the other : And without a Motive whence should Action arise ? Motives being as necessary to our Idea of an Action, as a Cause is to the producing its Effect ; and therefore without a proper Motive, *i. e.* such as is above-mention'd, no Action can or will follow. Besides, if this Being pays no manner of regard in his Acts to our Happiness, however beneficial they may be to us, he has laid us under no manner of Obligation to him, nor have we any thing to thank him for ; Thanks being due to a Being for the good Offices he Designedly does us, and for his kind Intention and Willingness to promote our future Happiness. 'Tis not the good Office consider'd in itself, but the manner in which it was perform'd, *i. e.* the Will and Intention of the Benefactor which entitles him to our Love and Gratitude. But forasmuch as the Happiness of all other Beings has, by Supposition, no manner of Relation to his, if he has no Complacency in Benevolence, he can have no manner of Concern in their Well-being, and therefore can have no view to it in his acting either this way or that.

Again ; If this Being makes the Relations of things the Rule of his Actions, 'tis either for the sake of the Happiness of others, to which such a Conduct is subservient, or abstractedly from all consideration of its tendency to their Happiness or Misery : If he pursues them under the notion of Means of Happiness to others, it supposes him to be in fact really kind and benevolent ; if without
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any regard to this End, and merely for their own sakes, he is in all moral respects the same to us as no Being, and we stand indebted (if indebted we are) not to him, but to them, for the Benefit we have from them.

They who say, as some have of late, that there is an intrinsic Loveliness in Goodness, Faithfulness, and these which we call the moral Perfections of the Deity, and therefore in the Exercise and Observance of them by his Creatures, rest their Assertion on very slender Proofs; and, 'till they bring better, we have as much Right, from the common Sense and Practice of the World, to deny that there is any such, as they have to affirm them.

The Case appears to me in the following Light. As the Happiness of a Creature arises from an agreement betwixt Appetite and Object, and the Sum or Quantity of Pleasure enjoy'd is (*ceteris paribus*) always proportion'd to the Strength with which the Appetite enjoys its Object: In like manner the Beauty of things is founded on that Agreeableness which subsists betwixt them and the perceiving Mind, or Faculty: Consequently when no such Agreeableness subsists, *i. e.* when the Mind has no Taste for this or that thing, she perceives no Beauty or Excellency in it. A Person of a cruel, sensual and envious Disposition, takes the very same Pleasure in the Contemplation and Practice of the contrary Qualities, that the Blind Man does in Pictures, or the Deaf in Musick. There lies just the same impossibility against them affording him any Satisfaction, as there does against a carnal Appetite relishing spiritual Dainties, or a brute Beast abstract Reasoning. There can be no Worth nor Beauty in things therefore without a Power to perceive it; and

and it is their congruity with such Power or Faculty that constitutes their Beauty: And, if this be the Truth of the Case, the Consequence is, that if the First Cause has no disposition for Goodness, Faithfulness, &c. i. e. unless we previously suppose him good and faithful, he can discover no Amiability in them; nor consequently take any Delight in the Practice of them.

If this Amiability in things were absolute and unchangeable, as some pretend, I should be glad to know why all Beings do not perceive and approve of it in the same degree; for these are Terms which will not admit of more or less. Will these Gentlemen answer, it is owing to Mens not making a proper use of their Reason in taking a right Survey of things? I ask how they come to make so very different use of their Reason? Besides, Reason may indeed inform Men what Actions are best adapted to attain any given End: Or, Circumstances given, Reason will direct them what tenor of Conduct is fittest, and will make most for their Happiness; but when she considers things as having no Connection with their Happiness, she will never discover any Beauty in the contemplation of them, without a prior Determination of the Mind to approve and be delighted with them: there is still wanting a proper Habit or Sense, thro' a Congruity with which things appear beautiful and delightful. The Truth is, that as in the natural World no Objects can appear beautiful, without a Mind endued with a Power or Sense to contemplate them; so in the moral World Benevolence can never charm that Being whose Mind and Principle are bent another way: i. e. who is void of a benevolent Taste or Disposition.

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God might indeed have constituted us in such a Manner as to be necessarily delighted with the contemplation and observance of a certain Species of Actions. But yet in this Case, who would say, the Ground and Cause of this Delight was in the Actions themselves, and consequently absolute and independent? Would it not on the contrary be wholly relative to the perceiving Mind, *i. e.* dependent on the Constitution of Nature? Now if this be actually our Case, if we be so framed as to be necessarily pleas'd with, and to approve of these Qualities in Things, yet might not God have cast us into a different Mold, from whence would have arose a different Form; and so these very Things, which the Mind looks upon as naturally beautiful and amiable, would have appeared to her quite the Reverse? If it be the Effect of Habits (as most probably it is) and consequently of our own making; this supposes that we have already acted in a certain Manner, in order to our acquiring these Habits in a Degree suited to our present Condition: And at last, it must be allowed that it is owing to God's original Appointment, that we are formed with such a Dependency on one another, as to acquire these Habits, and make them in a certain Degree necessary to our Continuance and Comfort in Being. A sure Sign that this Beauty in Things and Actions is not absolute but relative, not unchangeable but contingent; depending on the very Faculty perceiving it, and subsisting no where else. And we can never know *a Priori* whether there be any Thing essential to the Divine Nature analagous to these kind benevolent Affections in Men, or not.

In a System of Beings made dependent on one another for Happiness, which must therefore arise from a friendly Intercourse of mutual good Offices,

ces, Goodness, Justice, Veracity, and all such Qualities, on the regular Observance of which depends the Happiness of these Beings, are necessarily made the Objects of their Approbation and Desires; as the contrary are of their Disapprobation and Aversion. But separate once the former, tho' in Idea, from their Tendency to this End, and they immediately lose all their Worth and Valuableness. 'Tis true, by living in this dependent State, where Men observe the necessary Connection of these Qualities with publick Happiness, and their own Safety, they acquire by Degrees such Habits of them, and such a Relish and Appetite for them, as makes them conclude that there is not only an inherent and essential Amiability in them, but that they must appear such to all other rational Beings, of however different Complexions, and under whatever different Circumstances. Whereas, in truth could we suppose a Set of Beings existing independently on one another, as to Happiness or Misery, and not under the least Influence from kind and social Affections, they would find no Worth nor Significance in them; for having no manner of Relation to their Happiness, they are Matters of mere Indifferency to them, absolutely unable to excite either Approbation or Aversion.

If according to an ingenious Writer, Moral Excellency, or the Force with which the Will is carry'd to the Pursuit of moral Good, be precisely in a compound Ratio of the Degree of Understanding, and the Activity of their Natures,* then in equal Portions of these, moral Excellencies will be the same; because, if Understanding and Acti-

* See *Wisdom the first Spring of Action in the Duty*, Page 53.

vity of Nature, as such, constitute moral Excellence, then in equal degrees the moral Excellence of Two Beings, or the Moments of Good produc'd by them, will be alike. But this is contrary to Fact. We see Men of low Understandings and in lower Circumstances, oftentimes evidence much stronger Attachments to Virtue, than those who have greater Knowledge to discern, and Ability to direct, their Acts in pursuit of her; and who by their situation in Life have more Claims made upon them, and are laid under greater Obligations to the advancement of a common Felicity. Since the understanding and active Powers of Angels rise higher than those of Men, whence could arise their Defection from what is good and holy? Upon this Hypothesis it would be impossible. Moral Excellence therefore, or the Force with which the Will is carried to the pursuit of what is good and productive of Happiness, depends not on the degree of Understanding and activity of Nature, but on the quantity of Benevolence, and the abilities of the Agent, as shall be shewn in its proper Place. And our Author seems to be sensible of this, when he says, "The Understanding of an Angel will be own'd to be much larger and more comprehensive than the Understanding of a Man, and the Determination of the Will to Virtue in a *good* Angel to be as much stronger and more unconquerable than in an *innocent* Man, as his Understanding is more capacious, and the Activity of his Nature greater." Why came these Terms *good* and *innocent* in? The Paragraph ought to have run without them to have serv'd our Author's Purpose. But, as the Words now stand, I take it to be a plain Concession, that it is not Understanding and Activity of Nature as such, but the Goodness of

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the Disposition, which influences the Will to the Pursuit of what is Good and Right.

Further ; What can be the Reason, when A, B, and C contemplate the Object X, that it affords Beauty to one in Two Degrees, to another in Three, to C in Four, and so on? or, Why are the same Persons pleas'd differently with Objects; and different Men delighted with different ones? If Beauty were any thing real, independent and absolute, it must strike all Imaginations alike: Why also are we differently delighted with the Character of a *Brutus*, a *Cato*, or *Regulus*? And why does it not leave the same Impression on all Minds? The Reason is, not because the Understandings of some Men are more capacious than those of others, but because they have acquired stronger Habits of Benevolence and publick Good, which must operate proportionably upon them: 'Tis in consequence of these, and not the bare Rationality of our Natures, that we approve moral Characters, and are so charm'd with Mens Pursuits of publick Happiness.

When we come to examine our Ideas of perfect Knowledge and Power, they seem to have no manner of Connection with the communication of Happiness or Misery. Nor does the Existence of these Attributes in any Subject infer in the least the Exertion of them in the production of any thing without. Knowledge and active Power in the Hands of an Evil Being serve but to gratify his malicious Taste, and to introduce a degree of Misery proportionate to the malignity of his Temper, or propension to Mischief. In a Good Being they would give rise to a world of Creatures, framed with proper Powers and Capacities for Happiness.

If

If an Eternal, Independent, Omniscient, All-powerful, Free and *Happy* Being, as we demonstrated the First Cause to be, should ever take upon him to produce a System of Beings ; a Reason *a priori* may then be assign'd why he would form them with a view to be Happy, and not Miserable ; and that he would make them, in some degree, like himself, rather than otherwise. For, being infinitely *Happy* in himself, he can have no Idea of Misery ; the Idea of Misery being accompany'd with a painful and uneasy Sensation ; and, if he has no Idea of Misery, he cannot possibly produce it, at least not knowingly and intentionally. If he fitted up a System of Beings for Misery, he should, methinks, previously know wherein this Misery consists, and from whence it arises ; otherwise he acts blindly, and at random. He may, 'tis true, frame a Set of Beings with Powers which will place them in a possibility of being miserable as well as happy ; but this argues no malevolent Design in him, any more than a Fire lighted in my Chamber, which I may put my Hands into, argues that it was made by my Servant for that purpose ; a Liableness to be miserable being connected necessarily with the very manner in which some Beings exist, and without which they cannot be such Creatures as they are. But tho' this be knowable *a priori*, and we were able to prove, that a Being of absolute Perfection could not produce Misery as such, yet it will never follow from thence, nor can we *a priori* gather, that he will proceed to Action at all, or create any thing without him.

To satisfy ourselves therefore in the Will of the Deity, we must consult the Universe, and view him in his Works, which carry the strongest Evidences of the benignity of the Author of them.

When we take a Survey of the various Orders of Beings, and the Provision made for the Preservation and Happiness of each Class, and every Individual in it, we gather, that the Deity could have no other End in producing these Beings at first, and afterwards in continuing to preserve and govern them, but that they might be happy in some sort with himself, and consequently that he was mov'd thereto by a Principle of infinite Goodness, and directed by infinite Wisdom.

I know it will be ask'd, if God be good, Whence comes Evil? Why Pain and Misery, Defects and Imperfections in the World? If these be not produc'd by our Creator? Nay, there have been some, who, unable to reconcile the present appearances of things with the direction and superintendency of a Wise and Good Being, have concluded for a Malevolent one, existing in the same independent manner with the other, and matching him both in Knowledge and Power.

But should we suppose Two eternal and independent Principles, the one good, and the other evil, yet being both of equal Power, and acting from different views, and upon opposite Principles, the one would undo what the other did, and so each be a Negation of the other.

But, say the *Manichees*, these two Principles, finding that they could not over-power each other, did at last agree betwixt themselves for each to have a share in the production of things: and so one communicated that Happiness, the other that Misery, which is visible in the Works of Creation. But to this the Answer is obvious. For how can two Beings, distinct from and opposite to each other in Nature and Principle, agree to any thing? How is it possible for them to unite in a prosecution of the same general End? Perfect Goodness
and

and Perfect Maliciousness are set at an infinite distance from each other ; and it seems as easy to break thro' the Constitution of things, to change Pleasure into Pain, and Pain into Pleasure, as to reconcile two such eternally jarring and opposite Principles. But, allowing such an Agreement, pray what would be the Effect ? Why the Good-natur'd Being would be for introducing as great a quantity of Happiness as he could into the Creation ; and the Evil Being would be making the like Efforts for the introducing a proportionable share of Misery ; but being both equal in Power, as well as Inclination, neither would suffer the other's Quota to exceed its own : and so neither of them would attain the End for which it was suppos'd to act ; because equal quantities of Happiness and Misery expunge each other.

Had the *Manichees* search'd into the true Cause and Origin of Evil, they had never run into the wild, extravagant Opinion of the Existence of Two independent Principles, since the present jarring and difference of things may be reconcil'd without them. For the very Notion of a Creature implies Dependency, and therefore Imperfection. And to ask, Whence come Evils ? is to ask Why come Creatures ? Or why is any thing made at all ? Happiness can never subsist in this World apart from some alloy of Misery, nor Perfection without a mixture of the contrary Quality. Some Evils there are (and these not an inconsiderable part of the present Number) which arise from general Laws acting all the while for the Good of the Whole. Which Laws, tho' in particular Cases they be introductory to some particular Evils, yet, when they are weighed in the Ballance against the good Effects flowing from the Establishment of these Laws, they are lost in the Comparison, and

dwindle, as 'it were, into Nothing. There is not one established Law in Nature but what, upon Calculation, will be found subservient to a Thousand wise and good Ends, for One bad one. And it is an undeniable Truth, that every Thing, which upon the whole brings more Good than compensates for the Evil it is attended with, is itself a real Good.

Touching Defects and Limitations in Beings, we may observe, that they are necessarily connected with all created Existences, and therefore not the positive Effects of any external Cause. 'Tis a known Truth, that the Powers and Attributes of Beings are more or less perfect, in proportion to the greater or less Dignity of their Natures. A Being, who has his Existence, and Manner of Existence, not from himself, but another, *i. e.* a finite and limited Subject, must of necessity have finite and limited Attributes.

And as to Imperfections, it may be proper to take notice, that Creation implies a prior Non-entity; which, being the Absence of all Perfection, must, by the Terms, be the greatest Imperfection: Consequently, so far as any Creature has positive Being conferr'd on it, *i. e.* is remov'd from Non-entity, so much of its primitive Nothingness, and consequently of its primitive Imperfection, is taken from it. But since this Remove can never be infinite, it is of the nature of a Creature to be finite, and imperfect.

But, for our Reader's Satisfaction in a Particular of such Moment, we choose to refer him to Arch-bishop King's incomparable *Essay on the Origin of Evil*, who has made out this great and principal Attribute of the Deity, to the conviction of all reasonable Men, and defended it beyond all possibility of Opposition. To return;

By

By Benevolence we do not mean, as some would have it, a blind, mechanical Instinct or Propension, but a moral Quality, or a certain Determination or Inclination of the Will to communicate Being and Happiness. And agreeably to a former Observation, Moral Qualities and Principles, tho' they solicit and court, yet they cannot absolutely determine the Will. And be it ever so true, that the Divine Will never does amiss, but is constantly carried to the pursuit of Order and Happiness, yet it is as certain, that he has a physical Power of acting otherwise, tho' we be sure that he will never use it. And it is the sole Prerogative of the Great God of Nature, that, tho' he may, he never will choose to act contrary to the general Good of his Creatures.

Nor are these moral Qualities, or Determinations of the Divine Will, corresponding to benevolent Affections in Men, founded on some prior Perception, pleasant or painful, without which they could not exist; for, though there can be no Inclination in Men but which is founded on some prior Perception or Sensation, yet the Case is otherwise with God: His Goodness requires no antecedent Sensation or Perception as its efficient Cause; but it is as essential to him, as his Existence is; and to demand a Reason why he is so, or to assign any as the Cause of it, is just the same piece of Absurdity as to demand a Reason of his Existence, or Why he is, in any respect, what he is.

Neither in this view of the Case would it be matter of mere indifferency to the Deity, whether in the Beginning of things, and their arrangement into various Orders, he intended the Misery rather than Happiness of his Creatures; for, tho'

having no truly innate Idea, or implanted Notion of the Being of a First Cause, we can only arrive at the knowledge of his Existence *a posteriori*, yet it will never follow from thence, that he has not existed from Eternity : In like manner, tho' we have no Arguments *a priori* to justify us in this Conclusion, *that God is good*, but only can prove him so by Effects, yet this Consequence does not hold, that he has not been so eternally ; for then his Will at one time would be contrary to his Will at another, and consequently there would be a Change in him, *i. e.* an Effect without a Cause.

Having shew'd that neither the Relations of things consider'd abstractly, nor any external Principle (call it what you please) could possibly determine the Deity to Action at first, but that his own Will, mov'd by infinite Goodness, was the Cause and Reason of his creating the Universe in the manner he has, and of his imparting that Excellence and these various degrees of Happiness to his Creatures which we find among them, the next Question will be, Could not he have produced the same number of Beings, and communicated the same quantity of Happiness different ways ? Or, was he ty'd down to the present method of acting ? If indeed one System be preferable to another, upon account of its superior tendency to Happiness on the whole, his Omniscience enables him to discover it, and his Goodness will induce him to make choice of it. But that there is no Absolute Best in Nature is, I think, evident from hence.

1. That Whatever may be conceiv'd to be is possible ; for of an Impossibility we can have no Idea : but, seeing the distance betwixt the most perfect Creature and the all-perfect Creator will always continue infinite, it follows, that no System

of

of Creatures can be made so happy, but a more happy one may yet be conceived, and therefore made.

2. That as the Happiness of the present System of Beings arises from a congruity of Objects with Appetites, so the same Almighty Power, which gave rise to this, might also have given rise to infinite other Systems, differing from each other in degree of Perfection ; nothing being further required, but as in each System the respective natures of its Beings are more perfect than those in another, so proper Means be used, that the Appetites of these Beings be accommodated to their Natures, and a correspondent Set of Objects produced for their Gratification ; both which fall within the Province of Infinite Power.

Lastly, To suppose God to have made an Absolute Best, is to suppose that he can make no Better, *i. e.* that his Power is exhausted, or that Infinite Power is at the same time Finite, and actually restrained.

And if numberless Systems, perpetually encreasing in degree of Perfection, be possible, it is demonstrable, that if bare Will doth not, Nothing can determine the Deity's Choice in producing this or that System, and after this or that particular manner ; because, if he refuses to communicate any determinate degree of Happiness, upon the account of another lying above it in the Scale of Perfection, he must for the same Reason refuse That, and after that Another, and so on *in infinitum* : And therefore, if he cannot be determined but by the Best, and the Nature of created Beings will not admit of a Best, it follows, that he cannot be determined at all. And therefore, supposing we were sure *a priori* that the Deity could never act in contra-distinction to the Happiness of his
Creatures,

Creatures, yet if he ever acts, his own Will and Nothing else must determine what System he will produce, and what particular Quantity of Happiness and Perfection he shall communicate; otherwise no Creation at all can ensue.

We hence learn in what Sense the Relations of Things may be term'd dependent on the Will of God; and in what Sense eternal and immutable. That they flow from the present Order and Establishment of Things is with us a Truth unquestionable; and that, this Establishment depends primarily on the Will of God, who had it in his Choice whether he would produce this or another System, is, I think, a Truth as unquestionable as the former: Consequently, if it was thus originally matter of indifference to the Deity, whether out of an infinite Number of Systems, all equally effective of the same End, he should make this or the other the Object of his Choice, these Relations, as connected with the present Constitution of Things, pre-establish'd by the Will of God, cannot strictly and properly be stil'd Absolute, but Relative; not Eternal and Unchangeable, but Temporary and Contingent: In a secondary and less proper Sense they may be stil'd Immutable and Independent, since whenever such a System is suppos'd once to be, and things to exist in the manner they do at present, the same Relations will subsist betwixt the Parts thereof: And this is no more than saying, That whilst a thing is, it is; or that the same Causes, in like Circumstances, will produce the same Effects. Such a consequential Necessity as this no one ever deny'd, or doubted of, as flowing from the present establishment of Things; but as for any other Necessity, or Independency of them on the Will of God, stile it Absolute,

lute, Antecedent, or what you will, it is falsely ascribed to them.

We may learn also from hence the Foolishness of that Question, If Virtue and Vice depend on the Will of God, may he not cause them to shift sides, and so make Virtue Vice, and Vice Virtue? For to ask such a Question is the same as to ask, May not different Effects flow from the same Cause? or, May not the same thing both Be, and Not be, at the same time? So long as things continue to be what they are, the same Consequences are necessary and unavoidable; they must and will flow from them: And, consequently, should we suppose the present System to continue to Eternity, Virtue and Vice would continue to be what they are, unalterable to all Eternity. If the Objector should go further, and ask, May not God change his primary Volition, and give us another System, in the room of the present? We answer, That as he is infinitely benevolent, he will never change this System but for a better: but, as we have shewn there is no Best, the same Reason for his changing this for another, will hold for his changing that also for some other, and so on; consequently, as he must stop somewhere, it is most reasonable to suppose he will stand by his first Choice. They, who object against the divine Conduct being founded on *arbitrary* Will and Pleasure, would do well to let us know what they mean by these Terms: If they mean a fickle and changeable Will; a Will that determines one thing to-day, and another to-morrow: This coincides not with our notion of divine Will, which, as has been shewn above, can never be contrary to itself. If they mean a wild and ungovernable Will; a Will, which throws down the Barriers betwixt Right and Wrong, and tramples upon
Good.

Goodness, Veracity, and these Qualities in things which we stile moral ; this is contrary to what we have prov'd it to be. The Gentlemen, who talk in this strain, will reply by way of Query, if we cannot prove God good, and just, and faithful *a priori* ; or, if there be nothing in these Qualities that can engage his Will in the observance of them, May he not as well be *malevolent, unjust, or unfaithful* ? *Answ.* Tho' we have no Arguments *a priori* to rest our Proofs of the divine Goodness upon, yet the want of such Proofs does not at all affect its Certainty, any more than our not being able to prove *a priori* that he exists, can render that Existence precarious ; which is sufficiently prov'd *a posteriori*. Besides, this Argument, when pursu'd, terminates here, *viz.* that there is nothing in the whole Circuit of Nature, but what is knowable by human Reason, and consequently that human Capacity is the adequate Measure of all Possibles.

These two Notions of divine Will we therefore discard, and close with a third (tho' known only *a posteriori*) which is that of its being determin'd to Action by a Principle of infinite Goodness, and conducted by infinite Wisdom.

Since God is possess'd of infinite Knowledge, and Goodness, we are obliged to own, that all such Phenomena of Nature, as in our present situation we cannot account for (some of which seem to be real Evils, others Deformities in the Creation) are the genuine effects of an infinitely understanding and benevolent Being, and, as such, necessary in the present System of things : because it is a Contradiction to suppose that such a Being should ever do or will any thing to be done, but what upon the whole is good and wise.

Hence

Hence our Ignorance of the ends and uses of any particular thing is no Argument of its Uselessness : For, in a System whose Parts are all relative to each other, a Mind that sees not thro' their whole dependency and connection, *i. e.* that sees not infinitely, cannot see any thing distinctly ; and consequently cannot pronounce this thing useless, and that a Blemish in the Creation.

Having discover'd the Deity's Principle of Action, we shall now proceed to the Proof of his Wisdom, Justice, and other moral Perfections, which seem to be but so many Emanations from the same Source, diversify'd indeed by the several Channels thro' which they flow, but not so many distinct Attributes of themselves, much less existing apart, or acting counter to his Goodness. To begin with Wisdom.

DEFINIT. *Wisdom implies in its Idea a pursuit of some certain End by proper Means.*

Consequently, since the End the Deity has solely in view is the communication of Being and Happiness, Wisdom, when ascrib'd to him, must signify his choosing such ways of acting, as are productive of the greatest Aggregate of Happiness.

PROP. I. *God is a Wise Being.* His Infinite Intelligence qualifies him to see how he may best pursue the Happiness of his Creatures ; and his Perfect Power enables him to execute whatever is most conducive to that End : Consequently he must at all times, and upon all occasions, know and do what is right ; or, in other Words, He is a Wise Being.

DEFINIT. 2. *Justice denotes an adjustment of the Relations and Circumstances of things to the Qua-*

Qualifications and Behaviour of Free and Intelligent Creatures ; or thus, Natural Justice denotes such a Constitution of things, as will necessarily draw Happiness or Misery upon every Individual, according as his Acts are good or evil, and in proportion to the Habits of Virtue or Vice he has contracted.

Positive Justice, when ascrib'd to him, implies a Disposition in him to secure the great Interests of Virtue or Natural Religion, by proper Rewards and Punishments.

PROP. II. *God is a God of Justice.* We prov'd above, that he knows perfectly the Natures and Powers of all these things which derive their Existence from him, and consequently what Effect they will have upon each other : He knows likewise the Qualifications of his rational Creatures, whether they have forward'd or oppos'd the Ends of his Creation ; and, as he knows these things, he can apply the one to the other in such a manner, that the result shall be a certain Sum of Happiness or Misery to these Beings, as they have merited the one or the other. But being wise, and powerful, and good, he will be sure to have nothing omitted which tends to the Happiness of his System ; and will so contrive the Parts of it, that every Being shall certainly receive sooner or later the proper Effects of his own Actions.

The Necessity of God's dealing thus arises from its tendency to secure the Happiness of the rest of his Creatures. For when it is so order'd, that every degree of Misery, causelessly introduced into the Creation, is sure to meet with a proportional Punishment, either by natural Consequence, or positive Appointment, the Consequence will be, that every such Offender being made to know and feel how every vicious Act is an unavoidable Step to Misery,

Misery, he, and others by his Example, will be deterr'd from such Practices for the future.

We might observe here, by way of Corollary, that God's Goodness and Justice cannot clash as some have imagin'd ; but that the latter is directed by, and always exercis'd in subserviency to, the former ; since nothing can evidence stronger Marks of Goodness in God, than to make every Being sensible of the destructive Nature and Effects of Sin ; to let his Creatures know they cannot wander from their Duty, without wandering from their Happiness ; and so bring them by a proper chastisement to a degree of Happiness adequate to their Capacities.

DEFINIT. 3. *Holiness is that Quality or Disposition in a Being, which causes it to abhor and detest all manner of Vice and Wickedness.*

PROP. III. *This Quality belongs to the First Cause.* Whatever runs counter to the Will of the Creator is sure to be the Object of his Dislike and Abhorrence : But Vice and Wickedness, as being essentially productive of Misery, are incompatible with it ; i. e. he is a Pure and Holy Being.

DEFINIT. *Veracity is that Quality in a Being, by virtue of which he cannot declare otherwise than the Case really is : or, it signifies a moral Incapacity of deceiving others.*

PROP. IV. *God is a God of Truth.*

As Falshood embarasses limited Beings in their forming a right Conduct from the observation of Causes and Effects, and consequently tends to introduce all manner of Confusion and Misery into the World ; and since whatever introduces these
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in any degree, interferes in the same degree with a Principle of Goodness, it follows, that Goodness does of course infer Veracity.

PROP. V: *God is a God of Faithfulness ; or, he cannot be worse than his Word.* We have shewn that God is Unchangeable ; and, if so, he cannot will and do at one time what he will contradict at another ; and therefore he is incapable of being unfaithful, and consequently cannot break his Promise.

To sum up the Whole : Two opposite Qualities can never belong to the same Being at the same time. Therefore being assured that our God is good, we have proportionable assurance that he can have no Qualities, Principles, or determinations of Will, preventive of the communications of his Goodness in the most extensive Degree.

Justice, Veracity, Faithfulness, and these Qualities which we stile moral in the Deity, are but, as we hinted before, so many acts and manifestations of one and the same Principle, viz. Goodness ; which, as it uses different means, or is exerted different ways, in order to bring about the same End, is exhibited to us under different Prospects ; which is apt to make us conclude, that there are so many distinct Principles subsisting in the divine Nature, corresponding to these Effects, and the proper Causes of them : Whereas, in reality, they are but Branches springing from the same Stock, cultivated in such a manner as tends most to the propagation and advancement of universal Happiness. We say God is just, because to deal thus with his Creatures, is a means to oblige the Offender, and all such as are viciously inclin'd, to avoid all future Commerce with Wickedness.—He hates and abhors all manner of Sin and Iniquity,

quity, because all manner of Sin and Iniquity is connected with all manner of Misery. — He is true and faithful, because Truth and Faithfulness are absolutely necessary to secure Trust and Confidence, and consequently Peace and Happiness.

DEFINIT. 5. *By Providence we mean certain uniform Laws fix'd in the Course of things ; by virtue of which the several orders of Beings are continued in their Existence ; and perform their proper Offices without a continual Interposition of the Almighty.*

PROP. VI. *God governs the World by these Laws.* We see this every Day in Fact. We find one uniform consistent Method, by which Bodies are determin'd to Motion or Rest — A constant and regular Connection betwixt certain Causes and Effects — the like Powers always producing in the same Cases like Events. And as the several sorts of Beings are govern'd by Laws flowing from their *Specific Natures*, so those which are liable to be attack'd from without are furnish'd with Powers proper for their Defence — Inanimate Bodies, when acted upon, re-act — The Bodies of Animals are temper'd agreeably to the nature of the Climate in which they breath — They are possess'd of Faculties, and provisory means of Happiness, suited to their Capacities of enjoying it — In short, all Creatures come into Being with all necessary means of Self-defence, and nothing is wanting that can in any degree contribute to the universal Happiness of God's Creation.

DEFINIT. VI. *Particular Providence denotes such a Distribution of things, as corresponds to the particular Cases of particular Men.* That such an
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adjustment of Things to Persons may be laid in Nature ; or that the several Parts of this System may be related to one another in such a manner as to bring about Events suitable to the Qualifications of particular Men, is, I think, evident from hence.

1. That Man's Happiness or Misery, or his Good and Ill in Life, either flows, first, from the natural Order and Course of Things ; or, secondly, is the effect of his own Management ; or, thirdly, arises from the Actions of those, who like himself enjoy a Principle of natural Liberty.

2. As God created all things, and gave them their respective Powers and Situation in the Universe, he must necessarily know what Effects these things will produce, and how these Powers will be employ'd, whether for the Good and Advantage, or to the Hurt and Detriment of this System.

3. Since he is infinitely Intelligent, he must know from all Eternity every Individual that would exist in this System, and what would happen to each Part belonging to it ; and, if so, he knows in what portion of Space and Time it will be convenient to introduce any particular Thing or Person, for the bringing about any particular Event.

And as he knows when it will be of Benefit to the Whole, either to bestow Favours, or inflict Punishments, on such of his Creatures as deserve well or ill at his Hands, so being Perfect in Power, he can order and predispose natural Causes in such a manner as to bring about these great Ends without any subsequent extraordinary Influence. From whence it follows,

That since the Deity can so adjust the Parts of this Machine, and give them such Directions as shall constantly bring about Events adapted to the

the Qualifications of particular Men, so this way of providing for particular Cases and Things is as much the Object of God's Knowledge and Power, as the other. But which a wise and good Being will choose to act by, We will not take upon us to determine: Tho' we may safely go so far as to affirm, that infinite Wisdom delights to bring about any End by the fewest and most simple Means.

We are not insensible that this Hypothesis of pre-determin'd Causes is liable to some Objections; but they will be found to be less formidable upon Examination than they appear'd to be at first sight.

The first runs thus. It is granted on all hands, that Mens Acts proceed from their Wills; which being absolutely free, it seems impossible that God should have any Knowledge of them.

Ans. The Reason why Men know not this or that particular thing is because their Knowledge, in respect of it, is limited: But God's Knowledge, in conjunction with his other Attributes, being infinite, extends over all. And therefore it is no Consequence, because we cannot conceive how God should fore-know the Acts of these Beings, that therefore He cannot. The Modes of apprehending and knowing in God are widely different from what they are in Men; and consequently no Argument can be drawn from the one to the other.

2. Tho' we cannot at present conceive how God should foreknow the free Acts of his Creatures, yet we are certain that he both Does and Must know them; otherwise he would know at one time what he does not at another, *i. e.* his Knowledge would be limited: Contrary to what we have

prov'd. This Argument drawn from God's infinite Intelligence for his having in every point of Duration a perfect Knowledge of all future Contingencies, as those Acts are which flow from the Free-will of the Creature, carries with it the Force of Demonstration. If God be allow'd to be omniscient, Contingencies must be allow'd to be included in his Omniscience : If they are denied to be Objects of his Knowledge, his Omniscience is deny'd, and he becomes a Being with a limited Attribute.

The Mistakes that have arisen upon this Head are owing to these Terms, *Past*, *Present*, and *To come* ; which being successive Ideas, and consequently Affections of created Beings, are properly predicable of them only. With Beings whose Existence and Powers have relation to Time and Place, *i. e.* which are limited ; these Acts may be said to be past or future, as they happen to be done in this or that Period of their Existence, and their Knowledge of them in the same respect may fitly enough be stiled *Fore* or *After-knowledge*. But, to a Being whose Attributes have no more relation to Time and Place than his Existence has, *Fore* and *After* are very improperly applied.

The second Objection is this. If God fore-knows the Acts of Men, they cannot but be ; and if they cannot but be, they cease to be free and indifferent.

Answ. God's Knowledge of the Free Acts of Men is grounded on the certainty of the Existence of these Acts, and not the certainty of their Existence on his Knowledge of them. Since, by the last Argument, all such things as are successive to Men, are present with God, and therefore at all times proper Objects of his Knowledge.

Object. III.

Object. III. If an adjustment of Cases to Persons be laid in Nature, and every Being shall be sure to receive the natural Effect of his own Actions, Whence the Necessity of *Prayer*? Whence the Occasion of petitioning the Deity for any temporal Favour, or to be deliver'd from some present or impending Evil? Upon this Hypothesis all Supplications and Entreaties would be impertinent; forasmuch as the things pray'd for would necessarily come to pass, whether pray'd for, or not.

Ans. The mechanical Hypothesis supposes, that God upon the Knowledge of particular Mens Endeavours, and Prayers to him, ranged natural things into such an Order, that what they pray for, and endeavour after, shall be sure to come to pass: and what they deprecate be averted. This adjustment therefore, in order of Conception, is consequential to, and originally founded on, the Prayers and Qualifications of particular Agents. And if God knows that certain Persons would offer up to him such and such Prayers for the attaining some particular Favours, what should hinder, but that, being perfect in Knowledge and Power, he may so dispose things in their first Settlement, as to correspond eventually with these particular Requests and Endeavours?

But after all We shall not, as was observ'd before, take upon us to determine which Method of Government the Deity has actually chosen. Whether he has adjusted things in such a manner, as that all Events shall be secured by the working of natural Causes; or that he has reserv'd to himself a Power of providing for particular Cases and Emergencies by a particular Influence: since both ways are equally possible, and both perhaps equally effective of the same good End.

S E C T. III.

of MORAL OBLIGATION.

WE shall begin this Section with premising the following Axioms, which may be of service in giving a solution to such Queries as shall hereafter be started ;

AXIOM I. Pleasure is different from Pain ;
or, There is a Difference in Things.

AXIOM II. To a sensible Being Pleasure is a real Good, and perfective of its Nature : Pain a real Evil, and contrary to its Nature.

AXIOM III. The Fitness or Unfitness of Actions arise from their tendency to produce this Happiness or Misery in Beings, to whom such Actions are therefore said to be fit or unfit. Consequently Fitness and Unfitness, when ascrib'd to Things and Actions, are not positive and absolute, but of a relative Signification, as arising from that relation which such things have, as means of Happiness and Misery, to sensible Beings.

AXIOM IV. To find out this tendency in things, and to discover what Set of Objects will produce the greatest Sum of Pleasure, is the Province of Reason. Reason being of no farther Use to Man, than as it leads him into the right Road to Happiness, and directs him how he may continue in it.

AXIOM

AXIOM V. Man's Happiness, as a rational dependent Being, arises from a concurrence of those Powers on whom he depends for it ; and in proportion to his Dependency on others is he obliged (if he would act rationally, *i. e.* in the most effectual way to be happy) to pursue such Means as tend to procure this Concurrence.

AXIOM VI. The voluntary Production of this Natural Good, or Pleasure, by one rational sensible Being in another, or the voluntary introduction of it into human Life, is Moral Good ; and the voluntary Production of this Natural Evil, or Pain, or the wilful introduction of it into human Life, is Moral Evil.

Virtue therefore denotes a constant Pursuit of such Actions as tend to introduce Happiness, and expel Misery out of the Creation.

AXIOM VII. It is not this or that Action consider'd in itself, or the Consequences flowing from it, but the manner in which it was done, or the Will and Intention of the Agent, which entitles him to the Favour and Esteem of others. So far as the Will is unconcern'd in any Action, so far is such an Action of an indifferent Nature, and the Being, whose it is, is, strictly speaking, no subject of Esteem or Disesteem, of Rewards or Punishments, but stands properly upon the same footing with mechanical and involuntary Causes—— If, in the performance of any Action of Moment to the Publick, I look not up to God, and have not his acceptance, as one of the ends of my acting, in view ; however agreeable to him such Acts may be, as to the material Part, still I have done nothing that can in Reason recommend me to his
D 4 Favour,

Favour, and entitle me to a Reward from him. For nothing can in reason recommend me to the one, or entitle me to the other, but what was done purely upon his account, in sincere obedience to his Commands, or with a Design to please him.

Not that we can (nor is it indeed necessary that we always should) have the divine acceptance in view, or be able to deduce every particular Action immediately from a consideration of the Will of God, in order to make it rewardable by him.

“ It may, ’tis hoped, says an ingenious Writer, be
 “ sufficient, if we have a general intent of serving
 “ him in the whole of any considerable Undertak-
 “ ing, and an express regard to him whenever he
 “ appears to be more particularly concern’d in any
 “ part of it. Our imperfect Understanding will
 “ not allow us to trace up every thing to our
 “ ultimate End ; we find it necessary therefore to
 “ fix several inferior and subordinate ones, where-
 “ in we are forced to acquiesce both in our Know-
 “ ledge and Practice. And it is sufficient to re-
 “ commend and justify an Action, if it can be
 “ fairly deduc’d from any one of these subordinate
 “ Ends, and have some connection with what is
 “ manifestly our Duty. — Nay, further, some
 “ Actions which are directed to no distinct End at
 “ all, tho’ in themselves they be no proper sub-
 “ jects of Rewards, yet they may become such
 “ by virtue of certain *Habits*, whereof they are
 “ Consequences, and for which *Habits* we are
 “ properly accountable : and the Reason of this
 “ is evident. As we cannot have our main End
 “ constantly in view, ’tis necessary for us to ac-
 “ quire such *Habits* of Acting as may lead us al-
 “ most insensibly to it, and carry us on in our
 “ Journey, even when we are not thinking of it.
 “ These

“ These Habits therefore, if they be rightly
 “ founded and directed, must entitle us to a Re-
 “ ward for all the several Actions which flow from
 “ them, even when the first Foundation is forgot.
 “ Thus a Servant sufficiently deserves both the
 “ Title and Reward of being Faithful, if he have
 “ acquired such Habits of Labour and Diligence
 “ in his Master’s Business, as will carry him regu-
 “ larly thro’ it, tho’ he seldom consider the End
 “ of all his Labour, or think of his Master in it.”
 Thus far a Writer in the *Weekly Miscellany*, N^o. 9.

We may observe, by way of *Corollary*, from the last *Axiom*, that if A in the commission or omission of any Action aims at B’s Favour and Esteem, which Favour he looks upon as a means of Happiness to himself, and pursues it under that Notion; such Action or Omission is meritorious, *i. e.* entitles A to B’s Favour: Favour being due to one Being from another for any particular Action done by one upon the other’s Account. If I direct my Acts in pursuit of the Good and Happiness of others, tho’ with a view to please God thereby, and to secure his Favour to me, such Actions are necessarily made the ground of his acceptance, and must, of course, attain the end for which they were undertaken, *i. e.* his Favour and Rewards.

These things being premised we shall just take notice what it is which constitutes Moral Agency, and then pass on to enquire into the Ground of Moral Obligation.

And first of *Moral Agency*.

It is, I think, allow’d on all hands, that Intelligence and Freedom are absolutely necessary to Man’s being a Moral Agent; and without which he can be no subject of Rewards and Punishments. For if he has no Understanding, he is incapable
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of distinguishing betwixt Good and Evil, and therefore cannot determine what ought, and what ought not, to be the Object of his Choice. And tho' he be qualify'd in the use of his intellectual Powers to discern a Difference in things, and know how to adjust his Acts in procuring some, and avoiding others, yet if he has not a Power of acting agreeably to the result of such a Knowledge, i. e. if he has not a Power of choosing and pursuing what upon Examination appears proper for a Creature in his Circumstances to do, he is not voluntary, but passive; no Agent, but more properly acted upon: And whatever is necessarily determined either to Motion or Rest, to Action or Forbearance, by any Principle either from *within* or *without*, is so far only moved, acted upon, and merely passive: and not it, but the imposing or necessitating Power, is answerable for what is done or omitted.

That Man is possess'd of the former is evident from the known Powers of Thought, Understanding, Judgment, &c. And every Denial of the Truth of this Proposition is a confirmation of it; since a Man must deny it either with Reason, or without it; if without Reason, he neither wants, nor deserves to be confuted; if with Reason, he undoes what he was going to do, and proves the very thing he wants to deny. As to Free-Agency, his own Consciousness informs him that he is the subject of such a Principle; for he finds within himself a Power of choosing independently on the objects which solicit his Choice; a Power of determining among equal and indifferent Objects; and of preferring the Pursuit of some to others, different from and opposite to them. Man therefore having the Qualifications requisite to his being a moral Agent, we shall proceed next, as the

Subject leads us, to enquire into the Foundation of Moral Obligation.

To enquire after the ground of Moral Obligation is to enquire what Principle, Reason, or Consideration of things binds Men to pursue the several Branches of Morality. And there have been great Differences among Moralists in this Particular. Among the several Opinions that have been broach'd, Two more particularly have been insist'd on and warmly defended by their respective Parties. The one endeavour to deduce it from the Relations, Proportions, &c. of Things, consequent upon the different Modes of their Existence; and maintain, that these Relations have a *full, obligatory Power antecedent to any Reward or Punishment annex'd either by natural Consequence or positive Appointment to the Observance or Neglect of them.* The other are for fetching it from the Will of God, as the only Principle which can make Virtue universally binding, and the Practice of it always reasonable. For, say they, nothing can be the Object of Man's Desires and Pursuits, but what is judg'd to be some way or other connected with his Happiness: And consequently, if Men are obliged to the constant Practice of Virtue, it must be on supposition that such a Conduct does always, sooner or later, tend to their Happiness.

Before we examine these two different Opinions concerning the nature and ground of Moral Obligation, it will be necessary to shew, that as there can be no Law without an Obligation, nor Obligation without a Motive (which was never yet deny'd) so the only Motive to Action in general, or to any particular Action, is, and necessarily must be, the Prospect of procuring Pleasure, or avoiding Pain, of some sort or other. And if it be the Nature of Man, that he cannot be obliged
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to do or omit any Action, but as it tends to his Happiness, it is evident that nothing can oblige him to the Practice of Virtue, but an assurance that it is connected with his Happiness, either directly or consequentially ; by natural Consequence, or positive Appointment. And, consequently, it would be trifling to fix Moral Obligation on any other Foundation than that, which, if attended to, will, in all supposeable Cases, supersede all other Motives, however suggested : Or thus, That Moral Obligation must be founded on that, the Consideration of which will remove all Difficulties and Opposition lying in the road to Virtue, and over-balance all such Pleasures as flow from a contrary Course of Action. But to come to the Point.

In every reasonable Action some End is intended ; or there are some previous Reasons determining us to the Pursuit of it. Now the exciting Reason to Action in general, or to any particular one, is the Prospect of procuring some Pleasure, or of avoiding some Pain ; because from Acting to Not-acting, or *vice versa*, there is a Change ; and wherever there is a Change, there must be some Cause of it : The Cause of Change, in the present case, can only be a Desire of Change ; and the Cause of that Desire a Prospect of obtaining Pleasure, or of avoiding Pain, of some sort or other ; for, whilst the Mind of any sensible Being neither receives, nor is under apprehension of receiving Pleasure or Pain, from any particular Action, she, during such a State, must be perfectly easy and indifferent : And whilst she continues in such a state of Indifferency no Change will follow ; because, as we observ'd, there can be no Change without a Cause, *i. e.* without a Desire of that Change ; and no Change can be desir'd, be-
cause

cause all Desire is towards some attainable Good, or avoidable Evil ; Desire being only an affection of the Mind, consequent upon the apprehension of possessing a means of Happiness, or avoiding a means of Misery. Hence, as there can be no Action without a Change, no Change without a Cause, *i. e.* Desire, and no Desire without some apprehended attainable Good, in which it terminates ; so, when the Mind feels no present, and has no Prospect of obtaining any future Good, no Things, or Considerations, can give her the least Concern, or influence her at all either to Motion, or Rest ; and therefore nothing but Pleasure and Pain, or the Causes of them, can be any Reasons for, or Motives to Action. Hence these Corollaries.

COROL. 1. We are now qualified to judge what it is in Actions, which influences the Mind, and engages our Pursuit ; *viz.* the necessary, or at least probable, connection of such Actions with our Happiness, *i. e.* with such a degree of Happiness as is judg'd to be worth our Purchase.

COROL. 2. The Strength of Motives determining us to the Pursuit of any Action, or, which is the same (seeing there can be no Motive without an Obligation, nor Obligation without a Motive, both being founded in a view to Happiness) the degree of our Obligation to such Action will be in a direct Ratio of the degrees of Happiness suppos'd to accompany it in its real Existence.

COROL. 3. If nothing but Pleasure and Pain, or the supposed Causes of them, can be any exciting Reasons to Action or Forbearance ; and if the degrees of our Obligation to an Action be
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in proportion to the Quantity of Good or Evil apprehended in it, the Consequence is, that there can be no possible Motive or Excitement to any Action, when pure Pain and Misery are apprehended not merely as the probable or likely, but as the proper and genuine, Consequence of such Action.

COROL. 4. Since different Actions are the Causes of different degrees of Pleasure to us, and as the exciting Reason to Action is Pleasure of some sort or other, these Actions, which in the Eye of the Mind are productive of the greatest Quantity of Pleasure, and attainable, must lay her under as strong an Obligation as she can possibly admit consistently with a Principle of Free-Agency : And, consequently, as the Quantity of Pleasure in any given Series of Action is greater or less, in like proportion will the Mind be influenced to exert herself in the Pursuit of it. Hence again, that particular Action, or course of Action, which upon the whole will procure most Pleasure, must, if due Attention be paid it, act with the greatest Force upon the Mind, and consequently produce the strongest Desires for it.

This we thought necessary to have observed, because, when two unequal Quantities of Pleasure (not to be enjoy'd together) present themselves to the Mind, and solicit her Pursuit, the greater will, in the nature of the thing, turn the Scale, and draw the Mind with a Force proportion'd to its apprehended Prepollency : And for this Reason, because if Pleasure, consider'd as such, be really delightful, and the Mind chooses it because it is so, then the greater must necessarily be chosen and pursued, because, by the Terms, it is more delightful : And by *Corollary 2.* the Strength of
Motives,

Motives, determining us to any particular Action, is directly as the apprehended Quantity of Pleasure in it.

But tho' the greater Pleasure, when both are present, will certainly be chosen, yet, we see, in Fact, that present Pleasure has much the advantage of what is future, and at a distance. A future Pleasure often will be postpon'd to a present smaller one; and the Reason is, because things are so fram'd as to act with greater or less Strength in proportion to their distance from us. This we see is true in the material System; and it also holds in the intellectual. What is present affects us very sensibly, often engages the whole Mind, and prevents her in a great measure from attending to what is future. This was the Reason of our saying above, *if due Attention be paid it, i. e.* such an Attention as will engage the Heart and Affections.

Now the various kinds of Pleasure subsisting in Actions, or, to speak more properly, the Motives by which Men are determin'd to pursue any particular Action, are, as things now stand, either, first, the private personal Good to which such Action is subservient: Or, secondly, that inward concomitant Pleasure, *i. e.* that Pleasure which immediately flows from such Action; and this is the Consequence of some settled Habit of acting; and may be accounted for from an Association of Ideas, which we either made ourselves at first, or learnt from others; of which we shall speak hereafter: Or, thirdly, the Desire of being well spoken of, *i. e.* the Esteem of others, which is a means of Happiness itself, and which such Action tends to procure: Or, lastly, the Expectation of future Rewards from the Deity; and under this Class may be ranged those Pleasures which flow from the

the Consciousness of having done our Duty, and consequently entitled ourselves to that share of Happiness design'd us at first by our Creator.

From hence flow the following Truths.

1. That Action, which produces all these several sorts of Pleasure in the highest degree, must give the Mind the strongest Bias, and act with the greatest Impulse that it is possible for a Free Agent to receive.

2. That Action must produce a greater moment of Happiness to the Agent, and consequently be a more powerful Motive to engage him to pursue it, in which subsist these several sorts of Pleasure ; or, to speak more properly, the Powers of producing them, than when any are wanting.

3. Since these several sorts of Pleasure are so many several Motives acting upon the Mind, it follows, that when any of these are suppos'd to be wanting, so many exciting Reasons are wanting also. But were there but one sort in its lowest degree in any Action, the Mind would be influenced by it : because, since all Pleasure is agreeable, and as such, if attainable, becomes the Object of our Desires, the least as well as greatest (if it be apprehended worth the Labour in purchasing, and the Enjoyment of it be not incompatible with a greater Pleasure) the least, I say, as well as greatest degree of Pleasure must, within these Limitations, move the Mind, and dispose her to seek the means of attaining it.

Hence, as the Effects of human Actions are of a compound Nature, comprising different moments of Pleasure and Pain, the strength of Motives, and degrees of Obligation will be proportion'd to the apprehended excess of Good or Evil. If the inward concomitant Pleasure be inconsistent with private personal Good, the Motive influencing
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to or from Action may be determin'd thus. If the inward Pleasure be apprehended superior, the Strength of the Motive influencing will be as the prepollency of this Pleasure above the Loss of private personal Good, *i. e.* proportional to that Sum of Pleasure which remains after the degrees of private Disadvantage are subtracted. But when the loss of this over-ballances the inward concomitant Pleasure, there can arise no Motive to such Action, but rather a Motive to the contrary, unless a Man can think Misery more eligible than Happiness, *i. e.* reverse the order of Nature, and, if I may so say, unman himself. — Hence, lastly, if this inward Pleasure ballance the loss of temporary Advantages, or the loss of temporary Advantages ballance the inward Pleasure; in such Cases no Motives can arise either one way or other; because equal apprehended Quantities of Good and Evil in Actions raise neither Desire nor Aversion, nor can have the least Influence over the Mind.

Having thus pav'd the way, we shall apply what has been said to the Case before us.

Since there can be no Action without a Motive, and all Motives arise from a Sense of Pleasure and Pain, the former being constituted the necessary Object of our Desire, the latter of our Aversion; it follows, that the Obligation which rational sensible Beings lie under to act in conformity with Truth and common Good, is strictly proportion'd to the Quantity of private Happiness of one or the other sort, apprehended to follow such Conformity: And if every Man's Obligation to introduce and promote a common Happiness be in proportion to the degrees of Dependency of private on publick Happiness, then, as this proportion varies, so will Mens Obligation vary too; and consequently when this Union is dissolv'd, or the connection

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betwixt private and publick Happiness broke, no one can possibly be obliged to pursue any particular Action basely under the notion of its tendency to publick Happiness, i. e. when his own is no way or other interested in it.

Actions therefore, where Self is not concern'd, tho' ever so agreeable to the Relations of things *as such*; and tho' they have the most absolute beneficial tendency to the publick Happiness, cannot properly become the Objects of Choice; nor can any Consideration whatever influence the Mind, and carry her to the Pursuit of them.

But they, who ground Moral Obligation on the Relations of things; common Good, &c. bring no Arguments in favour of their Scheme, unless asserting be a Proof. Instead of satisfying Mens Understandings and Judgments, they appeal to their Passions and Prejudices, which most have now forgot how they were first acquired. They maintain, that there is an inherent Worth, and unchangeable Excellency in acting agreeably to these Relations; (but forget to acquaint us wherein their Worth consists, and from whence this Excellency arises :) That it is eternally and essentially fit for Men to practise the Rules of Righteousness, and to abstain from all Commerce with Sin and Wickedness, antecedently to all Consideration of their being made happy or miserable thereby: That every Being must perceive the fitness of such a Conduct, as necessarily as he does the Relation of Equality betwixt twice two and four; and that it would be as impertinent to go about to prove the one as the other.

I shall make no formal Reply to this now, because it has been partly obviated already, and shall be more fully by and by; particularly when we come to give an account of the Origin of our Passions.

There are some who argue for the same Scheme in this manner. Pleasure, say they, is really delightful and agreeable ; Pain otherwise : Pleasure is chosen and pursu'd for its own sake ; Pain shunned and avoided : Consequently Pleasure must be preferable to Pain, and consequently the communication of Pleasure preferable to the communication of Pain.

What means this Term *preferable* ? One thing is said to be preferable to another ; either, first, as the one is a means of Happiness, and the other not ; or, secondly, as it tends more to the increase of present or future Happiness than the other ; or, thirdly, as it is more immediately adapted to the removal of some present, or the prevention of some threatening Evil. If this be allow'd to be the Meaning (which is the only Meaning it can have) the next Question will be, *To whom* is this communication of Pleasure preferable to that of Pain ? To him that communicates it, or to him to whom it is communicated ? If to the former, it must be on account of one of the three Reasons before-mention'd, *i. e.* because it is connected with his Happiness ; and consequently it coincides with our Notion above. If to the latter, as it should mean ; then they must shew how the consideration of another's Happiness can engage me in the promotion of it, or be a Motive proper for me to act upon, when my own is entirely out of the Question. But this can never be shewn, because, as we prov'd above, to all Action some Motive is necessary, and all Motives are founded in a Sense or Prospect of Pleasure and Pain ; and consequently, when Pleasure of no kind is apprehended to flow from any Action, the Mind, in respect thereof, is absolutely unconcerned.

From all which it appears, that neither Truth, the Good of the Whole, nor the Relations of things have in themselves, *i. e.* consider'd abstractly, any binding Force at all ; and consequently cannot of themselves constitute Moral Obligation, or be any Law or Rule for us to walk by : As we are sensible Beings, Beings susceptible of Pleasure and Pain, nothing can be a Law to us, which tends not to produce the one, and prevent the other ; and consequently nothing can constitute a Law of Nature to us, or carry with it a never-failing Obligation, but which expresses in Propositions what Scheme of Events, or Series of Action will, in the whole, produce the greatest Sum of Natural Good to us. Consequently, again, the Relations of things can lay the Mind under no Obligation further than a Conformity of Acts thereto is sure to be attended with private Happiness of some sort or other.

Now we see it true in Fact, that, whilst Vice often flourishes, Virtue is depress'd : That the good Man often suffers merely upon the account of his being so : That the very Virtue which should lead him to such a degree of Happiness as by the ordinary Providence of God it was intended to do, serves only to ruin him : That by this means the good-natur'd Heart, thinking, and therefore fearing no Ill, is laid open to the Frauds of every Deceiver, who will be ready to improve every opportunity of making his own Ends out of the other's Honesty and Simplicity. This Experience confirms ; And how should it be otherwise ? For, whilst some close with the Rules of Virtue, others deviate from them : From such a collision of Interests, and unfriendly mixture of Actions, it must needs be, that a constant adherence to Virtue will many times be attended with Misery, and some-

sometimes perhaps with the loss of Life itself. But by *Corollary 3. pag. 45.* it appears, that no Considerations but these of Pleasure and Pain, and the probable means of producing them, can be any Motives to Action or Forbearance ; and consequently there can be no exciting Reason to Action or Forbearance, when pure Misery, Misery as such, is apprehended not only as the probable, but the natural consequence of such Action or Omission. 'Tis true the Mind may voluntarily choose to suffer Misery, with a view to obtain some considerable degree of Happiness, esteem'd worth all the Pain in purchasing, or to prevent some future prepollent Evils, which must otherwise have been unavoidably submitted to. But that the human Mind, when neither of these is the Case, should grow fond of Misery without the least mixture of the contrary Quality, is directly contrary to its Make, and that of all other sensible Beings, and cannot be asserted without denying Happiness to be Happiness, or a sensible Being to be what he really is. Hence we see how little agreeable this Scheme of independent Fitness is to our prime and fundamental Position, *viz. That Moral Obligation must be founded on That, which, if attended to, will, in all Cases, and in spite of all Obstacles, render the Practice of Morality eligible.*

Having brought Matters within such a compass, that these Gentlemen must either give up the Point in dispute, or affirm one of these Two things, *viz. That there may be Action without a Motive ; or, That pure Absolute Misery can, in many cases, excite Desire, and become the Object of Choice.* We might now fairly take leave of them ; but, since this Notion has been so warmly espoused by some eminent Writers of late, we had rather incur

the Censure of being tedious, than omit any thing which may be alledg'd in its Favour.

'Tis further urg'd that the Relations of things, as such, are an objective Rule to the divine Will : That God always is and must be determin'd by them : And that the very same Reasons which determine the Deity to command, must oblige us to obey.

Ans. This Notion of the Relations of things being an objective Rule to the divine Will has been confuted above, and a better one substituted in its room : But, were it true that they were such a Rule to the Deity, does it therefore follow, that the same Rules of acting are common to us with him ? This would be either to raise human Nature to the same Eminence with the Divine, or to bring down the Divine Nature to a Level with ours. But the Truth is, God being absolutely Perfect, his Creatures, however numerous they be, can neither augment nor lessen his Happiness ; and therefore what may be a Rule of Action to him, cannot be so to Men, who have not like him their Happiness from within. And, if it were possible for the divine Happiness to depend on Externals, yet, as he is the Author of Nature, and possess'd of infinite Knowledge and Power, he might so form the Plan of the World, and adjust the several Parts, as to make them all conspire in the completion of his Happiness. But with regard to Mankind the Case is otherwise : Tho' they know that an universal Observance of the Duties proper to rational Beings would produce universal Happiness, yet what connection is there betwixt such a Knowledge, and the Practice of them ? Men are always free ; and whilst some pursue the Rules of Virtue, others deviate from them : And
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from hence what Confusion and Disorder have been introduced into the World? Sufficient to deprive Virtue of that Reward, and those good Consequences, which are the only Reason why Men do, or indeed ought to pursue it. These Gentlemen therefore, who pretend that the same Reasons which determine the Deity to command, also oblige us to obey, would do well to let us know why we are obliged to act in concert with him: For, as the Matter stands above, the Case betwixt us and the Deity will not admit of any Parallel.

'Tis allow'd by all who acknowledge a Deity, and a future State of Rewards and Punishments, that the chief of Man's Religion consists in the Imitation of him; which, according to us, denotes a design'd concurrence of Acts with the Purposes of Creation; or it is a voluntary co-operating with the Deity in carrying on the great Ends of his Government, in order to our being made happy by him: It hath not therefore, * as some would have it, Respect to the general Principle of Action in God. For, as we before observ'd, they who make the same Principle of Action common to us with him, seem to put him upon a level with us. But that Beings, whose Happiness is chiefly from without, should act upon the same Principle with a Being whose Happiness is wholly center'd in himself, seems absolutely impossible: For, as the one exists independently, he cannot act in diminution of his own Happiness; and the other, as sensible intelligent Beings, cannot but act in pursuit of it; and therefore cannot but act (if they would act rationally) in concur-

* See *Wisdom the first Spring of Action in the Deity*.

rence with the Will of these Powers on whom they depend for it. See *Axiom 5. pag. 39.* Besides, it is hard to conceive how any Person can be the Object of God's special Love, and consequently entitled to his Favours, who does not propose the divine Acceptance, and consequently his own Happiness, as the sole End of his acting. See *Axiom 7. pag. 40.* And this is also an Answer to the same Author, who asks, *What Title the Selfish Generation can have to be called the Imitators of God; they who frankly declare that they have no Affection but for themselves; no Concern for the Interest of other Men, farther than their own is interwoven with it; so that in their most beneficent Actions Self-Love only verifys the Old Proverb, That the farthest way about is the nearest way Home? If Nature and Practice, in this Set of Philosophers, be not better than Principle, they will be hardly put to it to make out their Relation to God from Likeness.* While God, in creating and governing the World, hath no Happiness in view but that only of other Beings, chiefly of these that are intelligent; they, for their parts, tho' capable of proposing with their own the Happiness of their Fellow-Creatures, and of concurring to it, would never be at the Expence of a Wish for the Happiness of others, were it not as a means of their private Good, &c. *

Whilst I am upon this Head I cannot omit inserting an Observation from an ingenious Author. " If we follow Virtue, says he, for its own sake, " its native Beauty, and intrinick Goodness, we " lose the true Idea of it, we mistake the Means " for the End; and, tho' we may indeed qualify

* See *Wisdom the first Spring*, &c. p. 97, 98.

" ourselves for an extraordinary Reward from
 " God for such a State of Mind, yet we do really
 " nothing to *entitle* ourselves to it ; if we attain
 " the good Effects of every Virtue in this Life,
 " we have our Reward ; if we do not, what
 " Claim have we to any Rewards from God, whom
 " we have never thought of in it, and conse-
 " quently whose Servants we cannot be said to
 " be ? The only Principle, which can in Reason
 " recommend us to his Favour, must be the *do-*
 " *ing all things to his Glory*, in Obedience to his
 " Will, or in order to please him. " * But to
 return ;

They who assert that Men are obliged by the
 eternal Reasons of things, and that there is an in-
 herent and unchangeable Excellency in commu-
 nicating Happiness to others, seem to take for
 granted, either that Men are naturally possess'd of
 benevolent Affections which, as such, must call
 for proper Objects to be gratify'd with ; or that
 they have an Instinct or Moral Sense, which con-
 stantly operates and determines them ; which are
 Matters of Fact that want to be proved, and with-
 out which their whole Scheme falls to the Ground.
 Were Men divested of all publick and social Af-
 fections, and took no Pleasure in that Happiness
 they communicated to others, What is there in
 Nature that could possibly excite them to it? Se-
 parate private from publick Happiness, and you
 take away all Motives to pursue the latter, as we
 have often observed. If this needed Illustration,
 it might be explain'd in the following Manner.
 Suppose a System of Beings fram'd after the like

* See the Addition to the Notes on *Archbishop King's Origin of Evil*.

manner with ourselves, and that it was in the Power of a Being of superior Perfections to make them as happy as it was possible for Beings of such a Make to be; yet, if this Being be indifferent to their Happiness or Misery, What is it, I should be glad to know, that would determine him, moved by no inherent Principle of Goodness, to communicate Happiness rather than Misery, or indeed either of them? For, if he took no Pleasure in the Happiness he communicated, no consideration of such a Conduct could dispose him in the least to it: 'Tis not the intrinsic Worth and Excellency, or the natural and essential Beauty of communicating Happiness, that would do it; for these, with regard to such a Being as this, are mere empty Sounds.

The Mistakes which have arisen upon this Subject may, I think, be accounted for thus. Since Happiness is the Perfection of Man's Being, it is, and ought to be, the ultimate end of all his Actions: This Happiness, he sees, depends on others, who, being like himself endow'd with a Liberty of Choice, may, or may not, promote it as they please: And consequently he is obliged to such Actions as in their Nature tend to engage these Beings in his Favour, and consequently he must approve of such Actions: For the Mind will necessarily approve of whatever is judg'd a means of its Happiness. And hence it is, that Men acquire such Habits, and Principles of Action as are suitable to their dependent State; and the human Mind is so framed, as not only to grow fond of those Actions which she has been long accusom'd to, but also to be pleas'd with, and approve of the same in others.

And, as Mankind from the least to the greatest are sensible of their natural dependency on each other,

other, it seems probable, that these Habits, tho' in different Men they operate very differently, yet are of universal Influence : And therefore, as Men are at present circumstanced, they must prefer the communication of Happiness to that of Misery, even in Cases where it interferes with their own private personal Happiness. This, I say, they must do, so long as they are under the influence of such Habits, and such their own Happiness obliges them to acquire. And hence they imagine that all other Beings must choose and prefer it likewise, as being a thing beautiful and lovely in itself, forgetting the Reason which at first made these Habits eligible, and the Uses which still constitute them such.

If then Moral Obligation be founded on that inward Pleasure immediately connected with the commission of certain Actions, then Mens Obligation to these Actions can extend no farther than as they are, by Habit or Association, fitted to procure this Pleasure : consequently, Acts of Gratitude, Justice, publick Love, &c. would be no further pursued than as a Man took Pleasure in them : And the Reason is, because no Man can be obliged to an Action of any sort, but what tends, or is suppos'd to tend, to his Happiness : Consequently, again, did he take no Pleasure in these Actions, he would be discharged from all Obligations to them ; which is absurd.

Again ; If the Reason why Men pursue Virtue be merely for the sake of that Pleasure which immediately flows from the Exercise of it ; if the Scale should turn, or this Pleasure be over-balanced by some present or future prepollent Evil, then such as are influenced by no higher Motives must desert the Cause of Virtue, and go over to the other side. See *Corol. 3. pag. 45.*

Hence

Hence they, who follow Virtue for that Pleasure which immediately arises from the Practice of it, must acknowledge that this Pleasure not only exceeds all others in degree of Intensity, but also is a sufficient Counter-balance to all the private Disadvantages flowing from a virtuous course of Life: This they must do, or else they must give up the Point. For, tho' we grant (which is false in Fact) this virtuous Principle to be superior in degree to all other Desires and Principles, yet if the Consequences, which attend the gratification of it, be destructive of private personal Good in other respects; if a close attachment to Justice, Veracity, or any other moral Species, instead of recommending us to the Favour of all around us, is employ'd as an Engine to work our Ruin: When, I say, the Cause of Virtue thus suffers, it naturally produces a sourness of Temper, a discontent of Mind; and in room of the good-natur'd Principle, which by this means loses its Strength, the opposite will succeed.

From whence we may see how much Virtue is indebted to those who would take it from its proper Basis, and rob it of its main Support, the Belief of another World. For the only Remedy proper to support the sinking Interests of Virtue, and to preserve her Votaries from falling into a State of Despondency, is the Belief of a superior *Invisible* Cause, who, as Guardian of his Creatures Happiness, will be sure to maintain the great Interests of Morality, by dealing with every Man in another World, according as he has behav'd in this. It is this Consideration alone which can keep up a Man's Spirits, when his Virtue is become an Enemy to his present Happiness; and therefore this alone seems to be the ground and measure of all Moral Obligation.

Let

Let us see whether these Gentlemen come off better, who resolve Moral Obligation into *Reason*, as its proper Ground and Principle. Happiness, we see, is the grand Design of Man, as being by his Nature carry'd to the Pursuit of it : And in order to his being happy he finds within himself a Power or Faculty (call'd Reason) by the Use of which he is qualify'd in some measure to attain this End, *i. e.* he is qualify'd to discover what particular ways of acting are promotive of his Happiness, and in what degree they are so. Every Action, which tends to the Agent's Happiness, is a reasonable one, and is therefore reasonable, because it has such a tendency. And one Action is more reasonable than another, either as it is a means to procure a greater Sum of Happiness, or a more likely one to procure the same Sum. And consequently, upon supposition that there is no State of Existence after this, that Conduct would be term'd the most reasonable, which procures a Man the greatest Sum of Pleasure in this Life.

The Sum is this. When the immediate consequence of Virtue is Happiness to the Practiser, so far forth, and in such Circumstances, she carries Obligation in herself, and needs not any extraneous Help to bind her Votaries. But, when this is not the Consequence, it is necessary that the Deity should take off (if he would have her Rules universally practis'd) the rigidness of such a Compliance, and complete the Obligation by the appointment of positive Rewards and Punishments.

Since therefore it is acknowledg'd on all hands, that Virtue is of universal Extent and Obligation, and since nothing can infer universal Obligation but what is productive of universal Happiness, it follows, that nothing can oblige Men in all Cases to the Practice of Virtue but God ; because He,
and

and He alone, can make Man amends for the Losses and Disappointments he has undergone for Virtue's sake : And consequently no other Principle besides this can constitute *Moral Obligation*.

As Virtue therefore denotes a constant Pursuit of such Actions as tend to the Perfection and Happiness of this System, so Mens Obligations, we see, to this Pursuit, arise from the Will and Authority of God ; *i. e.* Men promote each others Happiness, because it is the Will of God that they should : For being mov'd by infinite Goodness to create the Universe at first, and then to stock it with a Number of Beings capable of enjoying themselves, he wills that all his Creatures, in their several Stations, concur with him in carrying on this End.

Since then it is the Will of God that I promote the Happiness, and alleviate the Miseries of other Beings, as much as possible ; the next Question will be, How shall I know what things Nature has made the occasions of Happiness and Misery to them ? The Answer is, We find by Experience, *i. e.* by the Effect neighbouring Bodies have upon us, that such is the Make of a human Mind, and such the Nature of external things, that the Presence and Operation of these will necessarily produce Pleasure and Pain in the other : And since Mankind are all cast into the same Mold, and fram'd after the same manner, these things, which are matters of Pleasure and Pain to one, will be matters of Pleasure and Pain to others. Therefore what is fit for and agreeable to me as a sensible Being, is fit for and agreeable to any other in the same Circumstances : And what is unfit for and disagreeable to me as a sensible Being, will be so to any other. Hence, by knowing what is good

good and convenient for myself, I know what is good and convenient for Beings of the same sort with myself; and consequently am as well qualify'd to discover what will, and what will not, make for their Happiness, as for my own.

S E C T. IV.

Of a STATE of NATURE.

DEFINIT. **B**Y a State of Nature we understand a State antecedent to the Constitution of Civil Government, when no particular Man, or Body of Men, were authoris'd to give Laws, and enforce Obedience to them.

DEFINIT. 2. By Right we mean a Liberty to do, to possess, or use that thing we are said to have a Right in, agreeably to our own Will: provided it be never contrary to, but always directed by the Law of Nature.

COROL. From our Definition of Right, it appears that there cannot be contrary Rights.

AXIOM I. The Measure of Men's Actions in a State of Nature, as also the Authority which was universally appeal'd to, for the accommodating all Differences relating to Life, Liberty, and Property, was Reason.

AXIOM II. The Reason of the present System of things being the common Happiness, the greater quantity

quantity of it is brought into the Creation, the more fully is God's Design therein answer'd.

AXIOM III. When an Inconsistency of Happiness arises from the natural Order and Occurrences of things, it is the Will of the Deity, that the Happiness of the greater Number be prefer'd to that of the less.

AXIOM IV. But if this Inconsistency should arise from the untoward concurrence of Mens Wills and Acts, 'tis his Will that the Happiness of those who do not deviate from the Law of Reason, be prefer'd to the Happiness of those who do.

AXIOM V. When the universal Toleration of certain Actions tends more, on the whole, to the Misery of this System, than their universal Prohibition, such a Toleration is wrong.

PROP. I. *Mankind have a Right in their Powers of Mind and Body ; and consequently a Right to use them for the attaining that End which their Reason discovers them to be made for, and their Constitution points out to them.* If they had not, the Scheme of Creation would come short of its original Design : For, as God fram'd his Creatures with proper Capacities for Happiness, he intended they should have all that share of it which Creatures placed in their Circumstances could acquire ; and, if so, he certainly gave them Liberty to use those Powers he endow'd them with for the attaining this End.

And from hence it is that we derive our Right and Property in Creatures, *viz.* from their Usefulness to preserve, and continue us in a comfortable Existence.

PROP. II.

PROP. II. *Things naturally common become the Subjects of private Property, by Labour and prime Possession.* When A, B, and C, have a common, and consequently an equal Right to the Object X; what may be done by A in respect of it, may likewise be done by B or C: And, if so, then to prevent those Differences which must unavoidably arise among them from the clashing of their respective Claims, it is necessary to reduce their Number, by fixing the whole Property in some one of them. And this must be done by his annexing something of his own to it, *i. e.* by Labour. For since the whole subsists but by the united Labour and Industry of its several Parts, whatever destroys Labour, or takes away the Motives to it, robs the whole of the means of its Support; which is inconsistent with the Will of the Deity: But the Motive to Labour is the presumption of a Liberty to use such things as are acquir'd by it; consequently (since all Right is founded in publick Good) Labour gives a right to the Effects of it, *i. e.* Labour is the means of Appropriation. Since also some extraordinary degree of Labour generally accompanies the first Possession of a thing, therefore the first Possessor has a greater Right to it than any other.

Rights admit of a Division into Natural and Acquired. The former all Men, as such, are born with: The latter they obtain by the Use and Exercise of the other.

Property, as distinguish'd into two sorts, Natural and Acquired, seems to admit of degrees, in respect of the Proprietor. What we have a natural Right in, seems to be more immediately our own, than what is acquired; and for this Reason, because it is more a Part of, and consequently more

more essential to our Being : And consequently the Invasion of natural Property is more injurious than that of acquired.

PROP. III. *Mankind before the Institution of civil Societies were, in respect of Dominion, naturally free and equal.* For, since A stands in the same Relation to B, that B does to A, the Consequence is, that A has no more Right of Dominion over B, than B has reciprocally over A ; it being self-evident that Beings, coming alike out of the same hand, must stand alike entitled to the same Privileges, and consequently no one can have a Right to exercise any Power over another, which that other has not as much Right to exercise over him.

COROL. On this State of Freedom and Equality, in which all Men naturally are before the Rise of Government, rest the two great Pillars of Religion, mutual Benevolence and Equity. For, since A is the same to B that B is to A, and B to C as C is to B, and so on ; it follows, that A can be under no greater Ties to assist B, than B is to assist A ; consequently B has as much Reason to expect Acts of Favour from A, as A has from B ; consequently, as A does to B, so must he expect to be done by : And therefore, as Men tender their own Happiness, it is necessary for them to manifest such a Behaviour towards others, as they would desire others to shew towards them in like Circumstances.

PROP. IV. *Those Propositions, which express what particular Actions will introduce the greatest Moment of Happiness into human Life, are the true Laws of human Nature.* This is so evident, that it scarce needs

needs Proof: For, as some things naturally tend to Man's Happiness, so others as naturally tend to his Misery; and as every Law necessarily infers Obligation, and Obligation Happiness, so nothing can be a Law to Man's Nature, which tends not directly, or consequentially, to his Happiness; and consequently the Object of human Laws must be human Happiness; and therefore those Propositions, which declare what particular Actions will produce the greatest Quantity of it, are to be look'd upon as the proper Laws of human Nature, and submitted to as such.

COROL. Since the moral Importance of Actions, or the Moment of Good produced by them, is directly as the Quantity of Good in the Action, and the Number of Enjoyers, therefore, in laying down a Rule of Action, Care must be taken, that the number of Persons, who may be benefited or incommoded by it, be brought into the Account: For the Pleasures of a few Individuals ought not to be consulted at the expence of the Happiness of large Societies; and in all Divisions the Happiness of the Greater Number ought to take place of that of the Lesser.

COROL. 2. Hence to transgress such Laws as are absolutely necessary to the good of the Whole, upon account of their opposition to private Happiness, is a breaking in upon the Laws of human Happiness, and consequently contrary to the last Proposition.

PROP. V. Reason is always uniform and consistent with herself; or, what may be done by A in any given Circumstance, may be done by any other in the same Circumstance. If A in a State of Nature has

no right to do what B, or C, or any other has not the same right to do, then whatever is reasonable in A must be the same in B or C, or any other, in the like Situation.

And if this universally holds with regard to Men in their natural Capacity, so does it in any other in Life, provided their Condition and Settlement in it be alike ; because, when Men's Circumstances and Situation are the same, they are still as it were, in respect of each other, in a State of Nature.

COROL. Hence it is that Reason, by being thus invariably the same, can never enjoin two contradictory things ; and consequently 'tis absurd to say, that we are obliged to act thus in some given Cases, and not so in others, when the Reason is the same in both. This one Consideration, if attended to, will teach a Man how to act in any particular Case ; and consequently how to discharge his Duty in any Station which, by the Providence of God, he finds himself placed in.

COROL. 2. Hence we are taught this great Truth, *viz.* That the Law of Nature requires that we do to others as we desire that others should do to us in parallel Cases. This is the Sum and Substance of our Duty, as we are rational dependent Beings : And he, whose Actions correspond to these unchangeable Laws of Reason and Equity, performs all that God and Man can require of him, and consequently cannot fail of rendering himself the suitable Object of God's Favour and Approbation, in consequence of which he stands entitled to all that share of Happiness, which was originally design'd for such a Creature.

COROL. 3. Thus we have a Mark by which we may judge of the reasonableness or unreasonableness of our Acts as they stand related to the Happiness or Misery of others, *viz.* the substituting ourselves in their room, and considering how we should be pleased or displeased, were the same Acts done to us by others, as are by us done to them: And therefore, would Men be but at the pains of asking themselves this Question, "How should I like or dislike, if others should in the same Circumstances do that to me?" they would plainly discover the Rule of their Duty, and what their God required of them.

We may here observe, that tho' the State of Nature be a State of Equality, yet it hath its Bounds. Men living in that State are not at liberty to follow the irregular Sallies of an unbridled Will, or to close with every Temptation that solicits their Choice: No, it is only a Freedom from the Compulsion and Restraint of others. And this was the Reason of our adding in the Definition of Right, provided it (*viz. Will*) be never contrary to, but always directed by the Law of Nature.

Before we proceed any further, it may not be amiss to enquire what limitations we are under from the Law of Nature, in respect of such Acts as concern ourselves and others.

By the Law of Nature we mean, as above, a certain Rule directing the Actions of all rational Beings in prosecution of each other's Happiness, *i. e.* it wills the Happiness of the whole human Species: Consequently, since all Religion, as such, arises from, and presupposes a religious Motive and Excitement, *i. e.* a Desire of pleasing God, natural Religion must mean, a Disposition in us to serve him, by promoting as much as may be the Happiness

piness of all within our Power. The Question then is, What means publick Happiness? or, In what does it consist?

What Happiness is, and from whence it arises, has been shewn above. Now publick Happiness, or the Happiness of any Society of Men, is made up of the Happiness of all the several Individuals in that Society. The Good of the Whole being nothing but the Sum total of the several degrees of private Good, which every Individual, or Part of the Whole enjoys. And since all human Beings include in their Idea finiteness and dependency, and consequently an inability to acquire singly such a degree of Happiness as will render Life a Comfort to them, it is evident, that this Happiness must be the produce of the joint Endeavours of the several Parts contributing to it. From whence it follows;

1. That it is the Will of the Deity, that all particular Beings promote the common Good preferably to any other Consideration.

2. That they abstain from such Acts as *directly* or *indirectly* break in upon the Rights of others, *i. e.* their means of Happiness.

3. That as the Happiness of the Whole is but the Happiness of the several Individuals collectively, therefore it is the Duty of every Man to make himself happy in proportion to his Abilities.

4. Since the removal or prevention of any degree of Misery is of equal value with the introduction of the same degree of Happiness, therefore, to guard others against the Evils they are liable to, is as much a Man's Duty, as his immediately promoting their Happiness.

5. Since all Beings were made for Happiness, No one can have a Right to disturb another's Happiness.

Happiness, or deprive him of the means of it, much less to take away his Life.

6. Since Mankind by a mutual connection of Parts constitutes one Body or Whole, and consequently every Individual comes under an Obligation to be subservient to the Good of that Whole, so no one can willingly withdraw himself from it, without acting in violation of that natural Right and Interest which others have in him, and which it was the Will of God that they should have.

PROP. VI. *The Law of Nature gives every Man a Right to punish those who transgress it.* Mens Rule of Action in a State of Nature directed them to the Promotion of a common Happiness; consequently whoever violates this Rule, breaks in upon the publick Law, and contributes his Quota towards the introduction of universal Misery. But this interferes with the Will of the Deity: Therefore his Will is, that all such Obstacles and Impediments be removed out of the way to other Mens Happiness, *i. e.* he gives Men a Right to punish such an one, and treat him as a common Enemy to their common Peace; it making for the Good of the Whole (because likely to deter the Offender and all such from the like evil Practices for the future) “That he, who is a Contributor to, be a Sharer in the Miseries of others.”

COROL. Hence, tho’ it be the natural Privilege of Mankind to acknowledge no one common Superior, yet, the State of Nature having a Law which directs Mens Actions in respect of each other, it subjects such as violate it to a degree of Punishment proportioned to the nature and extent of such a Violation: But this Right of Punishment is not in the least inconsistent with Mens

natural Equality, because it is not founded in any original Right in B, or C, or any other, to inflict this or that degree of Punishment on A, but in A's deviating from that Principle which was to be the Standard of Mens Actions out of Society; and which gives a common Right to all the Society of calling him to account.

PROP. VII. *What is taken from a Man against his Consent, i. e. by Force, or Fraud, he has a Right to recover by the best means he can.* Since whatever A does, B, C, and D have the same Reason for doing, in like Circumstances; if the one be permitted to enjoy quietly what he has acquired fraudulently, so may the other. But the universal allowance of such Practices would be productive of universal Misery; consequently they ought to be restrain'd. See *Axiom 5. pag. 64. SECT. III.* Consequently, since B has no Right to take or detain such a thing, A must have a Right to recover it by the best means in his Power.

And if A retains a Right to what is taken from him by Fraud or Force, he must, when passing thro' a variety of Hands, the thing is lost, or cannot be repossess'd, have a Right to some other thing of equal Value. And since every thing is of a certain Value to the Proprietor, to have the Value of a thing is the same as to have the thing itself; consequently, if he cannot recover the latter, he has a Right to the former.

COROL. When B's (the Invader's) Effects are not in value equal to what he has taken from A his Neighbour, A from hence derives a Right to B's Labour; or, to speak more properly, to the Effects of it, 'till such time as all Damages be ballanced.

COROL. 2. The Invasion of another's Property gives him a Right both to punish the Invader, and also to an Equivalent for the Expences he has been at in the Recovery of his own.

PROP. VIII. *A design'd Attempt upon the Life or Liberty of another gives him upon whom the Attack is made a Right to destroy his Adversary.* That the Good of the Whole should be strictly prosecuted, and in all cases prefer'd to matters of private Concern, is enjoin'd by the Deity. See *Corollary I. SECT. IV.* And, if so, it must be his Will, that all such tainted Members, which naturally spread their Infection, and consequently tend to disorder the Whole, be cut off. See *Corollary of Axiom 4.*

And this Right not only extends to the destroying such as would take away our Lives, but those who attack our Liberties : For Men in a State of Freedom, and Men in a State of Slavery, are, as it were, two different sorts of Creatures ; the one are in a capacity of tasting all the Sweets of Life, the other not : Freedom from the Restraint of others is the only Security of a Man's Person ; and therefore, when that is once taken away, *i. e.* when a Man is subjected to the arbitrary Will and Power of another, he cannot but expect to be hardly dealt with ; his Life must be dependent on the other's Pleasure both as to its Continuance, and easiness in Condition.

PROP. IX. *The End of all Punishment, either in or out of Society, is the common Happiness and Security.* In respect of divine Punishments we observe,

That

That God cannot punish without some Reason for his doing so ; but the exciting Reason to Punishment cannot be contrary to the prior exciting one to Creation ; otherwise he would unwill at one time what he will'd at another, *i. e.* his latter Will would be contrary to his first, and consequently there would be a Change in him, which we have shewn to be impossible : And if his End in punishing cannot but tally with his End in creating, it is certain he cannot punish but for the better Security and Happiness of his Creatures.

By supposing him to punish for Punishment's sake, we contradict all or most of the Truths demonstrated above concerning Him. We cast a shade upon his moral Character, and represent him as peevish, ill-natur'd, and revengeful : we make him to take pleasure in the Misery he *unnecessarily* communicates to others ; I say unnecessarily, because it furthers not, but opposes his primary End, and consequently makes him at odds with himself ; all which are monstrous Absurdities.

In respect of human Punishments, as when, and in what degree to be inflicted, we observe,

That, as all Right flows from the Law of Nature directing us to the publick Good, so the Right of Punishment cannot rise higher, nor extend further, but must be limited by that Law ; But the fundamental Law of Nature is, *that all if possible be preserv'd, and made happy* ; therefore, when the Good and Safety of some can be provided for, without the Misery of others, *i. e.* without Punishment, it is required that such Punishment be postponed, or remitted.

But tho' Nature, or its Author, might dictate this, yet since the limitedness of human Understandings

standings hinders them from knowing who are true Penitents, and consequently will reform, and who are otherwise : And since every exemption from Punishment is made an additional Motive to the Offender to tread the same Steps over again, (as also an Encouragement to others to be vicious, seeing they have the same Reason to expect the like Indulgence) necessary therefore it is that some be made the marks of publick Vengeance ; because, when Lenity and Forgiveness become more detrimental in their consequences to the Whole than Severity and Rigidness, Lenity then commences Cruelty, and ought not to be exercised ; the Happiness of Millions being more to be regarded than that of some few Individuals.

We may observe, by way of Inference from this Proposition, that the infliction of Punishment for no other end than merely to satisfy a Principle of Revenge, or Heat of Passion, is wrong.

PROP. X. *A may give B his Property upon such Terms as they shall agree on betwixt themselves.* What A has the Right in, he may dispose of for what Use he pleases : Consequently, if he gives it B, either by way of Exchange, or in consideration of Favours receiv'd or expected, or as a Present, he does nothing but what he has a Right to do ; and it is evident, that where there is no violation of Right there is no Injustice. Besides, if Men were not at liberty to use and dispose of what was their own as they pleas'd, one great motive to Labour would be taken away ; because most Men labour not to supply their own Wants, but chiefly to gratify their Inclinations, and satisfy the Claims of Relations, Friends, and Acquaintance ; and no small part of their Happiness, as things now are, arises from these good Offices to others.

Nor

Nor does B's Act, in accepting A's Property, interfere with any one's Right ; for he comes into Possession by the consent of the right Owner. Therefore the alienation is right, or the thing is rightly transfer'd to him ; and if the thing be rightly transfer'd, he becomes by the Terms the right Possessor of it.

COROL. To have a Property in any thing, and to have the Right of disposing of it, are one and the same thing ; and consequently in whom the Right of Disposal lodges not, neither in him lodges the Property of that thing.

COROL. 2. Hence he who uses or disposes of what is not his, but another's, uses and disposes of what he has no Right to dispose of ; and therefore he is guilty of Injustice, and consequently acts counter to the Will of the Deity, because all Injustice is connected with Misery, and productive of it.

On the last Proposition is also founded the Right of Barter, *i. e.* of A's transferring to B his Title in Lands, Money, Goods, &c. in lieu of an Equivalent from B. The necessity of such an Inter-course appears further from hence, That Mens Necessities cannot be provided for without it ; for every thing we make use of goes thro' a variety of Hands : Hence the necessity of different Men being brought up in different Trades and Employments, in order to their mutually contributing to each others Necessities and Conveniencies. If A barters such things away with B as are less convenient for him, tho' more so to B, for such as are more convenient for him, tho' less so to B, it is evident that much Advantage arises from such an Exchange to the Publick : In short, with

without such an Intercourse, Mankind cannot subsist.

To the validity of all Contracts and Bargains betwixt two or more Persons, there seem to be two things necessary; an equality of Knowledge, and an equality of Wills; it being necessary for both to be acquainted with the Defects as well as Goodness of the things under Exchange; otherwise they both act contrary to *Proposition 5*. An Equality of Wills, that both he who transfers his Title, and the other who accepts it, do it voluntarily, because what is against Will is against Happiness.

COROL. Hence whoever exposes any thing to sell, and conceals from the Buyer's Knowledge the Faults it has, and who requires more for it than he knows it to be really worth; whoever, I say, does this, is guilty of Injustice, and does to others as he would not desire to be done by himself.

PROP. XI. *Veracity, or declaring by Word or Action, things to be what they really are, is agreeable to the Will of the Deity, and consequently our Duty.* Man's Happiness, present or future, flows from his acting rightly: In order to which it is necessary that he have a previous knowledge of the Nature and Extent of things around him, and that he distinguish betwixt the Real, and Apprehended means of Happiness: But his Knowledge is not commensurate with every thing in which he is concerned; hence the Necessity of the assistance of others to this End: And consequently, as we founded the Right of Traffick on its subserviency to the Happiness and Conveniency of Mankind, so with equal Reason and Necessity may we establish

blish a Commerce for the giving and receiving of Advice, Instruction, &c. But since every Failure herein, i. e. every Misinformation, is sure to be attended with great and numberless Inconveniences, as it necessarily betrays Men into Errors and Perplexities; from hence therefore arises the necessity of owning and expressing, by Word and Act, or any other Sign, natural or instituted, Things and the Relations subsisting betwixt them, to be what they really are.

The Order and Harmony so prevalent in the whole of Things; the geometrical Arrangement of the World within and without us; the Conspiration of the several Phænomena of Nature to one common End; in short, the same uniform Method inviolably observ'd by the several Species and Orders of Beings moving and acting in just Conformity with the respective Laws of their Nature, gives us plainly to understand the Design of such an Adjustment of Things, viz. that it is to teach Mankind, and other rational Creatures, what will be the necessary Effect of any Series of Action in Life; to inform them how to calculate the Probability or Improbability of Events in any given Situation. And in virtue of these Laws, always acting after the same invariable manner, we are enabled to supply the Defects of Nature by the assistance of Art. God, as a tender Parent concern'd for the Happiness and Welfare of his Creatures, tells Mankind that he excludes all Confusion and Disorder (the natural and unavoidable Consequents of Things subservient to no Laws, but left to move and act at random) out of the Creation, as being inconsistent with their Happiness; for not to do this, would be to frustrate all our Schemes of Action, so far as they were dependent on Externals; to render all our
Expectations

Expectations vain, and Projects abortive; therefore, whoever inverts the Order of Nature, by declaring things to be otherwise than they really are, counter-acts the Laws of Creation, and consequently the Will of the Deity.

If Truth and Faithfulness were not obligatory upon Mankind, they could place no Trust in, nor have any Dependence on one another; which their Circumstances in Life absolutely require; consequently in the same Degree that these are necessary to our Happiness, are the other necessary also.

PROP. XII. *A free Commerce betwixt the two Sexes, or a promiscuous Use of each other, is introductive to general Disorder, and therefore inconsistent with general Happiness.* The Tendency of such a Practice, *i. e.* of Fornication, to introduce and propagate all manner of Confusion seems to be unavoidable. For all Men coming into the World with the same natural Freedom, what may be done or omitted by one, may be done or omitted by any other; therefore B, C, or D have as much Right to enjoy *this* Woman, as A has, and A as much Right as they; consequently, when their Desires rise high, and Passions grow turbulent, what will they do, or rather what will they not do, to come to a Gratification of them? and consequently in the midst of such an unrestrain'd Freedom, we should have little else but Wranglings and Contentions in the World, little of that Harmony and Agreement which was designed to run thro' the whole.

If every Man had to do with as many Women as he pleased; in the midst of such a confus'd Combination of Causes, A could not distinguish his own Children from those of B, or C, or D; it would

would indeed be impossible that he should ; but no Man could be induced to take care of that which he believes not his own ; consequently such a general Neglect in the Nurture and Cultivation of Children would soon unpeople the World ; and therefore such a Practice is contrary to the Will of the Creator.

To conclude ; we find it suitable to the Conveniency of Mankind, that all things to which all in common have an original, and consequently an equal Right, should be, by some Cause or other, made the Subjects of private Property ; and consequently 'tis necessary that a Restriction be made in this as in all other Instances of Property.

There is one Objection in Favour of the Lawfulness of Fornication, which is, that when two Persons have freely consented to cohabit together as Man and Wife, does not such a mutual Consent take off the Immorality of that Cohabitation ? for neither of them does any Injury to the other ; agreeably to the old Maxim, *volenti non fit Injuria*. But the Answer to this is obvious ; for if one Man ought to keep inviolably to one Woman, and *vice versa* ; then whatever Institution tends to consolidate more effectually their common Interests, to establish an Harmony and Union of Hearts, and preserve an Intimacy and Conspiration of Wills, thro' every Period of their Lives, must be agreeable to, and promotive of, this End. But nothing is more conducive thereto, than those solemn Contracts by which the Persons contracting come under religious Engagements to the Observance thereof.

C O R O L. From the last Proposition we gather, that all such concupiscible Affections as are directed

directed to improper Objects, are, in their degree, criminal, and therefore to be stifled ; it being demonstrative, that “ All Desires unlawful to be “ carried into Act, cannot be allow’d lawfully to “ make any stay in the Mind ; because, by continuing there, they may grow too strong and “ powerful to subside. ”

PROP. XIII. *Gratitude, or a voluntary promoting the Happiness of others, in consideration of Favours receiv’d, is exjoin’d by the Deity.* As rational sensible Beings, Men cannot act in contra-distinction from their own Happiness : As free and equal, A can be under no more obligations to assist B, than B is to A. See *Corol. of Prop. 3.* Consequently A has the same Expectations, and therefore the same Demands upon B for acts of Favour, as B has upon A : Consequently, if A communicates his good Offices to B, he expects the same again from him ; and if he should meet with no such return from B, the current of kind Offices would be stopt ; but, as the Happiness of the Whole not only arises from, but is actually secured by, such an Intercourse, it is the Will of the Deity, that acts of Favour be answered by suitable Returns, and consequently that the communications of Happiness should ever reciprocate, and be continued.

Gratitude is also connected with private Happiness, and consequently our Duty ; for Mankind around us will be universally influenced to promote our Happiness, or the contrary, in proportion to the Sense they find we have of Favours.

PROP. XIV. *The possessing in greater degrees Power, Riches, Understanding, &c. gives no right to condemn such as possess less of them, or to demand Submission from them.*

Men being by *Prop. 3.* naturally free, no one individual Man, or Set of Men, have a right to exercise Power over others : Consequently Man's natural State being a State of Equality, Pride, or an affectation of Superiority over others, as it is inconsistent with such Equality, is inconsistent with our natural State.

The Happiness of any Society, or System of Beings consists in the Happiness of the several Constituents collectively ; which Happiness is the Result of a combined Union of Will and Actions in pursuit of it. This Harmony of Wills, and Correspondency of Actions, Pride absolutely destroys ; for it breaks the Chain of Mens Dependency on one another ; and consequently, takes away all Sense of their Obligation to promote each other's Happiness ; and consequently, as it weakens the general Interest, it must be destructive of the designs of Creation, and therefore inconsistent with the Creator's Will.

God, by making us rational dependent Beings, plainly gives us to understand, that we should act as Beings dependent on him, for what we are and have : But Pride stifles all our Sense of Dependency on God ; it makes us view ourselves in a Mirror, disproportionate to our genuine appearance, and unsuitable to our present Circumstances and Condition.

Upon the whole, In proportion to the Sense of our Dependency on God shall we be influenced to conform ourselves to his Will, *i. e.* our Obedience to him will hold proportion to our Sense of Dependency on him : And the more obedient we are to him, and the more we strive to imitate him in his moral Qualities, *i. e.* in his extensive Love and Beneficence to Mankind, the more we must necessarily approve ourselves to him ; therefore what-
ever

ever takes away, and in whatever degree, this sense of Dependency, contributes so much to the Loss of private personal Happiness : But this Pride always does in some degree ; *Ergo, &c.*

COROL. Hence it appears, that an eager and immoderate pursuit after Honour, Fame, Popularity or Distinction ; that all high and aspiring Thoughts, all ambitious Views, all Affections and Desires, whose End and Objects are Power and Superiority over others, are, in their degree criminal ; for, if the End be evil, the Cause of it cannot, by the Terms, be good.

PROP. XV. *All Defamation and Detraction, and whatever tends to hurt the good Name, and lessen the Credit of others, interferes with the Will of the Deity.*

All other rational Beings will be disposed to promote our Happiness in proportion to the Esteem they have for us ; which Esteem is either founded on our voluntarily contributing to their Happiness, or else is owing to the fairness of our Character in Life ; consequently, whoever endeavours by Slander, Abuse, or Scurrility, *i. e.* by speaking of us otherwise than we deserve, to rob us of our good Name, robs us at the same time of the Esteem of others, and therefore robs us of our Happiness, which is against the Will of the Deity.



S E C T. V.

Concerning MARRIAGE, and the DUTIES of Persons in that State.

PROP. I. **M**EN and Women were originally design'd for the Use and Enjoyment of each other. The Difference in the Make of the Two Sexes, and the reciprocal strong Desires towards an Union of them, are so many Signs that God framed them thus to serve the great Ends of Creation : Consequently it is his Will that these Laws of Procreation be fulfilled after such a manner, and to such a degree, as best suits the general Happiness.

The Circumstances of the two Sexes have such a dependency on one another, as to make the kind Offices of each other absolutely necessary to their living comfortably in the World. The Author of Nature has allotted them their proper Provinces, and so laid them under mutual Obligations to be assisting to one another : And since a greater Quantity of Happiness will necessarily arise from an establish'd Harmony of Wills, and Union of Interests, it follows that Marriage must be a Duty enjoin'd by the Deity, because it has this tendency. See *Prop.* 12. SECT. IV.

COROL. The End of Marriage, we see, is twofold, viz. the Propagation of our Kind, and the common Happiness of the Conjuges. Consequently, when the two Parties go together (which is sometimes the Case) without any view to the former, or, if they have any such view, yet Nature

ture has not Strength to propagate its Kind, it follows, that a more easy and convenient way of subsisting must be the sole End of their marrying; and consequently, the more Happiness they enjoy in an united, than they could in a single Capacity, or State, the better is the End of Marriage answered.

COROL. 2. Hence whoever enters into this State with a view distinct from either of these Ends, *i. e.* either to bring about some private Purposes, or to give a greater loose to sensual Pleasures, inverts the great Order God has establish'd in his Creation.

COROL. 3. Since Happiness, a common Happiness, is one of the great Ends of Mans and Womans Co-union, whatever tends to alienate the Affections of the one from the other, and to render their Interests indifferent to each other, is a direct Violation of this End, and consequently wrong.

COROL. 4. Hence Adultery, and great Familiarities with other Persons, are productive of great and numberless Evils; they give rise to domestick Broils, and sometimes sow such Seeds of Dissention betwixt Husband and Wife as can scarce ever be eradicated: Consequently all such Practices are inconsistent with the End of the Marriage-State.

I know it may be objected, that if such an Intercourse could be carried on without any knowledge or Suspicion of the Party injured, it would not be unlawful. I might answer,

That a Crime is not the less so, by being committed without the knowledge of others. Privacy,

as such, cannot make that Action good, or indifferent, which essentially, or in its own Nature, is otherwise.

But I answer, secondly, That great Detriment must necessarily arise to the Party injur'd ; it being demonstrable, that in proportion to the Nature and Number of such Intrigues, the Wife will grow regardless of the Husband's Interests, cold and indifferent to his Person, and mindless of his Affairs : For, instead of managing her proper Concerns, and seeing that every thing be dispos'd of to the advantage of them both, she is contriving Methods, and forming Schemes, to follow her Amours with greater Secrecy and Security ; which, sooner or later, must infallibly end in the Ruin and Destruction of them both. We need not be at the trouble of ransacking Histories for Instances of this kind.

Tho' I have spoken here only of the Wife, I would not have any one infer that the Husband is at liberty to do what she has been condemn'd for : The Duty and Liberty of them both are bounded by the same End, the mutual Happiness of each other.

DEFINIT. *Marriage is a Contract, by which the two Parties expressly consent to the Use of each other's Person and Estate.*

POSTULAT. *Marriage necessarily implies some Form to be used, expressive of the End for which the two Parties marry, and declare their Assent to the Conditions which the Marriage-Contract is founded on. This Idea all or most Men conceive of Marriage ; and some such Ceremony is us'd amongst all Nations.*

We

We may observe, that, since Mens situation in Life makes Marriage necessary to their delightful way of living, it must, as such, be a Duty enjoined by the Deity ; because he makes every thing to become so, that is necessary to their Happiness ; and consequently, in this Sense, all such Institutions may properly be said to be of divine Establishment.

When such a Covenant as the matrimonial is made betwixt two Persons, neither of them can in Justice with-hold from fulfilling the Conditions of it.

And since Institutions, however well calculated for the Good of Mankind, may be abused ; and as Oaths, and the most solemn Promises are insufficient to bind some Men to their Duty, it has therefore been found necessary for the Civil Powers to render the Marriage-Compact more full and obligatory by temporal Enforcements ; that when any Injury is done to either, the Party injured may have redress. Such wise Provision have human Laws made for human Happiness, by securing as much as possible so weighty a Concern as that of Marriage.

PROP. II. *Poligamy in the present State of things is of pernicious Consequence, and ought not to be tolerated.* For, where there is a multiplicity of Wives, or Husbands, there, of course, is a division of Interests ; and where a division of Interests is, there Jars, Wranglings, and Discontents are unavoidable.

PROP. III. *The Author of Nature has given neither of the Conjuges an absolute Power and Superiority over the other.* For, as he wills the Happiness of them both, and consequently the means of it, so,

in all Divisions touching their common Interests, he wills that the weaker Capacity give place to the stronger ; because the latter can best discern what will be most for their Happiness ; and therefore Superiority of Understanding, wherever the Deity has given it, was design'd by him to have the Preference, or to be submitted to.

As Men are generally better qualified to see into the remote Consequences of Actions, they seem universally to claim a Superiority over the Women. 'Tis true, their natural Capacities are sometimes, and their Opportunities for Improvement often, much better than those of Women. But that is not always the Case. And when it is the Misfortune of a wise Woman to have a foolish Husband, if she be not permitted to sit at the Helm of Affairs, and manage their Family Concerns, they must expect to be soon visited with Want and Woe.

If in the Marriage-Contract the Wife expressly promises to pay Submission to her Husband, she so far ought to be subject to him ; because, if Promises were not obligatory, Men could place no Confidence in each other ; and without such a dependence on one anothers Words Mankind could not subsist. But this can only take place in Cases of an indifferent Nature ; for whenever there is a prior Reason against paying Obedience, no subsequent Promise can oblige to it, unless we could find out something more binding than Happiness.

PROP. IV. *When two Persons upon mutual liking of each others Persons, Estates, &c. voluntarily consent to be join'd in Marriage for Life ; if they would behave as Man and Wife ought to do, they must direct themselves by the following Considerations.*

1. They must consider themselves as each having,
not

not a private and separate, but a joint and undivided Interest, and conduct their Pursuits accordingly.

2. They must be true and faithful, loving and assisting to each other, in all Circumstances, and under all Changes of Condition. They must bear with one another's Infirmities, considering them as necessary to human Nature, and inseparable from it; always remembering that they are not only to promote the Happiness, but also to alleviate the Miseries of each other.

3. They must be constant to their Bed, and keep themselves solely each for the Use and Enjoyment of the other.

Having consider'd the Duties of Husband and Wife, we shall pass on to those of Parents and Children.

S E C T. VI.

Concerning the DUTIES of PARENTS and CHILDREN.

PROP. I. **W**HEN the Husband and Wife commence Parents, they are obliged to maintain their Children after the best manner they can. As Parents concur with the Deity to the Being of their Children, he intends that they concur with him to their Well-being; or he causes it to be their Duty to make a suitable Provision for their Happiness: Consequently, if A, according to the establish'd Laws of Creation, should give Existence to B, and neglect to make that Existence an Happiness to

to him, such an Omission interferes with the Will of the Deity, and consequently is wrong.

The several Orders of Beings beneath us both obey the Laws of Procreation, and are careful, even to Amazement, in preserving their Young 'till such time as they are able to seek their Living by themselves ; and what deserves much to be remark'd in this Case is, that we find their Love for their Offspring universally holds proportion to the degrees of their Dependency on them : A surprising Instance of God's Wisdom and Goodness in his providential Care of the animal World ! And, if this takes place in the inferior Parts of the Creation, how much more ought such a Provision to be made by Man, who, abstracted from the Impulses of Instinct, has a much more noble and excellent Principle, by which he is qualify'd to discover the natural Obligations he lies under to preserve and promote the Happiness of his own Productions.

To do to others as we desire others would do to us, in parallel Cases, is commanded by the Deity ; the Consideration therefore of our former State, of the absolute necessity of the Aid and Assistance of others to conduct us thro' all the hazardous windings of an helpless Infancy, safe into a proper Path of Actions, would teach us how we ourselves should act towards our Children : And if, after such consideration, Parents do not carry themselves towards their Children in a manner suitable to their tender Years, or if they deny them such things as their Circumstances absolutely require, they do what they cannot but know was never done to them when they were Children ; or, was the Supposition possible, would wish to be done to them, were they to return into their primitive State, *i. e.* they act in contradiction to *Prop. 5.*
SECT.

SECT. IV. and consequently against the Interest of the Whole.

COROL. 1. Since Maintenance is a Debt of Nature, a Bastard must have as much Right to it as one of a legitimate Issue.

COROL. 2. Since Children have a natural Claim upon their Parents for a Maintenance, and consequently a natural Right to their Estates, it follows, that such Estates (when the Parents die intestate) ought to descend to their Children in preference to any others.

PROP. II. *When the Mother dies, she has the same Right with the Father to dispose of her Share of the common Stock to their Children.* The Marriage-Contract gives each of them a Right in the Effects of the other; consequently both have an equal Right to the Whole; and if an equal Right to the Whole, then an equal Right to the disposal of it: (for to have a Property in any thing, and to have the Right of disposing it, is the same; See also Corol. 1. Prop. 10. SECT. IV.) Consequently the Wife has as much Right to dispose of her Share, as the Husband has of his.

Since, by Supposition, both are Contributors to, both ought to be Disposers of, what they possess; otherwise all exciting Reasons to add to the common Stock would cease.

PROP. III. *When the Husband and Wife die childless, and intestate, their Estates ought to return to those from whence they came.* For if they did not, the great Motive to Beneficence would be taken away, and consequently the Current of kind Offices stop.

PROP.

PROP. IV. *If Parents are to take care of their Childrens Interests, and watch over them for their Good, they from hence derive an Authority over them.* There is a degree of Power annex'd to every Relation in Life, sufficient for the Discharge of those Duties which arise from it, *i. e.* which belong to Beings in that Relation : Consequently, as Parents stand in the Relation of Guardians of the Childrens Happiness, they have a Right to compel their Children to the performance of such Actions as are the sources of Good and Happiness to them. But this plainly implies an Act of Authority and Power ; for he, who obliges me to any Action, must be allow'd to have so far an Authority over me, or to be my Superior.

Besides, If Parents are entrusted by God with their Childrens Happiness, he must delegate to them a Power adequate to the bringing about this End, otherwise it cannot be obtain'd.

But some have carried this Authority of Parents to a much greater length. They say, Since God has an original Right in the Works of his Hands, and consequently to dispose of them for what End he pleases, so Parents, as Causes of their Children coming into Being, have a Right to oblige them to what Actions they please. But to this we answer, That, as Man is at present constituted, neither God nor any other Being has a Right to exercise any Power over him further than it is exercis'd for his Good. For, in consequence of that irresistible Appetite to Happiness, he has a Right to resist (when he has done nothing to forfeit it) any Authority which would deprive him of the least degree of it which he could acquire in a proper way, *i. e.* by the right Use of his Faculties.

COROL. The Authority of Parents over their Children is not founded on their being (under the First Cause) the Authors of their Beings, but on the natural Obligations to provide for their Childrens Happiness, *i. e.* it is founded on the dependency of the one upon the other.

COROL. 2. Hence, since the Parents Obligations to take care of their Children are greater or less, as the latter are more or less dependent on them, it follows that the Power of the Parents both extends to, and is limited by, the Childrens dependency on them.

COROL. 3. Consequently, when the Children are arriv'd to such Years as to become capable of acting for an End; when they are qualified to distinguish betwixt Good and Evil, and discern their Obligations to pursue the former, and avoid the latter, *i. e.* when they come to the Use of Reason, then expires the Parents Authority over them, Because, if their Authority is founded on the Childrens dependency, or incapacity of providing for themselves, then, when such dependency or incapacity ends, the Authority of Parents ceases also.

But tho' the Power of Parents varies according to the different Capacities and Circumstances of Children; and when the Child's Understanding opens as he advances in Years, and he becomes capable of guiding himself, the Parents Power proportionably decreases, 'till by degrees it dwindles into Nothing: Yet we may observe, that if the Son, when he is grown to Maturity, chooses to continue with his Father, and judges it best, upon the whole, to be there, it is but reasonable that he should be determin'd by his Father in such things

things as respect his own Interests; because his Acts relate not as yet to his own, but his Father's Concerns. But when the Father has once fixed him in the World, and made him a Transfer of part of his Estate, he has no more Right to resume it again, or to dispose of it, than another Man.

If the Question should arise, Has a Parent that Power over his Child as to sell him to another, when his own Circumstances cannot conveniently maintain them both? Our Opinion is, that a Father may, under certain restrictions, subject his Son to the Will and Power of another, 'till such time as the Son is capable of taking care of himself, and has ballanced the Expences of his bringing up. But the following *Axioms* will teach us how each Party is to act in any such Case.

AXIOM I. No one can give a greater Power than he is possess'd of himself; for that is to give what a Man has not, which is an express Contradiction.

AXIOM II. Since the Parents Power is limited by the Childrens Happiness, therefore, in Cases where their Happiness is no way concerned, Parents have no Authority over them.

AXIOM III. All deputed Power must be exercised according to the measure or degree given, and no further; because the Exercise of Power without Right is Usurpation, and founded in Injustice.

AXIOM IV. All Power given conditionally reverts back into the Principal's Hands, when the Conditions with which it was given are not perform'd.

AXIOM

AXIOM V. When all the Conditions, by virtue of which any Contract subsists, are fully satisfied, such Contract ceases.

The two first *Axioms* shew, that the Father can give no one an arbitrary Power over the Lives or Happiness of his Children ; for such a Power belonging not to him, cannot possibly be derived from him.

By the third *Axiom* we find, that the Master has no Right to exercise any Power but what is expressly mention'd in the Contract betwixt them.

By the fourth *Axiom* it appears, that if he exercises a Power not thus express'd in the Contract, or when the Conditions on his side are not observed, he forfeits his Trust, and the other has a Right to claim his Freedom.

And we find by the last *Axiom*, that when the time limited is come, and the Conditions agreed on by both Parties perform'd, the Authority of the one, and the Subjection of the other both expire.

But, tho' at Years of Maturity the Parents Authority ceases, yet their Councils and Admonitions end not here ; If Children employ what is left them by their Parents, not to the Good, but the Hurt of themselves ; and if they take such courses as not only endanger their present but future Happiness, then ought Parents to admonish them ; to tell them of the Ill they do, and the great risque they run, both with regard to this and another World, by entailing Misery unavoidably upon themselves ; as we shall shew in another Place : which Admonitions ought to be received willingly by Children, and have the greatest Weight with them,

them, knowing that they proceed from such as are most deeply concern'd in their Good or Ill.

What Parents ought to regard chiefly in the Education of their Children is, the directing them at their first going out, to the Path they should afterwards tread in ; and to enforce as strongly as possible their Obligation to a strict observance of all social and publick Virtues ; they should prune their growing Appetites, and see that they fix them on Objects suitable to their Nature, and present Condition. Parents, I say, ought to be wonderfully careful what Steps they let their Children take at first, because the Seeds of Virtue and Vice, which are sown in the early Years of Infancy, oftentimes take such deep Root, as not to be easily remov'd. Hence, given the Education and Habits of Youth, it is easy to characterise the whole Man ; because a Man's future Life is generally of a piece with his first setting out : only this difference is observable, that those Desires and Aversions, which take their rise in Childhood, grow stronger and more confirm'd by Years.

PROP. V. *When Children are freed from the Ties of Obedience, the Parents Consent is not of indispensable Necessity to their disposal in Marriage ; or, The Author of Nature has put the Contract of Marriage, not in the Will of the Parents, but of the Parties contracting.* Since the Parents Power is only to be exercis'd for the Happiness of the Children, and consequently extends but to the means of it, they can have no Power to dispose of them against their Consent ; because what is against Consent, is against Happiness, Happiness arising chiefly from a gratification of the Will : And if these have no Power to dispose of them against their Consent, they

they are entrusted with the Power and Liberty of choosing for themselves, as best knowing whose Person and Qualities are most agreeable to them.

Since it is not in our Power (whatever we may think) to like or dislike otherwise than as the Object appears, so, when Affection binds not the Hearts of two Persons before Marriage, it is seldom in their power to produce it after. The very Thought of being bound for life to a Person whose Company we do not relish, is naturally apt to create either a morose Temper, or discontented Mind, from whence flow all these Jars and Discords which imbitter the conjugal Life.

We are sensible many Arguments have been brought to justify both sides of the Question, but it is an unquestionable Principle with us, that those, who are most immediately interested in any Contract, ought chiefly to be consulted before it is made; and from the Marriage-Contract flow either the greatest Blessings, or the heaviest Evils: the Conjuges rarely find any Medium.

But, tho' we reject the absolute necessity, we contend for the expediency of the Parent's Consent; for there is a wide Difference betwixt these: It is indeed reasonable that our Parents, to whom we are so nearly related, and who have been so much concern'd for our Welfare, should be consulted on so important an occasion; since their own Happiness is so closely connected with it. But, tho' we allow this to be an Act expressive of Honour and Gratitude, yet we maintain that the neglect of it, or the want of such Consent, renders not the Marriage-Contract a Nullity.

From the foregoing Propositions flow the following *Corollaries*.

COROL. 1. The Authority of Parents reaches not the Lives and Liberties of the Children ; nor consequently the necessary Means of preserving them.

COROL. 2. They have no right to enjoin their Children what God has forbidden.

COROL. 3. Nor any right to oblige them to any thing inconsistent with the Happiness, or destructive of the Properties of others ; as being in both Cases under previous Obligations to the contrary.

PROP. VI. *If Parents are obliged to take care of their Childrens Interests, this Care in them ought to be answered by a suitable Behaviour in the Children, i. e. Children ought to be obedient to them.* If a Power to be exercis'd for the Childrens Good be lodg'd with the Parents, it ought to be answered by a suitable Behaviour on the Part of the Children ; because all Authority justly founded implies an Obedience suited to the Nature and Extent of it ; 'Till such time therefore as this Authority of theirs expires (which we prov'd to expire with the Childrens Dependency on them) so long is an Obedience due to them from their Children.

But tho' the Childrens Obedience ends with the Parents Authority, seeing where there is no Authority to command, there can be no Obligation to obey ; yet an obliging Carriage and respectful Behaviour is to be shewn on all occasions to them, since it has a powerful influence over all other Parents towards their Children, and consequently encreases the Happiness of the Whole.

PROP.

PROP. VII. *Children are not only obliged to do what is express'd in the former Proposition ; but when their Parents grow infirm, and incapable of providing for themselves, they are to help and assist them : This being a Debt of Gratitude, and what Prop. 13. SECT. IV. expressly requires. And consequently it is their Duty to do as much for them as is consistent with their engagements to the rest of the Creation.*

It may not be improper to observe, that as our Approbation and Disapprobation, our Love and Hatred of moral Characters is founded on their voluntarily contributing to our Happiness or Misery (as shall be shewn afterwards) so Childrens Love to their Parents will in a great measure depend on the Parents Behaviour towards them. For Love and Hatred are modifications of Mind not to be taken up and laid down at pleasure : They necessarily presuppose something in the Object capable of exciting them. To rouse this Affection to a principle of Action, it is necessary to improve every little hint and intimation of what they have done for us ; we must be sure to consider them as being under God the Authors of our Being, and of all the Benefits consequent upon it. This Consideration alone will go a great way both to raise and preserve the Affection in us.

PROP. VIII. *Parents and Children are not only obliged to promote each other's Happiness ; but also that of other Relations, according to the degree of the Relation. For, if it be the Will of the Deity, that Parents should promote their Childrens Happiness, and for this Reason, because they are related to them ; it must for the same Reason be his*

Will, that they pursue the Happiness of all other Relations in their proportion.

That warmth and vigour of Benevolence, which would soon be swallow'd up in the great Ocean of Beings that surround us, and would soon expire if diluted and diffused among Mankind in general, is preserv'd and kept entire by being contracted to the Branches of the same Stock, and confined to private Families ; and afterwards extended by degrees to larger Societies and Bodies of Men, as their respective Spheres of Action are enlarged. Hence 'tis necessary that the Current of our good Offices should in the first place be directed to those that are more immediately related to us, and flow towards them with a strength proportion'd to the several degrees of such Relation.

The only Business is to find out the degrees of Relation betwixt Descendents from the same Stock. All natural Relations proceed in order thus ; *First*, That of Husband and Wife ; *Secondly*, That of Parents and Children ; *Thirdly*, That of Children and Parents ; *Fourthly*, That of Children, one to another.

The degrees of Relation betwixt the Children of these Children, and their Descendants, may be estimated after the manner following.

Let C be the Son of A and B, D the Son of C, E of D, F of E, G of F, and so on : And let the Relation of C to A and B be in what Ratio you please : Let us proceed on to D, who (we shall find) will bear but half the Relation to A and B that C does, because C is only one of the Parents of D, and therefore one half, as it were, of him proceeds from C ; consequently the Relation that D bears to A and B is to the Relation that C bears to them as 1 is to 2 : And D being only one of the

the Parents of E, E can only bear half the Relation to A and B that D does : But the Relation that D bears to A and B is, by the foregoing, to that which C bears to them as 1 is to 2 ; consequently the Relation that E bears to them is to that which C bears to them as 1 is to 4. And in like manner we might proceed to estimate the several Degrees of Relation, which F, G, &c. bear to A and B the common Stock, from whence they originally sprung, since in every successive Generation one half of the Relation vanishes ; and will be always thus,

$$\frac{1}{2}, \frac{1}{4}, \frac{1}{8}, \frac{1}{16}, \frac{1}{32}, \frac{1}{64}, \text{ \&c.}$$

But considering the vast variety of human Circumstances, and the several Claims which others as well as our Relations have upon us for our good Offices ; some wanting them more, some less ; it seems impossible to fix any Rule which will hold universally : In general, the Good of Relations ought, and must be consulted before that of others : And, *cæteris paribus*, it ought to be universally so.



S E C T. VII.

Of GOVERNMENT.

PROP. I. **M**ENS Condition and Circumstances in the World shew that they were designed for Society. Though a moderate share of Abilities, rightly applied, will direct a Man what he ought to do, yet there is no connection betwixt the bare knowledge and the actual observance of a Law ; 'tis the Sanctions which induce the Obligation, and enforce an Obedience to it. But whether Men in a State of Nature took care to see the Law of Nature in all Cases properly executed, and the Sanctions duly applied, will appear evident to every one who considers ;

That as the end of all Punishment is the common Happiness and Security (See *Prop. 9. SECT. IV.*) so it ought to be neither greater nor less than what is necessary to this End ; for, were it less, it could not be an effectual Bar against future Offences ; and, were it greater than what the common Safety required, there would be a causeless introduction of Misery. But, since all Men are vested with the executive Power of the Law of Nature, (See *Prop. 6. SECT. IV.*) it would frequently happen that A, through the Ill-nature and Revenge of B or C, would suffer too much, whilst D, by their Partiality, would suffer too little, or perhaps escape all Punishment ; and from such an Excess on one side, and a Defect on the other, the End of Punishment could not be answered, nor consequently the general Interest secured.

Hence

Hence the Necessity of one common Rule to take in the several Cases which may affect the Properties of Mankind.

What should hinder in a State of Nature but that a number of Men, attach'd to the same Principles and Interests, should unite under one Head, and grow too formidable to be restrained? Hence again the Necessity of a common Power to guard against all such Encroachments upon Liberty and Property.

PROP. II. *The Nature of Society requires some Form of Government.* When a number of Men have agreed to constitute a publick Interest, they must be govern'd in some particular Manner or Form; which Form must be previously agreed on amongst themselves: As for Instance, Whether the Power residing in Society shall be lodg'd in the hands of One Man, or more? Whether the Succession to it shall be Hereditary, or Elective? Fixing the Constitution, or appointing a Form of Government, is the prime Act of Society; the right settling of which is a matter of importance to Society, since its future Happiness depends absolutely upon it.

PROP. III. *The End of Government (whatever the Form be) necessarily supposes a Power of making, repealing, and executing Laws for the Good of Society, lodg'd somewhere.* This is contain'd in the Idea of Government, the End of which is the Safety of the Governed; in order to which it is necessary, that there be such a Collection of Rules as will accommodate all those Differences, which (Men consider'd as having different Interests) will necessarily happen betwixt one and another; and which, when Property is violated, may pro-

portion the Punishment to the Nature of such a Violation.

And since the Circumstances of things are continually liable to be changed, and consequently what may affect Society at one juncture, may not at another, or in a different degree; so from hence appears the necessity of repealing Old Laws, and substituting New ones in their room.

And, as the Interests of Society are affected in Cases of a different Nature, there arises a necessity of entrusting a Set of Men with a Power proportion'd to the importance and variety of such Cases; *i. e.* there must be some to execute the Laws, to administer Justice, and determine all Disputes relating to Property.

Those, who are entrusted with the Supreme Power residing in Society, are call'd Governours.

Those, who act under them in the management of Publick Affairs, are call'd Subordinates; because their Power is deputed to them from the other, and they are answerable to them for the discharge of it in the same manner as these are to their Principals, the People.

Governours are called Supreme, because the Power of making and executing Laws, and of using the whole Force of the State for its Preservation and Safety is lodg'd with them.

Since the Happiness of Society flows from a wise Administration of able Officers acting agreeably to the Station they fill in it, it follows that such Men ought to act in a publick Capacity who are best qualified for publick Business. Thus, when the degrees of Mens Knowledge in matters of State, or their natural Abilities are equal, such ought to be chosen as have shewn the strongest signs of a publick Disposition. And, when the Signs of Publick Love are equal, the Preference then

then ought to be given to the greater natural Capacity.

These Propositions which take in all or most of the Cases which occur in human Life, concerning which Doubts may arise ; which suit the degrees of Punishment to the Extent of Mens Crimes, and which declare what is most agreeable to Mens Circumstances in Society ; these Propositions, I say, when drawn into a Form, and establish'd by common Authority, are the proper *Laws* of Society.

PROP. IV. *The Power of making and executing Laws for the Good of Society is originally lodg'd in the People.* The natural State of Man, *i. e.* the State of Man out of Society, is a State of Equality. See *Prop. 3.* **SECT. IV.** Hence flow these *Corollaries*, which will confirm the Truth of the present Proposition.

COROL. 1. If Men are naturally free, then no individual Man, or number of Men have any Power or Dominion over others.

COROL. 2. Hence, for any particular Man or Set of Men to assume a Power of making Laws, and imposing them upon others without their Consent, is an Act of arbitrary Will, and utterly inconsistent with Mens natural Equality : For to be subjected to Laws includes a Subjection to those who made them.

COROL. 3. Hence appears the true Source of all Political Power, *viz.* the Consent of the Governed : And consequently all assumption of Power, in a manner different from this, is a direct Encroachment upon the Rights of Mankind, and consequently not to be justify'd.

COROL. 4. Hence arises the Peoples Right to wrest the Reins of Government out of the Hands of him who by indirect means is got possess'd of them; since it cannot be unlawful to dispossess a Man of what it is unlawful for him to hold.

N. B. This Right of Insurrection in the People can only take place when the Grievances they labour under over-balance all those which will necessarily or probably follow upon the Usurper's Exclusion: it being a fundamental Truth, That when One of Two Evils must be endur'd, the Less ought to be submitted to.

But, tho' this Power resides originally in the People, yet, for the more convenient Exercise of it, it is necessary that it be placed in the Hands of some one or more chosen by the People to act and manage for them.

When the Supreme Power is vested in the Common People, the Form of that Government is call'd *A Democracy*.

When it is lodg'd in some chosen out of their collective Body, *An Oligarchy*.

When in the hands of a single Person, the Form of Government is call'd *A Monarchy*.

And from this Power variously modify'd arise various Forms of Government, differing according to the several Conditions under which it is given,

PROP. V. *That Form of Government which best suits the Interests of Society is to be chosen.* Where there are different ways leading to the same Place, surely it is best to make choice of that which will carry

carry us the soonest and safest thither : So, when there are several means tending to the same end, it is the Province of Reason to choose that which is the least likely to miscarry.

We may remark, that when the Government is purely Despotick, Mens Properties are seldom so secure as in a State of Nature. Experience teaches, that Men overgrown in Power generally commence Tyrants. Besides, 'tis evident that a Person vested with the whole Power of Society would never fail of wresting the Laws to his own particular Humour or Interest ; and who has Thousands at his beck ready to execute whatever he shall be graciously pleas'd to command, whether it be the result of Caprice or Passion. And, if so, the Condition of those who live under such a Government is, I think, worse than theirs who are in a State of Nature, and so answerable to each other for every Offence committed in it.

That seems the best Form of Government by which the Laws are made the standing measures of every ones Actions in Society, as well of the Governour as Governed : For it is scarce supposable, that the Legislative Power should enact any thing which tends to its own Detriment, directly or indirectly ; by which means private Property will be more effectually secured, and the publick Interest rendered more sacred and inviolable.

'Tis true, Forms of Government signify nothing where the End is as well answered by one as another ; but, when there is a greater Tendency in one Form to the Safety and Happiness of Society than in another, Reason gives the Preference to the former ; since it is her Business to shew us the most direct way to our Happiness.

PROP. VI. *If the Members of Society would attain the end for which they enter into it, they must give their Governours a Power sufficient to provide for the publick Interest in all particular Cases.* Since every end must be attain'd by its proper means ; and the end of Association is the Safety and Happiness of the Associated ; it is therefore necessary that Governours be entrusted with sufficient Power, *i. e.* with the proper means of attaining this end, otherwise they cannot procure the Members of Society that Safety and Happiness which Government was design'd to afford them ; and consequently the end of Association would be frustrated.

As every Member of Society has by the end of Association a Claim upon his Governours for Protection against all such Injuries as by his Situation in Society he is subjected to, so, in return, Governours have a Claim upon every Member for a proportionate share of his Assistance towards the maintenance of that Society, otherwise it could not be supported, nor consequently the end for which Men enter into Society attain'd. Besides, it makes for the Good of the Whole (as we observ'd above) and consequently is enjoin'd by the Deity, that such as are Sharers in, should also be Contributors to the Happiness of Society.

The degrees of Assistance which every Member ought to contribute to Society (and which Governours may compel them to, if they refuse to do it voluntarily) may be estimated in the manner following. Since Gratitude is enjoin'd by *Prop. 13.* SECT. IV. each Man's respective Quota to Society ought to be in a direct Ratio of the degrees of his Obligation to it : And the degrees of his Obligation to it hold proportion to the Bene-

Benefits he receives from it. But the Benefits of Government are the better Security of Mens Properties : Hence the greater Mens Properties are, *i. e.* the larger Possessions they hold by Virtue of the Protection of any Government, the greater Benefits they receive from it : Hence the greater is their Obligation to it, and consequently the greater degrees of Assistance they ought to contribute towards it. And thus we have an universal Rule for raising of Money, levying of Taxes, &c. for the use of Government.

We may remark by way of Inference from the last *Prop.* that Governours, as Guardians of the Happiness of Society, have a Right to suppress all such Acts as are injurious to the publick Interest ; and to promote those which are connected with it.

PROP. VII. Governours of Society have a Right to oblige the Members of it to take up Arms in Defence of their common Liberties, when they are either openly attacked, or liable to be so. By the last *Prop.* every Member of Society is oblig'd to give his Governour a Power sufficient to secure the Interests of that Society, and consequently every such Member is supposed to have consented for his Governour to have a Power to oblige him to take up Arms in Cases where the Safety of the State absolutely requires it ; because 'tis by this means only that they can be protected from all foreign Power and Oppression. And, if there be a Necessity of some taking up Arms in defence of the Liberties and Properties of the whole, it is reasonable that those in low Life be *obliged* before such as act upon larger and more extensive Schemes of publick Good, and who have more ways than the former

former of benefiting Society : For he, who cannot serve the Publick in one Capacity, ought in another.

By this time, I think we are able to give an Answer to that famous controverted Question, *Has a Governour a Right to deliver up an innocent Citisen into the Enemies Hands, to save his City from imminent Ruin?* They who maintain the Negative, argue thus ; Governours have no Right to exercise any Power but what arises to them from the End of Association, *i. e.* from the Consent of the People ; but the People have no absolute Power over their own Lives, and therefore they can give to no other such a Power, and consequently no other has such a Power. But to this we answer, that the Reason of a Man's not having such a Power over himself is, that he, with many others, are Parts of a Whole, who by their mutual Dependencies stand obliged to send in their respective Quota's towards the Support and Preservation of that Whole ; consequently, whoever withdraws himself from it, deprives the whole of that Assistance which it had a Right to claim at his Hands, and which he in point of Duty was obliged to give. Hence, tho' a Man has no arbitrary Power over his own Life, and consequently no Power to subject it to the arbitrary Will of another, yet he has a Right (and for this very Reason it is that he cannot take it arbitrarily away himself) to hazard it in Cases where the Liberty of the State would otherwise be lost, or some great Detriment accrue to it ; because it is the Will of the Deity, that the Lives and Liberties of the greater Number be preferred to those of the less. See *Axiom 3.* SECT. IV. And, if Man has a Right to sacrifice his Life for the Safety of the State, he may transfer it under Restrictions to his Governours ;

ours ; and if so, he, by the End of Association, must be supposed actually to have transferred it.

PROP. VIII. *Man is to be consider'd as a Member of Society, when he either gives his Consent in Person ; or, secondly, by some Deputy ; or, thirdly, when he lives in that Society, and accepts the Benefits of it.* Whoever gives his Consent either of the two first ways, is obliged to remain a Member of Society so long as the Form of Government which he has submitted to continues, because all Promises are obligatory. See *Prop. II. SECT. IV.*

By the last way a Man's Consent is given indirectly. But, that he is suppos'd to have given it, and consequently is answerable to Society for his Conduct in it, and consequently to be look'd upon as one of its Members, appears from hence ;

1. That every acquiescence in the Laws of Society is an acknowledgment of a Man's being a Member of that Society ; because to be subject to any Laws necessarily infers a Subjection to that Power who made them.

2. Whoever enjoys the Benefits of Society is obliged to send his Quota of Assistance to its Support. See *Prop. 6.* Consequently none can accept the one, without being obliged to pay the other ; and consequently as long as any one continues in Society, and reaps the Advantages of it, so long is he to be reckon'd one of its Members, and is obliged to act as such.

PROP. IX. *Human Laws ought to be coincident with the natural Order and Establishment of things ; or, Laws commanding things essentially evil are not obligatory upon the Members of Society.* As the Creator's Right is greater than the Creature's, and a superior Authority cannot be limited by an inferior,

rior, therefore no human Laws can abrogate that universal one which the God of Nature has subjected his Creatures to.

Things are constituted in such a manner, that the same Consequences will always follow in the same Circumstances; and they cannot be altered without an Alteration in the present System; and, if so, the Law of Nature is incapable of being changed by any human Ordinances.

All the Authority by which Governours act is deriv'd to them from the Consent of the People; but a Power to ordain what is evil, *i. e.* productive of Misery, being not in the People themselves, cannot possibly be derived from them.

COROL. The Injustice of the Subject-Matter of any Law renders that Law a Nullity, and dissolves the Obligation.

PROP. X. *The Power and Authority, which arises to Governours from the End of Association, is to be employed for the common Safety and Happiness.*

This is but a *Corollary* of what went before; for we prov'd above, that the Power residing in Governours arises from the end of Government, and that the end of Government was the Safety and Happiness of the Governed; consequently it must be the Duty of Governours to procure their Subjects all the Conveniences which Government is capable of yielding them.

2. As all Power given conditionally reverts into the first Hands when the Conditions with which it was given are not fulfilled; (for the Presumption of the performance of these Conditions was the Reason of its being given) therefore, as the Power of Governours is only Conditional, it follows, that when they use it contrary to these Conditions, and beyond

beyond the Restrictions with which it was transferr'd, i. e. when they use it not for the Good and Safety, but to the Hurt and Ruin of the Govern'd, they unking themselves, and become private Men.

PROP. XI. *In Cases unprovided for by Law ; or where the Benefit of the Law cannot be had, Men are in a State of Nature.* Laws constitute the difference betwixt a State of Nature and Society ; Consequently, where no Law is, there is no Government ; and consequently Men are still in their natural State.

When no Benefit of the Law can be had, such Law signifies nothing ; for Mens Obedience to Laws arises from their Obligations to obey them ; and their Obligations to obey them, from the Benefits they expect from them : Consequently, when no Benefit of them can be had, Men can be under no Obligation to obey them ; i. e. they are to them the same as no Laws at all.

The Reason that makes Men enter into Society is the Protection they expect to meet with against all Enemies to Life, Liberty, and Property ; and if so, Men must be naturally free when no such Protection can be had, because the Presumption of such Protection was the sole Motive for their resigning up their natural Rights ; and therefore, in Cases where no such Protection can be had, they are still in possession of them.

A Power vested in the Supreme Magistrate to provide for Exigencies independently on the Consent of the Legislative Power is call'd Prerogative. The Right to exercise which, or the necessity of lodging such a Power in the Governour's Hands appears from hence, viz. that human Knowledge being limited, and consequently unable to take in

all the Occurrences which affect Society, human Legislators cannot provide suitable Remedies against them. And, when the Legislative Power consists in a number of Men chosen by the People, it would often happen that they, having their own Private as well as the Concerns of the Publick to take care of, and for that reason not to be suppos'd to be always busied about the latter, it would often, I say, happen, that they could not be conven'd to deliberate about Matters of State within such a compass of Time as would suit its Exigencies : And therefore it is necessary that a Power of providing for its Safety be lodg'd somewhere ; and no where so proper, as in the Hands of him who is entrusted with the whole Force and Strength of the State.

This Power ought never to be employ'd but in Cases left unprovided for by Law ; and, when it is used, it ought always to be used for the publick Security ; and then it is called *Undoubted Prerogative*.

There is one thing remaining which deserves to be remark'd, and that is, when any particular Law is introductive to certain Evils which more than ballance the good Effects of it, that such Law loses its Obligation, and becomes a Nullity : For no human Law can cancel that natural one, which wills the Happiness and Tranquillity of the whole Creation.

From our Idea of Right, as arising from the Law of Nature, it appears, that no Right can be opposite to the Good of the Publick ; and *vice versa*, whatever taken with all its Circumstances and Consequences necessarily tends to this end, must be right. Hence arises the Right to the performance of any Action of universal moment to the Happiness of Society.

Hence

Hence also in limited Monarchies, when the Governour's Power is not sufficient in some particular Cases to secure the State from Slavery, arises his Right to go beyond the Limits fix'd by the Constitution, and to use the whole Force of the State for its own Preservation.

And for the same Reason the People have a Right to re-assume their Original Power, and to put themselves, independently on the Will of the Governour, under the Command of some One of their own Appointment, for the more speedy Defence of their Liberties, and the Security of the Government. Provided such Acts are never drawn into Precedent but in Cases of the like extreme Necessity.

We may observe by the bye, that the Grievance must be very great to over-balance the Evils which will necessarily arise from an Act of Arbitrary Power in the Governour on the one hand, or an Insurrection of the People on the other. And therefore such violent Measures ought but seldom to be taken, and then with great Caution, and fully considering the Consequences which will attend an Overthrow or Alteration of the Constitution.

From what has been said flow, in the nature of *Corollaries*, the following Truths.

I. That all human Laws must arise from, and consequently presuppose a strict Conformity with the Law of Nature; and consequently their Justice or Injustice must be measured by their Agreement or Disagreement with it.

II. If the Authority of Governours is founded on the Consent of the People, it cannot be employed for any other end than what they have

consented it should. And if they exercise such a Power, either in the making or the execution of Laws as does not arise to them from the Consent of the People, they do what they ought not to do; all such Power being usurped, and all Usurpation founded in Injustice.

III. The Authority of Governours extends not to the arbitrarily taking away the Life or Liberty of the Subject, because such a Power belonging not originally to the People themselves cannot possibly be derived from them.

IV. And since Governours are Trustees and Guardians of publick Happiness, they have a Right to restrain the Liberty of the Subject in such Cases where the free Use of it is destructive of the general Peace and Happiness of Society. *i. e.* of the End of Association.

V. And as their Authority extends to the compelling Men to, or the restraining them from, such Actions as are the occasions of Advantage or Disadvantage to Society, so here it ends. For the Authority of Governours is confin'd to the Relation they stand in to Society; and their Relation is that of being Guardians of the Subjects Properties; consequently they have no Right to interpose in any Matters but what Society is interested in: From whence it follows,

First, That the Authority of the Governour, and the Liberty of the Subject, or the Prince's Power and Subjects Obedience both extend to, and are both limited by the same End.

Secondly, That in Cases where the Governour has no Right to command, the Subject can be under

under no Obligation to obey, and *vice versa*, where the Subject is not obliged to pay Obedience, the Governour has no Right to require it.

N.B. By Authority arising from the End of Association, and by Authority arising from the Consent of the People, we mean the same thing; it being according to *Prop. 6.* necessary, that every individual Member consent for his Governour to have such a Power as will in all Cases enable him to provide for the Exigencies of Government.

S E C T. VIII.

Of CONQUEST.

AXIOM. I. NATURAL Rights are Superior to, and consequently must take place of acquired ones.

AXIOM II. A Posterior Right ceases to be one, when inconsistent with a Prior.

AXIOM III. So far as his Will is unconcern'd in any Action, so far the Agent is not answerable for the Consequences which attend it; and consequently he is not accountable for any Actions but his own.

All Children have a natural Right or Claim upon their Parents for a Maintenance 'till they come to be of Years capable of providing for them-

selves. This we prov'd in *Prop. 1. SECT. VI.* See also the two *Corollaries* following it.

We have seen above, that every Man has a natural Right in his own Life and Happiness; and, if so, no one has a Right to molest or injure either of them, much less to deprive him of them. And consequently, since there cannot be contrary Rights, it follows, that no War can justly be carried on by both Sides.

But from whence the Conqueror's Power over the Conquered arises, and how far it extends over those that are related to them either by Nature or Compact, such as Children and Wives, or Fellow-Citizens and Subjects, is a Question though not easily, yet necessary to be decided, in order that the One may know the Extent of his Power, and the Other in what degree his Liberty is restrain'd. I know it is more usual for the former to measure their Right by the Success which follows their Arms, than by the Rules of Justice or publick Happiness: But Conquest can never alter the essential Difference betwixt Good and Evil, or take off Mens Obligation to promote the one, and abstain from the other. Happiness will always continue to be what it is, and Mens Obligation to produce it, remain the same. But to come to the Point.

By *Prop. 8. SECT. IV.* Every Attempt in A to take away B's Life or Liberty subjects his own to the Will and Power of B; consequently so long as he continues such an Attempt, *i. e.* uses Force against B, so long B has a Right to destroy him. And this holds also in respect of every Attempt to keep by Force what is acquired by Fraud and Rapine. It being agreeable to *Corol. of Axiom 4. SECT. IV.* that the Lives and Properties of the Innocent be prefer'd to those of the Guilty and
In-

Injurious. But when Force ends, B's Right to to take away his Life ends also. B as well as others have indeed, by *Prop. 6.* and the following *Corollary*, a Right to call him to account, and to oblige him to give Security for his good Behaviour for the future.

And as the Conqueror's Power extends not to the arbitrarily taking away the Lives of the Conquered, so neither does it to the putting them into a Condition worse than Non-existence: For we are to be guided by the Law of Nature in all particular Cases (for human Laws are only enforcements of it) and her fundamental Lesson is, that all, if possible, be preserv'd, and that all be preserv'd in as happy and secure a Situation as possible. Consequently she subjects not the Conquered to the unreasonable Will and Humour of the Conqueror.

When we consider that the Bulk of the Conquered (who generally consist of Persons in low Life, and consequently for the most-part happen to be the greatest Sufferers) do engage not out of Choice, but by Compulsion, there seems less Reason for the Conqueror's Severity: And in such Cases his Behaviour and Conduct ought rather to be measured by Lenity and Compassion, than Cruelty and Revenge. For it is unreasonable that Thousands should suffer for the Caprice or Ambition of One. See *Corol. 4. Prop. 5. SECT. IV.*

By *Corol. 1. of Prop. 7. SECT. IV.* it appears, that the Conqueror must have so far a Power over the Conquered, as to subject them to *Labour* and *Drudgery* till such time as an Equivalent be made him for the Expences he has been at, and the Hazards he has undergone in defending his own and his Countries Liberties.

And if the Conqueror's Power reaches not the Lives of the Conquered, much less those of the Nation who neither actually engaged in, nor voluntarily contributed to the War; it being by *Axiom 3.* reasonable, that every Being be answerable for his own Actions, and those only.

Besides, when Men are born naturally Free, (as all Governments are in respect of each other) Consent, and that only, can give others a Right of Dominion over them. See *Corol. 3. Proposition 4. SECT. VII.* Consequently no Conqueror, as such, has any Power over the Lives and Liberties of the Innocent, their Wives and Children.

And as the Conqueror's Power extends not to the Lives and Liberties of those who neither assisted in, nor concurr'd to the War against him; so neither does it reach their Estates. For, as they had done nothing that could forfeit their Title to them, it can only be transferr'd by their Consent. See *Prop. 7. SECT. IV.*

The Conqueror has indeed a Right to make up his Damages out of the Conquered's Effects, yet as this Right is subordinate (by *Axiom 1. SECT. VIII.*) to that natural Right which Children (by *Prop. 1. SECT. VI.*) have for a maintenance from their Parents, it cannot take place of it, nor consequently be satisfy'd before it: And consequently the Childrens Rights cannot be forfeited or cancelled by any miscarriages of their Parents. And the Wife has a Right in her Husband's Estate as well as her Children; for she must have a Right to what she has acquired by Labour or Industry. Besides, when the Husband and Wife come together, they generally by some Compact (See *Definition of Marriage, SECT. v.*) give each other a joint Property in their Estates; and, if so, the Husband cannot dispose of his Estate without the
Consent

Consent of his Wife ; and, when she has done nothing that can possibly forfeit her Right to it, no one has a Right to dispossess her of it.

The Conqueror has indeed a Right to come in for his Share for the Expences he has been at in defending himself and his Country, when the Wife's and Childrens Rights are satisfied ; not before : Because the Childrens Rights are founded in Nature, and consequently cannot be cancell'd. And the Right of the Wife is prior to the Conqueror's, and as such must take place of it.

Consequently Conquest, as such, gives the Conqueror no Right over the Lives, the Liberties, or the Estates of those, who neither us'd nor consented that others should use Force against him.

S E C T. IX.

Of the DUTIES of MASTERS and SERVANTS.

DEFINIT. **B**Y a state of Service we mean a State in which one Person upon certain Considerations binds himself to do the Will and Pleasure of another, so far as is contain'd in the Agreement betwixt them.

PROP. I. *A may agree with B to serve him a certain time for something which shall be thought equivalent to his Labour.* For as A has a right in the Effects of his Labour, See Prop. 2. SECT. IV. and every Proprietor has a right to dispose of his

his Property for what Use he pleases, (See *Prop.* 10. and the following *Corollary*, SECT. IV.) so if he exchanges it with B for Wages, and B accepts it upon these Terms, no Injury is done to the whole by either of them ; for where there is no Encroachment upon Right, there is no Injustice.

But Man has not barely a right to barter his Labour for Wages, but he seems to be under a sort of Necessity to do it. Mens Circumstances and Situation in Life absolutely require such an Interchange of Offices. And it is for certain wise and good Reasons, that the God of Nature has so contriv'd that neither the Happiness nor Conveniency of Mankind can subsist without them. Because by this means the Interests of little Bodies of Men are knit and interwoven with each other, and, by their reciprocal Relation and Dependency on one another, the great Interest of the whole is established.

PROP. II. *All Servants as such are in a State of Subordination to their Masters.* For he that serves another must by the Terms be subject, *i. e.* inferior to him he serves.

PROP. III. *This Power and Authority of the Master extends to the obliging his Servant to all such Actions as the Master has a Right to by Bargain.* For, if Contracts were not binding, there could be neither publick Faith nor Credit ; and without these Mankind cannot subsist. See *Proposition II.* SECT. IV.

PROP. IV. *And as this Power extends to the obliging the Servant to all such Actions as the Master has a right to by Bargain, so it extends no further.* For since by the last *Proposition* the Servant's
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Obligation to obey his Master arises from the validity and binding force of Promises ; and since no Promises can bind but what are both made and accepted voluntarily, so in Cases where the Servant has not consented either expressly or tacitly, *i. e.* by the nature of the Contract, to obey his Master, the Master can have no right to exact Obedience of him ; or, if he does, the Servant is not obliged to pay it.

COROL. 1. As the Authority of the Master and the Obedience of the Servant arises from the Contract betwixt them, so such Authority and Obedience varies according to the difference of these Contracts. And consequently such Action or Omission as is lawful in A may not be so in B.

COROL. 2. Hence Masters have no right to oblige their Servants to any thing contrary to divine Will and Order ; and, if they should be so wicked as to require it, Servants are not to obey them, since no human Authority can exempt a Man from the Obligations he is laid under by the great Master and Governour of the Whole.

And since human Laws are superior to the Commands of private Men, so Masters have no right to enjoin their Servants what these Laws have prohibited.

PROP. V. *Servants ought to be honest and diligent in their Masters Business.* For when A has agreed with B to give him his Labour and Time in lieu of Wages and Maintenance, it would be as unjust in A to mis-apply that Time, or withhold that Labour, which by agreement are B's, as it would be in B to keep back from A those Wages which by Bargain are his ; and which, when the
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Conditions required on his side are perform'd, he has a strict right to.

And as Masters commit the management of their Affairs in a manner wholly to their Servants, and place a greater Confidence in them than in any others, therefore they ought to be careful of their Masters Interests, as being accountable for the Trust reposed in them.

PROP. VI. *Servants have the same right to their Wages, and what is theirs by Agreement, as Masters have to their Labour.* Otherwise all Motives to Labour would be taken away, and the Current of Benefits would be stop'd, as above. Consequently Masters are under equal Obligations with Servants to discharge what they owe to each other.

PROP. VII. *Masters ought to treat their Servants with Tenderness and Humanity.* Positive Rights and Duties are subordinate to those laid in Nature, *i. e.* proceeding from the primary Will of the Deity, and consequently these latter must be satisfied before them: But we are commanded by the Deity to concur with him in his pursuit of a common Happiness; and, if so, we stand in the relation of means of Happiness to others, *i. e.* they have a right to an Endeavour in us to promote their Happiness; consequently no situation in Life can exempt a Man from the prior Obligation he is under to promote the Happiness of his Fellow-Creatures, *i. e.* can cancel their right to his good Offices, and consequently to be us'd kindly and gently by him.

The Master's Authority is neither greater nor less than what the Contract affords him, *i. e.* than what the Servant consented he should have over him,

him, but no Man in his wits would give another a Right to treat him, ruggedly, and with Severity, and consequently no one has such a Right.

When Masters are humane and benevolent to their Servants, they tread the steps of their Creator, and imitate him in his chiefest Excellency, and what he most desires to be imitated in.

There is one more Duty incumbent on Masters, which they in a particular manner are obliged to discharge, and that is to instruct their Servants in the great and fundamental Principles of Religion; because those who act in low Life are generally ignorant and illiterate: Their little Knowledge is mostly confined to things within their own Province: If their natural Parts should be good, they still want Opportunity to exert and improve them. And, as they are more immediately dependent upon their Masters than the rest of Mankind, 'tis not merely the effect of Kindness, but their Duty, to teach them the several Branches of Virtue, with the Grounds and Reasons of their Obligation. And Masters will be sure to find their Interests in it; for the more religious they are, the better Servants they will make; more diligent and careful and honest in their Masters Business: And therefore they should endeavour tho' not for their Servants sake, yet for their own, to produce in them a strong and affecting Sense of their Obligation to follow Virtue, and abstain from Vice.



S E C T. X.

Of PRIVATE DUTIES, or those respecting a Man's self.

AXIOM I. **T**HAT Being is said to be *absolutely* happy, the Sum of whose Happiness is commensurate to his Capacities of Enjoyment.

AXIOM II. That Being is said to be *ultimately* happy, the Sum of whose Happiness exceeds the Sum of his Misery ; for when the whole Amount of Misery is subtracted from that of Happiness, the Remainder is pure Happiness ; and a Man is said to be happy by so many degrees as his Happiness over-ballances his Misery.

COROL. Consequently Existence must be entirely indifferent to him whose Happiness and Misery ballance each other.

AXIOM III. Any given degree of Happiness, possess'd in any one determinate part of a Creature's Existence, is of equal value with the same degree of Happiness possess'd in any other part of his Existence ; the Enjoyment at any one particular time making it neither greater nor less than at another.

COROL. Hence when the degree is the same in every part of a Man's Existence, it is matter of perfect indifferency in whatever period of Life he enjoys it, provided it be preventive of no other Hap-

Happiness: And consequently to enjoy a degree of Happiness unlimited in duration is infinitely preferable to one that is limited.

AXIOM IV. Since it is the Province of Reason to conduct Man to the greatest possible Happiness, he uses it best, who by the application of it enjoys a Happiness equal in Quantity to what these Powers could possibly produce.

Since Man's Happiness arises from the voluntary Contributions of other Beings to it; (See *Axiom 5. SECT. III.*) And, since no other Being, besides the Deity, can confer such a Happiness as is mention'd in *Axiom I. SECT. X.* therefore it must arise from a conformity of Actions to his Will, *i. e.* from the observance of these Truths describ'd in the foregoing Sections, because these are enjoin'd by the Deity, whose Will can never contradict itself.

And if a Man observes and practises the foregoing Duties, he cannot fail of discharging those he owes to himself; for, without previously doing these, he will not be able to do the other. To begin therefore with them.

PROP. I. *Man ought to preserve himself.* See *Corol. 6. SECT. IV.* Since also the Deity brought him into Being, and made suitable Provision for his continuance in it, it is his Will that he preserve his Existence 'till such time as he himself shall be pleased to make some alteration in the manner of it, either by a particular Influence, or the working of natural Causes.

PROP. II. *For the same Reason that the Deity obliges every Man to preserve himself in Existence, does he cause it to be his Duty to endeavour to live as happy*

happy as it is possible for him to be. The Creator's Design was, that Existence should be a Blessing to all Beings made capable of knowing what Happiness is, and consequently that every Being should use the means in his Power to make it such both to himself and others.

COROL. Hence God has appointed every Man to be the Guardian of his own Life and Happiness.

PROP. III. *Man ought to subject himself to the Government of his Reason.* For as Man was made for Happiness, and had Reason given him to conduct him to it, he ought to make it his Guide, *i. e.* be subject to it.

We see also, that the several sorts of Beings beneath us inviolably observe the Laws of their respective Natures ; an inanimate Being is solely obnoxious to the Laws of Gravitation ; a sensitive Creature is wholly governed by Sense, for Sense is his uppermost Faculty, and consequently should be his governing Principle : From whence we may conclude, that it was the Design of the Author of Nature, that every Being should be governed in a way peculiar to the mode of its Existence. And, if so, a rational Creature should at all times appear in a rational Dress ; his Actions and Behaviour should be all rational, i. e. conspire to the production of universal Happiness ; otherwise he inverts the Order God has establish'd in his Creation, and robs the Whole of a Part of its Happiness.

COROL. Hence no Man ought to indulge any Passion, Appetite, or Affection to the impairing in any degree his Reason and powers of Action :

Action ; because whoever does so, incapacitates himself for acting his Part in the Creation.

PROP. IV. *Man must be careful in the improvement of his Powers of Body and Mind, especially in ripening his Understanding, perfecting his Judgment, &c. that he may be able to form right Notions of Things, and draw just Conclusions from their tendencies to his Happiness or Misery.* This, I say, a Man ought to do, if he would have his Tenor of acting conformable to the several Truths demonstrated above. Besides, if to be ignorant of those things in which we are any way concerned be a Disadvantage to us, especially when such a Knowledge will either procure or prevent the apprehended Good or Evil ; then the removal of that Ignorance, wholly or in part, must by the terms be an Advantage to us ; and proportionally so, as the matter in which we are thus ignorantly interested is of greater or less Importance to us. But if we be not able to do this, as many in low Life are not, we must desire the Information of such as are both ready and able to give us their Assistance : And afterwards we should endeavour to requite such Kindnesses according to our Ability.

PROP. V. *Man must avoid, as much as possible, attaching himself to any particular way of acting, but what ultimately tends to his Happiness.* For we see that things originally nauseous do by frequent use become palatable and delightful ; and such is the Nature of Habits, that when once contracted they are not easily broke thro'. The Will, that Self-motive Principle, loves not to leave the Track she has been accustom'd to, but delights to go over it again. Hence arises the Necessity of familiarising
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ourselves

ourselves to the Paths of Virtue, and avoiding all Communication with Vice, least by the repetition of such Acts, Vice at length predominate, and we become its Slaves.

COROL. Since Appetites, if not check'd in their Career, are too often apt to run us into inextricable Difficulties, hence arises the Necessity of curbing them, and keeping them in due subjection to Reason by Abstinence, and the like wholesome, tho' at first severe, Laws of Mortification. Hence the Expediency of certain Days set apart for that purpose.

PROP. VI. *Man ought to acquire such Habits, and keep himself always in such a disposition of Body, and frame of Mind, as to be ready on all occasions to discharge the several Duties he owes to all other Beings.* And the Reason is, that, being thus prepared and habited, he can with more Ease and Pleasure answer all the great ends and purposes of Being, and satisfy the Claim which God and his Fellow-Creatures have upon him.

PROP. VII. *Lastly, Man ought to make himself easy and satisfy'd in that Station in which his own Choice, or the general allotment of God has placed him, and patiently submit to these Evils and Trials of Life, which in his situation seem to be unavoidable.* The Necessity of such a Disposition of Mind, together with the reasonableness of it, shall be more distinctly consider'd by and by.

From the above-mention'd *Propositions* flow the Four great Duties or Branches of the Law of Nature respecting Self.

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I. Prudence, *which denotes our prosecuting the best End within our Power by the best and most simple Means.*

II. Temperance, *which consists in our gratifying our Appetites in a manner best consistent with the Station and Circumstances we are in; or, the Enjoyment of such a Portion of things of this World as is agreeable to our Capacities.*

III. Chastity (*which is a Species or Branch of Temperance*) *which denotes a regular and orderly gratification of our concupiscible Affections; or a gratifying them in a manner most agreeable to the general Happiness of the Whole.*

On the last Proposition are founded the two great Duties of private Life, Contentment and Patience, or, if you please, Fortitude; the former being a voluntary resigning up ourselves to the Will of God, and being perfectly satisfy'd with the Condition we are in.

IV. Patience denotes our bearing with Constancy and Calmness of Mind such Afflictions as the Circumstances of our Being subject us to.

The Necessity and Reasonableness of this Duty will appear from the following Observations.

1. The Parts of this System are so connected with one another, that the same Actions will necessarily produce the same Effects; which cannot be prevented without a Suspension of the Laws of Nature, and a breaking in upon the Constitution of the World: And consequently, in a System framed and constituted as this is, Evils are and must be.

2. Whoever observes, will find that one Part (and that not the least) of the Evils which a Man suffers is owing to the Acts of others, which affect him either immediately or consequentially; and consequently are the Effects of that Liberty with which human Beings are endow'd, and which as such cannot be prevented without destroying Free-agency, and the universal Law of Liberty.

3. The other Evils which Man suffers arise from the wrong use of his own Powers; and, with respect to these, he has no Reason to complain; seeing he himself is the Cause of them, and therefore answerable for them.

Now it is an undoubted Truth, that we ought to avoid all Misery, when we can do it in a manner not inconsistent with a greater future Happiness, or introductive to some prepollent Evils. And consequently, since we are in a great measure Masters of ourselves, and of our own Actions, we may, if we please, prevent such Evils as flow from them.

But, touching the prevention of Evils arising from the Frame and Constitution of Nature, we may observe 4thly, That, when Men address themselves to God in a manner suitable to their Condition and Relation to him, the divine Goodness gives them Reason to conclude that he not only may, but actually has, on some particular Occasions, so order'd matters that their Prayers shall be granted.

But, previous to all Expectations of Success from our Prayers, we are in Reason obliged to enquire whether the Object of our Prayers be capable of being effected, or not.

Now we are certain that God will do every thing that makes for the universal Happiness of his Creatures; and the more any thing tends to this

this end, the more eligible it is to him. And consequently every thing is possible with him, the Sum total of whose Good over-ballances the Sum of its Ill Effects.

Consequently, Men considered as Men, the Happiness of the greater Number will always be prefer'd to that of the less : And, if so, it is unreasonable to expect that He should answer the Petitions of one or two Individuals, to the prejudice of greater Bodies of Men.

From whence we may observe 5thly, That when the Object of Prayer is possible, and our Petition is drawn into a Form, and address'd in a manner, and with a degree of earnestness expressive of our Condition, and suitable to the importance of the thing pray'd for, we may rest satisfied, that, if God think it good for us, he has so adjusted the Parts of this System, that our Requests shall be both heard and answered.

But when the Conditions required on our side are perform'd, and yet God with-holds from us the thing we applied to him for, we have in such Cases strong Reasons to conclude, that it is best upon the whole for us to be without it ; or that our present Condition, taken with the Circumstances and Consequences attending an Habit or Frame of Mind which acquiesces in the dispensations of God, is preferable to what we petition'd him for : And consequently that upon a Principle of Goodness he would refuse us it. For it is contradictory to suppose that God, who is infinitely wise, should with-hold Favours from any of his Creatures, which they may enjoy consistently with the Good of the Whole ; and which by their Conduct they have qualified themselves for.

N. B. The end of Prayer is not so much to move the Deity, who, consider'd as an unchangeable Being, is incapable of being moved, as it is to fit and qualify the Petitioner for his enjoying what he makes his Prayers to God for.

When we are thus qualified by Prayer, and God does not remove from us the Evils we labour under, it is then both our Duty and our Interest to bear them with calmness and serenity of Mind. It is our Duty, because the Will of God requires that we patiently submit to that State (how grievous soever it be) which our own Choice or his Providence hath settled us in. And that it is our Interest is evident from hence, *viz.* that as such a resignation of ourselves to the Will of God is a voluntary submitting to the ways of his Providence, as just and reasonable, it must necessarily render us acceptable to him, and consequently entitle us to Favour and Reward from him.

No less tendency indeed has this submissive frame of Mind to our present than to our future Happiness: Such an evenness of Soul in every change of Condition, and thro' every successive Series of Affairs, makes us look on things beneath us with an eye of Indifferency: It raises us almost above the impression of things external, and makes our Desires suit with our Circumstances, when we cannot make our Circumstances suit with our Desires; and so brings our Happiness in a great measure within our Power; it being demonstrable, "That we are more or less happy, as our Happiness is more or less dependent on Externals."

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If to these Observations we subjoin the following Considerations, they will render the Practice of this Duty still more reasonable.

I. If we did but consider that we every day sin against God, either by doing what we ought not to do ; or not doing what we ought to do ; and consequently that we give him a Right to punish us ; who notwithstanding is pleased to wave the Exercise of that Right, and to forbear the Punishment which he might in Justice inflict upon us ; did but we, I say, consider this, we could not but, in return for such Mercy and Long-suffering, struggle with Patience thro' those Evils which befall us either by the natural course of things, or which he, for certain wise and good Ends, shall be pleased to visit us with ; and which, tho' grievous at present, shall be short in their duration, and their Reward, if we manfully hold out, endless.

II. No Creature has any Reason to complain of Life, or be weary of his Condition, the Sum of whose Happiness exceeds that of his Misery, because Existence upon the whole is a Blessing to him, and what he cannot but esteem as an object of Choice : But if we compare our Grievances with the Comforts and Conveniences we have enjoy'd, and still continue to enjoy, we shall find these latter much more numerous, and Life with all its Hardships to be desired. Thus much with regard to *Patience*.

Fortitude consists in bravely struggling with the Crosses and Adversities of Life, and in endeavouring to surmount them by such ways as interfere not with

the Happiness, nor consequently encroach upon the Rights and Properties of others ; but, when this lies out of our Power, it denotes our bearing them with a manly Patience, and heroick Constancy of Mind. This seems to be the utmost Height of Perfection which Man in his present Circumstances is capable of: For in this he, as it were, resembles his Maker, and becomes allied to the Deity. And this suggests a Reason why God oftentimes afflicts good and virtuous Men with the greatest Disappointments, and Virtue is made to recoil upon herself; viz. for the Exercise of their Patience, that they may acquire such an Habit and Frame of Mind, as will fit and prepare them for an Heavenly State; because the more Men conform to the divine Will, the greater relish they have for Heaven; and consequently the more ready they are for it, it being impossible to enjoy Heaven without an heavenly Appetite; but more of this in the twelfth Section. And thus we have done with the Duties Man owes to himself,



S E C T. XL

*The Relation of MAN to GOD, is that of
a Creature to the Creator.*

BY Worship we mean, Mens testifying their acknowledgment of the Belief of a Deity, and his governing the World ; their praying to him for such things as they want ; and their praising him for what they have received.

PROP. I. *God is to be worshipped.* There are some who found the Creator's Right of Worship on his Power and Sovereignty over Mankind, and argue for it in the following manner.

1. God, say they, as Creator, has an underived Right to the Lives and Services of his Creatures ; and, if so, then no Creature in any period of its Existence can with-hold such Services from his Creator without breaking in upon his Right. Consequently an universal Obedience is at all times due from the Creature to its Creator ; and, if due, then necessary to be express'd by some outward Sign, *i. e.* it is necessary that Men regulate their Behaviour in such a manner, as to be declarative of it : For without frequent acknowledgments of God's Presence with us ; of his Greatness and Sovereignty over us ; and his Goodness and Munificence to us ; the Sense of our Obligation to obey him would by degrees grow languid, and in time lose all its Influence over us.

2. As God is the Preserver and Governour of the World, he has a Power over it ; and, if so,
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all created Beings (all such as are conscious of their Origination from him) stand obliged to pay him such Homage and Obedience as is correspondent to it. For Obedience paid to Authority justly founded ought to be proportion'd to the Extent of it : But God's Power, in conjunction with his other Attributes, being absolutely perfect, the Obedience paid to it ought to be the same. But since a finite Being can never pay Obedience and Adoration suitable to the Excellency of an infinite one, therefore he is to do it *in the best manner he can*. For tho' we cannot worship him in a manner suitable to what he is, yet, since we are obliged to do it, we are therefore obliged to do it in the best manner we can.

As to Prayer ; The Consideration of our absolute Dependency on God for what we are and have, and for the Supply of such things as either our Necessities or Conveniences call for, obliges us to be constantly making our Prayers and Addresses to him : for we have no Reason to expect them of God, unless we first ask them of him.

As to Praise and Thanksgiving ; Since what we have no Title to we have no Right to demand, therefore we can have no Claim upon God either for such things as we want, or the continuance of those we already enjoy ; consequently we must be wholly indebted to him for them ; and if Debtors, we stand in Reason obliged to discharge that Debt, or we are obliged to make him the best Returns we can for them, *i. e.* we ought to be thankful, seeing that is all we can do.

But, not to insist on these Arguments, I shall prove the Necessity of religious Worship from the good Consequences which attend it ; *i. e.* from its tendency to produce in our Minds such a lively
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and affecting Sense of Gods Being and Attributes, as will express itself in a proper Influence upon our Passions, and in a suitable Behaviour towards our Fellow-Creatures ; which Habit or Frame of Mind alone can render us lovely Creatures in the sight of a lovely Creator, who desires that our Love and Gratitude to him may be manifested in a tender and affectionate Concern for the Good and Welfare of our dependent Brethren. To begin therefore ;

Religion is a necessary Step to Happiness, or, without Religion Men cannot be happy ; because a strict and universal observance of the Duties proper to rational Beings produces universal Happiness ; and an universal Neglect or Breach universal Misery. Consequently, whatever tends to make Men more religious, tends, of course, to make them more happy.

Now Worship seems to be the only means that can keep up in Mens Minds a Sense of God and Religion ; and consequently the only means to secure the Tranquillity and Well-being of Mankind. For in every Act of Worship we own God to be the Creator, Preserver, and Governour of the World ; that we are indebted to him for every good thing we enjoy, and for the Supply of those we stand in need of ; and no rational Being can possibly profess to believe this, without being suitably affected by it. The apprehension of God's being always so present with us, as to be intimately conscious of what we think, speak, and act, makes us shudder at the thoughts of thinking, speaking, or acting any thing with which he may be offended. —The Sense of his Infinity and Eternity, of his Power and Majesty, of his Intelligence and Wisdom raises in us the highest Astonishment and

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Admiration. — His Justice demands our awful Fear and Reverence — His Veracity secures our Trust and Confidence in him. — His Mercy and Goodness produce the most lively Sense of Love and Gratitude. Thus are we affected with the Consideration of what God is in himself, and what in Regard to his Creatures.

As to Prayer, if it be consider'd as the Address of a Creature to its Creator; it naturally tends to possess us with an awful and becoming Sense of God's Being and Majesty, of his Power, Supremacy, and Dominion over all Things; it reminds us of our Obligations to him for all the good Things we enjoy: And as we know we cannot *oblige* him to give us them, such a Sense of our Dependency on him will necessarily produce Resolutions in us of acting in such a Manner as will *dispose* him to it.

By praising the Deity, we acknowledge we have no Right to the Benefits he confers on us; but that they wholly proceed from his good Will and Pleasure, and consequently that he may chuse whether he will bestow them or not; the Consciousness of which will excite in us a Desire of rendering ourselves suitable objects of his Favour and Kindness, by doing all such Things as we judge agreeable to his Will.

From hence we are furnish'd with an Answer to those who demand, That tho' God, as Creator, has a Right to oblige his Creatures to such Actions as he pleases; yet what End can a Being, whose Happiness is complete, have in requiring Honour, Reverence, and Prayer at his Creatures Hands? Is he the better for being worshipped? Or can he be more glorious by being glorify'd? Or does he want the Prayers of Men to be inform'd of their
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Necessities, or inclined to relieve them? Did such Objectors as these but consider what Tendency the regular Exercise of this important Duty has both in Reason and Fact to draw Men by Degrees to a closer Imitation of the divine Perfections, they might easily see they had no Foundation for such Objections; for, in every succeeding Intercourse with the Deity, we have fresh Enforcements and Motives to write after his Copy; to be tender and compassionate to the distress'd; kind under a lively Sense of God and Religion: They will be afraid of offending him in the least as well as greatest Matters.

PROP. II. *God is to be worshipped publicly.* Some Things are of a private Nature, others of a publick: The former concern particular Men, the latter Men in general. And as a private Interest demands private Endeavours and Application; so a publick Interest demands publick Endeavours, &c. For if private Persons have no Reason to expect private Favours, unless they ask them privately of God, Persons, who in a publick Capacity have publick Concerns, have no Reason to expect publick Favours unless they ask them publickly of God. Consequently, when Men are jointly concerned, they are obliged to join in one common Prayer if they would expect one common Benefit; and to make one common Acknowledgment in Consideration of Favours publickly received; *i. e.* Men ought to pray to God, and to praise him publickly, or there ought to be a publick worship.

2. We have prov'd, that all rational Creatures are obliged to worship the Deity: But since some of them are immers'd in worldly Affairs, and others

others, who are oblig'd to act in low Life, are not qualified to understand the whole of their Duty ; therefore, in Consideration of such a Deficiency, it is highly necessary that they be taught it by others, *i. e.* that certain Times and Places be appointed by general Consent, for Men to hear the great Branches of Morality ; their several Duties to God, their fellow Creatures and themselves, with the Grounds and Reasons of their Obligations explain'd and enforced.

Lastly, Mankind cannot live out of Society : No Society can subsist without Religion ; no Religion without some Establishment, *i. e.* without certain Times, Places, and Persons being set apart, when, where, and by whom, religious Worship is to be perform'd.

Thus much in regard to Worship in general. We shall now consider the several Qualifications and Circumstances to be observ'd in each Act of religious Worship.

And, in order to the better and more effectual way of worshipping the Deity, the following things are necessary to be observed.

1. A Seriousness of Mind, or an Attention to what is said, or done. For if Mens Minds do not accompany and go along with their Words, such Words signify nothing, because expressive of no Ideas ; and a Man in such Circumstances cannot be said to worship God, but more properly to mock him. Consequently, when Men worship God, they ought to do it with such Seriousness, Humility, and Devotion of Mind, as suits their present Condition ; they ought to consider themselves *as being what they are*, and that great Being to whom they apply, *as being what he is* ; in short, they

they ought to pray *heartily*, so as to be heard *readily*.

2. A proper Time and Place. For as all Times and Places are not alike, some will be found more convenient for this purpose than others ; now those which are the least liable to discompose the Mind, and draw off Attention from what is said, are the fittest to be chosen.

3. A proper Gesture, or Motion of Body. For as the Gestures of Body with which we worship the Deity flow from the Heart, or inward Affections, so these inward Affections are heighten'd by such outward Gestures ; Consequently the more humble and devout we are in our Worship, or the more expressive our Gestures are of Humility and Devotion, the higher are our Affections rais'd, and our whole Souls more disposed to love and obey him.

4. If rational Creatures are obliged to join together in praying to, or praising the Deity, such Prayer and Thanksgiving should be previously agreed amongst themselves, and digested into Periods, and expressed by a proper Form of Words. For, were it not so, how could the Devotionists suit each other's Minds, and the Words expressing them, in each Address to Almighty God ? To suppose that they know before-hand what every one will say, immediately and without Consultation, is to suppose that all of them are omniscient ; a Property which no one of them will presume to claim.

S E C T. XII.

Of TRUTHS concerning A FUTURE
STATE.

PROP. I. **T**HE God of Nature designed
Men for another State after this.

The same Motive that induced the Deity to create B at first, and to communicate to him a certain degree of Happiness in this World, will induce him to communicate such a degree to him in another, as B's Conduct and Behaviour here have qualified him for there. The Reason for his doing the latter being the same with that for doing the former.

A benevolent Being will desire to communicate Happiness in proportion to his Benevolence ; consequently an infinitely benevolent Being, *i. e.* the Deity, will be disposed to confer on all other Beings all possible Happiness, or, he will produce the greatest quantity of it. But being infinitely knowing and powerful, as well as benevolent, he will be sure to bring about whatever his Will inclines him to, and is possible : The only Question then is, Are Men capable of subsisting in another State after this ? Now, a change of Place, or a Translation out of this into another State, seems no more to clash with our natural Notions, or to imply a greater (nor indeed so great) an Act of Power, as the Production of all things at first out of nothing. In short, either there is a State of Existence after this, or there is not ; if not, the Reason is, because God either will not introduce
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Man into such a State, or cannot : To say the latter, is to affirm that he is a defective Being ; but Defects cannot have place in a Being of absolute Perfection, or All-sufficiency. And to say that he is unwilling to give Man that Happiness which a Being in his Circumstances is capable of enjoying, plainly contradicts the whole Scheme of divine Providence, as well as Creation. It remains therefore, that Man's departure out of this Life be made his Entrance into another.

PROP. II. *Man's Happiness and Misery in another Life will arise from the different ways of acting he has been accustomed to in this ; or thus, the Habits and Appetites Men have acquired here, will necessarily constitute their Heaven or Hell hereafter.* For, since all Pleasure flows from an agreement betwixt Appetite and Object, those Appetites must be form'd according to the Will of the Deity, *i. e.* we must acquire Habits and Appetites of Benevolence in this World, otherwise we shall meet with no Objects to gratify them in the other ; because, being all made for a common Happiness, our Happiness must ultimately arise from the Happiness of the Whole, *i. e.* from the Exercise of benevolent Affections, which must therefore be previously acquired in this Life.

Again ; all Disappointment of Desire necessarily produces Pain ; consequently, if we carry out of this World such Desires as will meet with no means of Gratification in the next, we must of necessity be miserable ; and proportionally so, as these Desires are stronger or weaker.

When Habits of Lust and Avarice, and Principles of Malice, Envy, and Hatred, pursue us out of this into the other World, the Deity must

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either

either change our Appetites, and substitute others in their room, or else produce a Set of Objects correspondent to them; otherwise Pain and Torment cannot be avoided. The Connection betwixt all frustration of Desire and a proportionate degree of Misery is fix'd and unalterable. And the Author of Nature has appointed a Law to our Elections of the same Nature with those which the material System is subjected to; which cannot be violated without destroying the nature of Elections, and making Mankind other sorts of Beings than they really are. And consequently in such a Situation, *i. e.* to be crowded with a number of Appetites, tearing the Mind to pieces, and drawing her, as it were, out of herself, serves like so many distinct Engines to convey Misery; and the Mind being always engaged in restless Pursuits, and hankering after Objects she never can enjoy, will prove her own Tormentor.

In this view it is no difficult matter to conceive how unqualify'd that Man is to taste heavenly Pleasures, whose Appetites and Affections are tied down and riveted purely to sensitive Objects; for if all Pleasure results from an Agreement betwixt Appetite and Object, how can a sensual Appetite relish spiritual Entertainments, or Malevolence the communication of Happiness, or take Pleasure in seeing others happy? No more than contrary Causes can produce the same Effects, or different things have the same tendency. These Appetites may by a certain Metaphor be not improperly term'd, *the Worm that never dieth, and the Fire that is not quenched*: For since these will be incessantly gnawing upon the Mind, and tossing her to and fro after this or that chimerical Object, they of course will produce the natural Hell of those who are agitated by them.

But

But the Case is far otherwise with those who by a continued repetition of benevolent Actions, and a constant perseverance in Well-doing, are arriv'd to a proper Temper and Frame of Mind; for being duly season'd to imbibe the Streams of Goodness, Knowledge, &c. perpetually flowing from the Fountain of all Goodness and Truth, they go out of the World with all the Qualifications necessary for the participation of a Heaven of Bliss. And tho' we should suppose these Appetites to rise higher and higher to all Eternity, yet always finding adequate Objects, they would have no room to complain of the insufficiency of the means of their Gratification, nor of the want of any degree of Happiness possible to be enjoy'd by them.

It may probably be objected, that if Man's future Happiness or Misery arise from his present Habits of Virtue or Vice, then it depends not on the positive Will of God, but on the Circumstances and Manner of our acting here, that we shall be happy or miserable hereafter; and consequently that we give up our fundamental Principle, into which we maintain'd that all our moral Acts were ultimately resolvable, *i. e.* Men pursue Virtue, not because it is conformable to the Will of God, who therefore will reward them for it, but because it must independently on his Will make them happy; Happiness being the necessary result of such a Habit and Disposition of Mind. But to this we answer, that tho' our Heaven of Happiness be previously acquired in some degree in this World, and is the natural Effect of proper Habits, yet, as we observ'd before, it depends absolutely on the Divine Will, whether he will assign us a place where our Habits and Appetites

of Virtue will meet with proper and agreeable Objects, as also what positive Rewards and Punishments he shall super-add to them.

The Case is this. We are so made, that Happiness, present or in prospect, must necessarily be the End of all our Actions. This Happiness on the whole can only arise from, and be secured by, a conformity of Actions to the Will of the Deity; which Conformity in the Issue produces Habits of Virtue. Hence the Source of moral Pleasures, which in their kind are superior to sensible ones, and will be pursued by us as such. And as our future Happiness is not only founded on, but (as shall be shewn in the next Proposition) is strictly proportion'd to the strength of these Habits; and as these Habits grow stronger as the Conformity of our Actions to the Divine Will is more uniform and perfect; and as this Conformity varies as the view we have to serve God is more or less; so, in the upshot, we find that our Happiness in another Life will both arise from, and be in proportion to, our Conformity to his Will.

PROP. III. *Man's Happiness in another Life will hold proportion to the degrees of his Virtue in this.* Before we go to prove this Proposition we shall just observe, that Man's Virtue is not directly as the moment of Happiness he produces, but as the moment he design'd to produce, to the common System: For if A's and B's Desires to introduce a common Happiness be the same, yet if the Abilities of the former be not equal to those of the latter, such an Insufficiency detracts not from his *Virtue*, or *moral Goodness*, because, had they both been equal in Power as well as Principle, their moments would have been equal also: Consequently

quently Mens Virtue is not as their moments, but as their degrees of Benevolence. This being premised, we proceed to the Proof of the Proposition.

The Pleasure arising from the gratification of any Appetite is as the Strength with which it enjoys its Object; consequently the Pleasures of Heaven will be in proportion to the *Taste* Men have for them, *i. e.* as the Height of their benevolent Appetites; but, by the last Observation, Mens Virtue is as these Appetites; therefore their Happiness in another World will be proportional to the degrees of their Virtue in this.

After the same manner we may prove that Mens Miseries in the other World will be in proportion to the degrees of their Vice and Wickedness in this.

PROP. IV. *The Habits of Vice and Sensuality which Men contract in this Life, and which constitute their Hell in the other, will not cease acting upon them there; or, the Miseries of the Wicked will be eternal.* Every thing must for ever continue the same without some Change; every Change presupposes a Cause; the Cause of this Change in our Appetites must be either external or internal; *i. e.* either the consciousness that such a Change will produce in us the Pleasure of the virtuous, or else the Action of these Pleasures upon our Minds. The latter can have no Place in the Mind, because, as all Pleasure results from a correspondency betwixt Appetite and Object, as we have often observ'd, the Pleasures of Benevolence can never act upon a merely sensual or malicious Mind: Nor can the first afford any Cause for such a Change; because, if these Pleasures cannot act

upon the Mind, she cannot have any consciousness of them, as being entirely indisposed to attend to them; and, if she has no consciousness, there can be no Cause of Change, nor consequently any real Change.

In this view of things it is easy to conceive how the Miseries of the Wicked may have no other Period than the final Extinction of the Subject. But whether it be expedient upon the whole to take these wretched Creatures out of Being, or to continue them in it, seems to be beyond the Province of our Reason. We know not how one System is by divine Wisdom rendered subservient to the Good of another: Only this we may venture to affirm (and which is going the greatest length we can) that God, as a wise and good Being, will always do what is productive of the most extensive and unlimited Happiness; and therefore that he will prefer the Happiness of large Collections of Men to that of Individuals, especially when these have forfeited all Right to his Favour, and their Misery is entirely of their own making.

From the foregoing Propositions we learn, that it is impossible to enjoy Heaven without an heavenly Disposition; and consequently that our Heaven must be begun in this Life. Since our Appetites of Benevolence are for ever capable of rising higher and higher, and tho' they rise ever so high are sure to meet with adequate Objects in the other World, it follows, that the Pleasures of the righteous will be always encreasing.

S E C T. XIII.

Containing some General RULES of ACTION.

AXIOM I. **T**HE moment of Good arising to the Publick from any particular Action is in a compound Ratio of the degrees of Good in the Action, and the number of Enjoyers.

COROL. Hence, in equal degrees of Good from any Action, the moment is as the number of Enjoyers. And, in equal numbers of Enjoyers, the moment is as the quantity of Good in the Action.

N. B. The situation and moral importance of Men will make great alterations in the Case, and ballance Numbers. If by my good Offices B is enabled to produce four times as much Happiness as A would have been, it is evident that I do four times as much Good in choosing to assist B as A.

This shews that we are to do good to those who by their situation in the World are capable of extending our kind Offices to the advantage and improvement of others, in preference to such as are not thus circumstanced. For by this means our Acts of Benevolence are not limited to particular Objects, but diffused and propagated among numbers.

AXIOM II. The Value of things is in proportion to their usefulness; and their tendency to
L 4 satisfy

satisfy our Necessity constitutes their Usefulness ; for what we do not want, makes no part of our Happiness : And what may be necessary to A may not be so to B, or in the same degree.

COROL. Hence an Act of Charity may be a greater means of Happiness to A than to B, as the Circumstances of the latter may make it more necessary than those of the former.

COROL. 2. Hence the Folly of Poor Men making Presents, &c. to the Rich and Wealthy ; unless such Gifts be apprehended as proper means to excite the other to return them with superior Kindness : for, when the Pursuit of another's Happiness in any given degree is inconsistent with our own in a greater, such a Pursuit is manifestly wrong. And it is strictly true, that the greater Good, or what upon Examination appears to be so, ought always to be pursued.

AXIOM III. When other Circumstances are equal, a Man ought to pursue his own Happiness before another Man's, however situated and related to him. I said, when other Circumstances are equal, because when the Pursuit of a small degree of Good to ourselves is inconsistent with a much greater to another, it is the Will of the Deity that we decline our own, and pursue the other ; otherwise the moment of Good to the Whole would be diminish'd.

And thus we find ourselves obliged to postpone a smaller degree of Good, and to undergo some slight Inconveniences, for the greater Ease and Happiness of others.

AXIOM

AXIOM IV. Next to our own Happiness we are to pursue the Happiness of those who are related to us either by Nature or Compact, when no Reasons intervene to limit our Benevolence to other Objects.

This teaches us, that after we have provided for ourselves we ought to make Provision for the Happiness of our Children, and other Relations.

AXIOM V. When these Calls of Relations are answered, and their Claims satisfied, our Friends and Benefactors have a right to demand a return of kind Offices.

This shews that we should do good to those who have done good to us by such means as are within our Power.

AXIOM VI. When the degree of Relation and other Circumstances are equal, our Acts of Bounty ought to be directed to those who by their Situation are most dependent on us.

Thus we are to relieve and succour those around us in preference to such as are Foreigners, and who, as lying more out of the Circle of our Acquaintance, cannot be known to be equally Objects of our Charity.

AXIOM VII. Our Pursuit of private Happiness ought to be in proportion to its apprehended Quantity, and the probability of our attaining it.

COROL. Hence in equal Quantities of Good from any Object our Pursuit must be as the Probability of obtaining it; and in equal degrees of Probability, the Pursuit must be as the Quantity of Good. To

To know whether any Action be worth our Pursuit, the Quantity of Good in the Action must be divided by the degrees of Hazard there is in acquiring of it, and the Quotient will give the Proportion of Pursuit: when the Quotient is positive, the Action becomes the Object of Pursuit; when it is Negative, the contrary.

COROL. Hence, when the Quantity of Good in one Object is to the Quantity of Good in another in the same Ratio as the Hazard of attaining the latter is to the Hazard of attaining the former, then it is absolutely indifferent which Object we pursue.

COROL. 2. Hence it may be more rational to pursue the smallest moment either of private or publick Good than the greatest, when the Hazard of attaining the latter exceeds the Hazard of attaining the former in a greater Ratio than the moment of one exceeds that of the other.

Thus a Man ought to direct his Actions in Pursuit of such Objects as lie more immediately within his own Province, rather than to grasp after those which in all human Probability lie beyond him.

AXIOM VIII. Our Pursuit of publick Happiness ought to be in proportion to the apprehended Sum of it, and to the probability of producing it.

From the Premises we may draw the following Conclusions.

1. That our Pursuit of any Action ought, when the moment and other Circumstances are equal,
to

to be proportion'd to the number of Persons that may be benefited by it.

2. When the moments themselves and the number of Enjoyers are equal, our Pursuit ought to be proportion'd to the degrees of Relation and Attachment to the Persons.

3. When the moments, number of Enjoyers, and degrees of Relation are equal, our Pursuit ought to be in proportion to our degrees of Obligation to the Persons.

4. When all these are equal, our Pursuit ought to be in proportion to the dignity and importance of the Persons to the Publick.

COROL. Hence our Pursuit of publick Good ought to be in a compound ratio of the Moment, the relation, number, and moral importance of the Persons.

To the foregoing Truths we shall subjoin the following ones concerning *Pleasure* and *Pain*.

AXIOM I. Pleasure and Pain are relative; the Former results from the gratification, the Latter from the disappointment of our Desires.

AXIOM II. The quantity of Pleasure a Man enjoys from any particular Object is in a ratio compounded of its Intensity and Duration.

AXIOM III. The intensity of Pleasure is strictly proportion'd to the degrees of Strength with which the Appetite enjoys its Object.

COROL. Hence the stronger the Appetite, the greater the Pleasure.

Hence

Hence also we are able to assign a Reason why the same Objects are Sources of different degrees of Pleasure and Pain to different Men, viz. because their Desires and Aversions towards them are different.

COROL. 2. Since Legislators know not the difference of Men's Likings and Loathings, their Desires and Aversions, it is impossible that they should appoint Rewards and Punishments strictly proportion'd to their Virtues and Vices.

AXIOM III. The duration of Pleasure depends both on the constancy of the Object acting, and the Subject acted upon; i. e. of the Appetite, or Disposition; a Change in either of these will necessarily produce a Change in the duration of our Pleasures. It is not indeed necessary for the Object to be always present; a View or Reflection of it in the Mind may suffice either to produce or continue the Satisfaction. And indeed, had we no Pleasure but what resulted from the bare-Presence and Enjoyment of the Object, our Sum would be very small.

AXIOM IV. The moment of Good flowing from the gratification of any Appetite is as the degree of Good in the Object multiplied into the degree of Strength with which the Appetite enjoys it.

It may not be improper to remark, that tho' the Rise of the Appetite may encrease the quantity of Pleasure in the Enjoyment, yet this quantity never rises or falls *exactly* as the Appetite does; it being agreeable to Reason, and confirm'd by Fact, that there is a fix'd degree of Good in every Object,

Object, which neither the strongest Appetite nor greatest Susceptibility can possibly encrease. For nothing is more common than to hear Men complaining of things balking their Desires, and not answering in the Event one Half of what they promis'd themselves in the Expectation.

AXIOM V. Since all Pleasure as such necessarily becomes the Object of our Desires and Pursuits, so when a present smaller is not destructive of a greater future Good, the present ought to be pursued and enjoyed. And consequently we are left at full Liberty to gratify all our Appetites in a manner not inconsistent with a future greater Good.

From what has been said we may observe,
“ That the highest or greatest possible Happiness
“ consists in the most durable gratification of our
“ highest and strongest Desires with adequate
“ Objects.” *N. B.* I call these adequate Objects,
which have a degree of Good suited to the extent
of our Desires.

The Use of *Reason* in the management of our Desires and Aversions, is, first to enquire when they are to be gratified, and when not; to examine into the nature of the Object to be possess'd; the variety of Circumstances that attend the manner of it; its Consistency with a future greater Happiness, and the like; and then to regulate our Elections, and adjust our Pursuits accordingly.

The Business of Reason therefore is to be a Check upon the sensitive Part of our Nature; not to suffer our *Passions* to govern or become Principles of Action without her Direction. 'Tis true,

true, our Passions are the great Springs of Action, and without which we should not be disposed to put our Machine into Motion: But still Reason is to fix the Object, set the Bias, and shew the way by which it may be come at: as well as to restrain and regulate the Affection in its Pursuit: and by the due Discharge of this important Office it answers the End of God who gave it.

FINIS.



ERRATUM.

PAGE 141, l. 11, read kind and charitable to the Poor; courteous, humane, and affable to all. And when Men live under, &c.





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